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ABSTRACT 
U.S.-style terms of use (“TOU”) are “take it or leave it” waivers, 
masquerading in the clothing of contract and divesting consumers of 
important procedural and substantive rights.  As U.S.-based software 
publishers and platforms go global, the one-sided TOU agreements they 
employ will increasingly be under scrutiny in European Union (EU) 
countries and other nations with radically different legal traditions.  Thus, 
U.S. companies need to pay close attention to the EU’s mandatory 
consumer provisions governing their agreements, and perhaps even adopt a 
minimum floor for consumer rights as they intersect with TOUs.  The 
following argument for re-conceptualizing consumer TOUs—so that they 
afford consumers minimum adequate rights and remedies—unfolds in four 
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parts.  Part I explains how TOUs have evolved from shrinkwrap mass-
market licenses to clickwrap, browsewrap, and other methods.  Parts II and 
III demonstrate that European Union regulations offer mandatory 
procedural and substantive rights for consumers.  Part IV examines ten 
problems with TOUs and proposes that these troublesome practices be 
reformed so that companies will be able to safely export consumer 
information products. 
INTRODUCTION 
To paraphrase Woody Allen’s character, Alvy Singer in Annie Hall, 
U.S.-style terms of use (TOU) agreements fall somewhere on the 
continuum between the horrible and the miserable.1  TOU agreements, 
presented on a “take it or leave it” basis, are spreading faster than the 2011 
New York City bed bug epidemic.  Just as bed bugs hide in cracks and 
crevices of mattresses and box springs, sneakwrap documents, 
masquerading in the clothing of contracts, purport to bind consumers to 
oppressive and unfair terms.2  Social networking TOU agreements, for 
example, are the most widely used standard form contract in world history 
with potentially billions of users.  Facebook alone has more than nine 
hundred million subscribers and is available in more than seventy 
languages.3  Facebook and hundreds of other social networking sites deploy 
terms of use as the latest method of conditioning access to digital data and 
information-based platforms. 
Most, if not all, electronic standard forms used in social networking 
sites, assert the right to modify their rolling terms of service “at any time, 
for any reason, or for no reason at all.”4  The typical social media site 
 
 1. “I feel that life is divided into the horrible and the miserable.  That’s the two 
categories.  The horrible are like, I don’t know, terminal cases, you know, and blind people, 
crippled.  I don’t know how they get through life.  It’s amazing to me.  And the miserable is 
everyone else.  So you should be thankful that you’re miserable, because that’s very lucky, 
to be miserable.” ANNIE HALL (Rollins-Joffe Productions 1977) (quoting the character 
Woody Allen); see also Michael L. Rustad, SOFTWARE LICENSING: PRINCIPLES AND 
PRACTICAL STRATEGIES 292 (2010) (comparing this characterization of life by Woody 
Allen’s character to quickwrap license agreements). 
 2. The term “sneak wrap” refers to online TOU agreements.  See Ed Foster, “Sneak 
Wrap” May Be a Good Way of Defining the Maze of Online Policies, INFOWORLD, July 26, 
1999, at 73 (describing sneak wrap as “where the vendor reserves the right to change the 
terms of a deal at any time, and sneak notice of the change right past you if they possibly 
can”). 
 3. Facebook posts statistical information about the website online.  Newsroom, 
FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx?NewsAreaId=22 (last visited May 
26, 2012) (reporting “901 million monthly active users at the end of March 2012”). 
 4. Terms of Service, TAGGED, http://www.tagged.com/terms_of_service.html (last 
updated Sept. 30, 2011). 
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claims the right to revise their terms of use “at any time without notice” to 
the consumer.5  YouTube’s terms of service assert that those who merely 
use content are subject to its terms, conditions, and privacy policies and 
that it has the right to modify or revise its agreement.6 
YouTube’s drive-by manifestation of assent by mere access to its 
platform resembles the way that bed bugs encounter hotel guests by 
hitchhiking in luggage, clothing, or personal effects.  Nearly every social 
media site conditions user access to TOU agreements.  This access is often 
one-sided and deceptively presented in the form of clickwrap, browsewrap, 
or a combination of these mass-market standard form documents.7  As 
software companies go global, U.S.-style TOU agreements will face 
increased scrutiny by foreign courts and consumer protection agencies. 
This Article calls for procedural and substantive reforms of U.S.-style 
TOU agreements by arguing that contract law is a misplaced metaphor for 
information-based products.  Our argument that consumers need minimum 
adequate remedies in TOU agreements unfolds in four parts.  Part I of this 
Article develops a typology of ideal TOU agreements, as they have evolved 
from shrinkwraps to more advanced forms such as clickwraps, 
browsewraps, and various hybrids (that combine browsewrap and 
clickwrap agreements).  This part of the Article begins with an examination 
of the history of the software industry and the development of mass-market 
licenses, and examines how this legal invention enabled software 
publishers to turn their products into commodities.8 
Part II explains why there is a chasm between U.S.-style TOU 
agreements and mandatory European private international law or 
 
 5. TOS, SOCIAL NETWORK REVIEWS, http://www.social-networkreviews 
.com/content/tos (last visited May 26, 2012). 
 6. Terms of Service, YOUTUBE (June 9, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/t/terms. 
 7. Facebook calls its terms of use agreement, “Statement of Rights and 
Responsibilities.”  Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/terms.php?ref=pf (last updated Apr. 26, 2011).  Users agree to 
litigate all claims in Facebook’s home court, Santa Clara County.  In addition, they agree to 
indemnify Facebook if the social media site is sued because of postings that infringe third 
parties content or result in other lawsuits.  Id.  Additionally, the U.S.-based social network 
site AsianAve requires users at signup to agree to the site’s terms of service and privacy 
policy.  AsianAveJobs Terms of Service, ASIANAVE, http://www.asianave.com/jobs/tac.html 
(last visited May 26, 2012). 
 8.  
The term ‘mass market license’ is new and the definition must be applied in light of 
its intended and limited function.  That function is to describe small dollar value, 
routine transactions involving information that is directed to the general public when 
the transaction occurs in a retail market available to and used by the general public.  
The term includes all consumer contracts and also some transactions between 
businesses if they are in a retail market. 
UNIFORM COMPUTER INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT § 102(38) (1999) [hereinafter 
UCITA], available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucita/ucita600c.pdf. 
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procedural contracting rules.  Part III discusses the many ways that 
substantive contract terms in social networking sites and software licenses 
clash with mandatory substantive consumer rules in the Eurozone.  U.S.-
style TOU agreements, structured as “pay now, terms later” in form, are 
considered unfair and unenforceable in the EU countries.  Currently, many 
U.S. companies do not localize their standard form TOU agreements to 
comply with European law.  To date, courts in Europe have invalidated key 
provisions in U.S.-style mass-market licenses.9  Unless U.S. businesses 
localize their consumer TOU agreements, this trend will undoubtedly 
continue. 
Part IV notes ten areas in which TOU agreements need reform and 
proposes specific ways to change these agreements such that social 
networking sites may export their products for consumer transactions 
around the world.  Harmonizing TOU agreements and providing consumers 
with minimum adequate remedies will result in increased legal certainty 
and eliminate barriers for trade.  The reforms to TOU agreements will 
ultimately benefit content providers, such as social media companies, 
although such companies may be reluctant to abandon their current one-
sided contracting practices.  Europe and the United States address the issue 
of TOU agreements with polar opposite approaches.  To paraphrase Victor 
Hugo, the time has come for reforming U.S.-style TOU agreements for the 
consumer market.10 
I.  THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN ONE-SIDED TERMS OF USE 
A.  The Birth of the Software Industry 
In the new millennium, software is an enveloping attribute of daily life 
 
 9.  
In Union Fédérale des Consommateurs v. AOL France, AOL’s terms of service 
agreement was struck down.  The AOL France case is not an isolated case but reflects 
a larger trend to challenge U.S. style software contracts.  In Germany, consumers 
associations have challenged successfully the terms of Compuserve, AOL, and 
Microsoft:  the first one was subject to a default judgment; the other two agreed to a 
binding cease-and-desist declaration.  All three American companies have entered 
into settlement agreements agreeing to change their marketing practices.  The 
implications of these cases are that practices validated by the Principles of Software 
Contract expose U.S. companies to a heightened litigation risk in Europe. 
Michael L. Rustad & Vittoria Maria Onufrio, The Exportability of the Principles of 
Software: Lost in Translation?, 2 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 25, 79 (2010) (internal 
footnote omitted). 
 10. Victor Hugo’s original quote is as follows:  “Nothing else in the world . . . not all 
the armies . . . is so powerful as an idea whose time has come.”  Victor Hugo’s Quotes, 
FAMOUSPOETSANDQUOTES.COM, http://famouspoetsandpoems.com/poets/victor_hugo/quotes 
(last visited June 3, 2012).  
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for consumers around the world.  Software is also as American as apple pie 
and the Fourth of July.  America invented the lightning rod, the cotton gin, 
the sewing machine, and software.  Software is now the country’s third 
largest industry.11  As software is increasingly exported around the world, 
the United States remains the leading exporter.12  In this era of mobile 
software applications, it is difficult to fathom that the term “software” was 
not even part of popular lexicon prior to 1970.13  Back then, software was 
neither separately priced nor marketed, but was included with the hardware 
in a turnkey computer system.14  The computer industry of the 1950s and 
1960s was a sleepy backwater compared to today’s dynamic software 
industry.15  During the formative era of the computer industry, sales of 
software were incidental to a bundled transaction consisting of hardware, 
software, and documentation.16  Computer industry moguls did not license 
software, nor did they even conceptualize code as an intangible asset of 
value separate from the mainframe computer system.  In a turnkey system, 
the software accounted for only about three percent of the value of the 
computer system, as the industry was not yet marketing software as a 
 
 11. Jon M. Garon, Media & Monopoly in the Information Age: Slowing the 
Convergence at the Marketplace of Ideas, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 491, 574 (1999) 
(stating that by 1996 computer software was ranked as the “third largest segment of the U.S. 
economy, behind only the automotive industry and electronic manufacturing”) (citing 
Ronald Rosenberg, Software Fastest Growing Industry, BOSTON GLOBE, June 5, 1997, at 
D2).  The software industry has been “projected to grow five times faster than the economy 
as a whole between 1996 and 2006 . . . ..’”  One Million New Positions Seen by 2006—
Software Sets Pace for Future Job Growth, ELEC. ENG’G TIMES, Jan. 5, 1998, at 1–2. 
 12. Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious About User-Friendly Mass Market 
Licensing for Software, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 687, 687–88 (2004) (concluding that end 
user licenses (EULAs) are here to stay for the foreseeable future despite hundreds of articles 
criticizing this form of contracting). 
 13. Today, “software is defined as ‘[a] set of computer programs, procedures, and 
possibly associated documentation concerned with the operation of a data processing 
system, e.g., compilers, library routines, manuals, circuit diagrams.’”  Michael D. Scott, 
Tort Liability for Vendors of Insecure Software: Has the Time Finally Come?, 67 MD. L. 
REV. 425, 430 (2008) (quoting U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF COPYRIGHT OFFICE 
PRACTICES II, 300–34 (1984)). 
 14. ROBERT W. GOMULKIEWICZ, XUAN-THAO NGUYEN & DANIELLE CONWAY-JONES, 
LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW AND APPLICATION 303 (2008). 
 15. “Before NASDAQ and millionaire making IPO’s, the computer industry occupied a 
reclusive corner of mainstream America.  Before the 1980s, computers were large and 
expensive, thus restricting ownership to the government, universities and a few major 
corporations.”  Daniel B. Ravicher, Facilitating Collaborative Software Development: The 
Enforceability of Mass-Market Public Software Licenses, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 11, ¶. 9 
(2000). 
 16. “Software was bundled along with the sale of hardware prior to the 1970s.  The 
courts generally viewed software as incidental to the predominant purpose of selling main-
frame computers.”  Michael L. Rustad, Commercial Law Infrastructure for the Age of 
Information, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 255, 274 (1997) (discussing 
widespread method of transferring software). 
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separate product.17  Because code was not viewed as a product to be 
commoditized, software licenses had yet to be invented.18  Michael 
Madison explains how software licensing was invented as a response to the 
U.S. Department of Justice’s antitrust lawsuit against IBM: 
The technological and legal landscape began to change in the 
early 1970s.  In 1969, the Justice Department filed its antitrust 
lawsuit against the industry giant, IBM, arguing that IBM’s 
bundling of hardware and software was anticompetitive. IBM 
responded later that year by unbundling its charges for hardware, 
typically leased to customers, and software “services,” now 
offered under separate pricing.  Separate pricing for these 
“services” began as month-to-month leasing of the software, 
designed to avoid the implication that IBM was “selling” its 
code.  For administrative reasons, this evolved into paid-up 
“licensing” of the software. 
Functionally the code still was supplied with the machine, and 
initially the “licensing” business strategy was aimed primarily at 
responding to criticism of IBM’s alleged anticompetitive 
marketing practices, not at nurturing protection for computer 
software as an independent economic sector.19 
 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, IBM enjoyed a seventy percent 
market share of the mainframe computer system marketplace.20  The U.S. 
Justice Department filed an antitrust lawsuit against IBM in 1969 that was 
not finally resolved until the early 1980s.21  The takeoff point for the 
 
 17. “The lack of concern for intellectual property in software may seem surprising, but 
as late as 1970 manufacturer-supplied programs accounted for only about 3 percent of the 
cost of a computer.  There was little economic incentive to press for an appropriate IP 
regime for software protection.”  Martin Campbell-Kelly, Not All Bad: An Historical 
Perspective on Software Patents, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 191, 210  (2005). 
 18.  
Software licensing was not an issue in this era.  The programming was typically 
completed through vertical integration within the entity of the computer owner.  In 
other words, the computer programmer received compensation by her employer for 
her development of software.  In return, the employer benefited not from selling the 
code to other entities, but by using it himself.  Perhaps the largest reason why 
software licensing was not an issue in this era was that a market for copies of the same 
software did not yet exist. 
Ravicher, supra note 15, at 11. 
 19. Michael J. Madison, Reconstructing the Software License, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 275, 
311–12 (2003) (internal footnotes omitted). 
 20. Rachel Konrad, IBM and Microsoft: Antitrust Then and Now, CNET NEWS (June 7, 
2000, 2:50 PM), http://news.cnet.com/IBM-and-Microsoft-Antitrust-then-and-now/2100-
1001_3-241565.html. 
 21. Id. 
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software industry occurred in December of 1968, approximately six months 
before Neil Armstrong, Buzz Aldrin, and Michael Collins touched down on 
the Moon.22  Notably, in 2009, both Apollo 11 and the software industry 
celebrated their fortieth anniversaries.23  Unlike the anniversary of Apollo 
11, which was celebrated with network television specials, the software 
industry’s celebration received no fanfare.  IBM made the business 
decision in December of 1968 to unbundle software from hardware in its 
turnkey products.  This choice was a defensive response to the Justice 
Department’s antitrust lawsuit, rather than a brilliant insight that software 
was valuable as a commodity.24  Nevertheless, one of the unanticipated 
consequences of the unbundling decision was the rise of the software 
industry.  Within a decade of IBM’s decision to decouple code from 
hardware, revenues for the packaged software industry skyrocketed 
because new applications could be marketed and priced separately from the 
turnkey systems.25  In sum, beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
companies began marketing software for the consumer marketplace.26 
The first important application software was ADR’s Autoflow and 
Informatics’ Mark IV file management.27  The packaged or boxed software 
 
 22. RUSTAD, supra note 1, at 9. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See Madison, supra note 19, at 311 n.127 (arguing that “IBM’s unbundling decision 
was made in anticipation of the Justice Department’s” antitrust lawsuit and attributing 
licensing as a means of responding to the Justice Department suit as opposed to viewing 
software “as an independent economic sector”); see also, Michael L. Rustad, Torts as Public 
Wrongs, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 433, 543 n.679 (2011) (quoting Katharine Davis Fishman’s book, 
citing a March 1969 internal memorandum that explicitly states that IBM’s decision to 
unbundle was the result of pending litigation). 
 25. RUSTAD, supra note 1, at 9. 
IBM introduced its first electronic computer, the model 701, in 1953.  The term 
software had not yet been invented (it came into use about 1960) and the programs 
that IBM supplied for the 701 consisted of only a few hundred lines of code—a tiny 
fraction of the amount one would get with a domestic PC today. 
Martin Campbell-Kelly, supra note 17, at 193–94 (internal footnotes omitted). 
 26. One of the earliest software applications was a spreadsheet called VisiCalc 
“released to the public in 1979, running on an Apple II computer.”  Mary Bellis, The First 
Spreadsheet—VisiCalc—Dan Bricklin and Bob Frankston, ABOUT.COM, 
http://inventors.about.com/library/weekly/aa010199.htm (last visited May 26, 2012).  The 
first word processing program was released to the mass market in 1979.  Mary Bellis, 
WordStar—The First Word Processor, http://inventors.about.com/od/wstartinventions/a/ 
WordStar.htm (last visited May 26, 2012).  See generally A Rush of New Companies to 
Mass-Produce Software, BUSINESS WEEK (Sept. 1, 1980) at 54–56. 
 27.  
ADR took a very different approach to protecting its product, Autoflow.  In the 1960s, 
almost all programming shops required programmers to document programs with a 
flowchart—a graphical representation of the logical flow of the program.  
Flowcharting was often the last, and most irksome, task of a programmer before 
moving on to the fresh field of a new assignment.  Consequently, flowcharts often did 
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industry evolved in the late 1960s as a product of IBM’s unbundling 
decision and exploded into a major industry upon IBM’s release of the first 
personal computer in 1981.28  Shortly after software publishers sold 
software in boxes, software publishers employed box top or shrinkwrap 
license agreements. 
B.  The Genesis of the Mass-Market License 
Software publishers and content creators typically use licensing as the 
chief method of transferring value for mass-market software products.29  
Comparable to the creation of the corporation or the limited liability 
company, the invention of the software license agreement is equally 
significant.  “For broad distribution, individually negotiated contracts are 
not feasible, and the EULA is an efficient tool to set the terms for the 
standard, mass market transaction.”30  Licensing enables the software 
developer to prohibit assignments or transfers of their product so the initial 
purchaser may not resell or reproduce the copy.31  The legal invention of 
licensing makes it possible for a software publisher to retain title to its 
information-based product and impose significant transfer restrictions.  
This enables the software publisher to slice and dice pricing based upon a 
complex array of variables.  Software publishers have different fee 
schedules for databases depending upon whether the user is a large 
 
not get drawn, and maintenance costs increased.  Martin Goetz, co-founder of ADR, 
designed Autoflow to produce flowcharts effortlessly by reading through a user’s 
source program and from it automatically generating and printing a neatly formatted 
flowchart.  It was a tour de force of programming that even today is an impressive 
piece of coding.  The system cost about $10,000 to develop, much more to promote; it 
paid off, however, as it went on to sell several thousand copies. 
Campbell-Kelly, supra note 17, at 214 (internal footnotes omitted). 
 28. See PC Magazine Celebrates The Fifteenth Anniversary of the PC: Special Issue 
Covers Fifteen Dynamic Years of the Computing, PCs of the Future and Conversations with 
The Founders of Microsoft and Intel, PC MAGAZINE (Mar. 6, 1997) (discussing the 
evolution and future development of the PC). 
 29. “The paradigm contractual model for a transaction in intangible goods is a license 
agreement.  Under the license, the creators of the product authorize the use of their work, 
but, because of its intangible nature, restrict its use.”  Sean F. Crotty, The How and Why of 
Shrinkwrap License Validation Under the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 
33 RUTGERS L.J. 745, 746 (2002); see also Commercial Law Infrastructure For The Age of 
Information, supra note 16, at 269 (discussing the rise of a new paradigm for software and 
contrasting licensing with the sale of goods). 
 30. Robert W. Gomulkiewicz & Mary L. Williamson, A Brief Defense of Mass Market 
Software License Agreements, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 335, 342 (1996). 
 31. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010)  (holding that a 
software user is a licensee rather than an owner of a copy where the copyright owner 
specifies that the user is a licensee, and noting that this arrangement significantly restricts 
the user’s ability to transfer the software and imposes use restrictions). 
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corporation, a community library, a small business, or a noncommercial 
user.32  A company’s licensing fees reflect not only the product chosen and 
the identity of the user but the number of users for the chosen products.  
Software publishers and content creators can charge different prices for 
licenses and retain exclusive reproduction and other rights under copyright 
law.33  For enterprises, royalties are typically based upon such variables as 
the number of employees or the revenues of the licensee.  The concept of a 
license gives the licensee permission to use software, information, or other 
content subject to conditions, permissions, and restrictions.34 
Licenses have evolved as advanced contracts that come in many 
flavors depending upon whether they are for standard-form (without the 
possibility of negotiation), customized, or yet to be developed software.35  
By the 1980s, the software industry began giving customers conditional 
contract rights in the form of license agreements in contrast to the 
contracting form of sales or leases.  Microsoft’s business model was to 
contract with original equipment manufacturers of personal computers to 
preinstall their software.  The distributor, in turn, would then sell the 
personal computer subject to an end-user license agreement (EULA).36 
 
 32. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that 
licensing enables software to be sold for a higher price for commercial users, while the same 
product may be priced lower if use restrictions are enforceable and the license is restricted 
to non-commercial use). 
 33. Copyright law gives a copyright owner remedies when any of the rights under 17 
U.S.C. § 106 are violated, such as the exclusive right to distribute copyrighted material.  
Software code is copyrightable as literary works.  See Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 
878, 885 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  If a licensee of software or other content exceeds the scope 
of the license, they are liable for infringement.  See generally SoftMan Products Co. v. 
Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1082–83 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that the 
defendant’s piecemeal distribution of unbundled copies of Adobe software against terms of 
its EULA did not violate copyright law since the First Sale doctrine of 17 U.S.C. § 109 
applied). 
 34.  
A license is an agreement the terms of which entail a limited or conditional transfer of 
information or a grant of limited or restricted contractual rights or permissions to use 
information.  A contract “right” is an affirmative commitment that a licensee may 
engage in a specific use, while a contract “permission” means simply that the licensor 
will not object to the use.  Either can be the basis of a license. 
UCITA § 102(37) (amended in 2002), reprinted in 10 Hawkland UCC Series UCITA § 102. 
 35. See Raymond T. Nimmer et al., License Contracts Under Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code: A Proposal, 19 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH L.J. 281, 294 (1993) (defining a 
“software contract” as “[a]n agreement that transfers or promises to transfer one or more 
rights in specific computer software, including the right to access, the right to use or to have 
used, the right to modify, the right to copy or the right to otherwise employ the computer 
software”). 
 36. Microsoft’s practice was to enter into distribution agreements with Original 
Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) such as personal computer makers like Gateway.  OEMs 
pre-installed the Microsoft Windows system into their personal computers.  Consumers did 
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The “fundamental difference [between a license and an assignment] is 
that, while licenses and assignments both focus on rights in, or use of, 
information, in an assignment the original rights owner tends to divest itself 
of rights in the subject matter . . . .”37  In contrast, the licensor “retains more 
rights in the subject matter of the license.”38  Since the 1990s, “the 
American economy [has] exploded with new technology and a proliferation 
of software and Internet companies.”39  Tablet computers such as 
smartphones and other mobile devices “let consumers work and surf the 
web on the move.”40  In effect, the software industry’s invention of 
licensing as a way of commodifying software as a separate product was a 
monumental decision that reshaped the U.S. economy. 
Software licensing has evolved as a leading means of transferring 
value in an increasingly information-based economy.41  In the new 
information-based economy, access to software, data, and entertainment 
products challenges the sale or lease of durable goods as the economic 
base.  In the 1980s, software publishers began using licensing as a way to 
bypass copyright law’s first sale doctrine, first articulated by the Supreme 
Court in 1908.42  The first sale doctrine allows owners of copies of 
copyrighted works to resell their copies.43  In Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony 
 
not directly license their software from Microsoft but through their OEMs. Kurtis A. 
Kemper, Resale and Use of Licensed Technology, 2 COMPUTER AND INFO. L. DIGEST § 9-6 
(2d ed. 2010) (updated Nov. 2010). 
 37. RAYMOND T. NIMMER, LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND OTHER 
INFORMATION ASSETS 3 (2d ed. 2004). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Tanya Patterson, Note, Heightened Securities Liability for Lawyers Who Invest in 
Their Clients: Worth the Risk?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 639, 639 (2002). 
 40. Dell and Hewlett-Packard: Rebooting Their Systems, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 12, 
2011, at 73. 
 41.  
Worldwide enterprise software revenue is on pace to surpass $232 billion in 2010, a 
4.5 percent increase from 2009 revenue of $222.4 billion, according to the latest 
forecast from Gartner, Inc.  The enterprise software market is projected for continued 
growth in 2011 with revenue forecast to reach $246.6 billion.  Through 2014, the 
market is expected to reach $297 billion at a five-year compound annual growth rate 
(CAGR) of 6 percent. 
Press Release, Gartner, Gartner Says Worldwide Enterprise Software Revenue to Surpass 
$232 Billion in 2010 (Sept. 20, 2010). 
 42. The first sale doctrine of copyright law gives the owner of a lawfully made copy the 
power to “‘sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy’ without the copyright 
holder’s consent.”  Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 96 n.7 (3d Cir. 
1991) (quoting Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908) (holding that a 
copyright owner’s exclusive distribution right is exhausted after the owner’s first sale of a 
particular copy of the copyrighted work)). 
 43. Section 109 of the Copyright Act states in relevant part:  “the owner of a particular 
copy . . . lawfully made under this title . . . is entitled, without the authority of the copyright 
owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy . . . .”  U.S. Copyright Act, 
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Computers & Electronics,44 the court held that Microsoft’s software was 
not subject to the first sale doctrine since it licensed rather than sold its 
products.  If a licensee of a software product resells a product, it infringes 
on the copyright because this will typically exceed the scope of the license 
agreement.45  The impetus behind licensing is that the same software 
product can be licensed to multiple markets with varying restrictions and 
conditions on end-users.46  If the first sale doctrine can be bypassed, 
software publishers can calibrate pricing on such variables as commercial 
versus non-commercial use, number of computers on which the customer is 
licensed to install the software, and territorial restrictions.  With licensing, 
there is a “first license” but not a “first sale.”47 
Social networking TOU agreements grew out of the licensing 
paradigm that enabled the software industry to become America’s third 
largest industry in just a few decades.48  “Terms of use” agreements 
evolved from shrinkwrap license agreements and both contracting forms 
enable the content creator to side step the first sale doctrine of U.S. 
copyright law.49  Software licenses, unlike sales of goods, always include a 
close relationship with the underlying intellectual property rights protecting 
code.50  TOU agreements masquerade in the clothing of contracts binding 
 
17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006). 
 44. Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Elecs., 846 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 
1994). 
 45. See, e.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1104 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding 
that Vernor infringed Autodesk’s copyright when he resold software products on eBay). 
 46. MARK A. LEMLEY ET. AL., SOFTWARE AND INTERNET LAW, 254–55 (4th ed. 2011) 
(explaining that licensing enables the licensor to control price discrimination that allows 
arbitrage). 
 47. Under the first sale doctrine, once the copyright owner sells a copy of the 
copyrighted work, the owner has no continuing right to control either the use or distribution 
of a particular copy of a copyrighted work.  See id. at 254 (discussing 17 U.S.C. § 109, the 
first sale provision of the Copyright Act). 
 48. Steve Lohr, Study Ranks Software as No. 3 Industry, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1997, at 
D2 (citing study by Nathan Associates funded by the Business Software Alliance); see also 
Garon, supra note 11, at 574 (stating that by 1996 computer software was ranked as “the 
third largest segment of the U.S. economy, behind only the automotive industry and 
electronic manufacturing” and growing “five times faster than the economy as a whole 
between 1996 and 2006 . . . .”). 
 49. Bradley E. Abruzzi, Copyright, Free Expression, and the Enforceability of 
“Personal Use-Only” and Other Use-Restrictive Online Terms of Use, 26 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 85, 105 (2010) (arguing that website terms of service evolved 
from shrinkwrap licensing practices). 
 50. Steven A. Heath, Contracts, Copyright, and Confusion: Revisiting the 
Enforceability of ‘Shrinkwrap’ Licenses, 5 CHI-KENT INTELL. PROP. 12, 13 (2005) (arguing 
that software licensing was invented to avoid “governmental scrutiny over anti-competitive 
practices at large in the computing industry” as well as to side-step the first sale doctrine of  
the U.S. Copyright Act). 
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the end user to terms dictated entirely by the software publisher.51  Terms 
of Service Agreements are the latest stage in pro-seller standard form 
contracts where the issuer neither reads nor understands their terms.52 
C.  The Evolution of Terms of Use 
Internet-related TOU agreements are the latest stage in the evolution 
of the adhesionary contract where the consumer adheres to the terms of the 
stronger party, the software maker.53  The mass-market software license 
was invented shortly after IBM’s decoupling software from hardware in 
1969.54  Traditionally, software was included as part of a mainframe 
computing system.  Hardware and software were conceptualized as a single 
product in the mainframe computer era of the 1940s through the late 1960s.  
IBM’s decoupling of software as a separate product made it possible to 
price and market computer code as a commodity.55  “In the early 1980’s the 
number one method of software licensing was ‘do nothing and hope for the 
best.’”56  Some computer manufacturers employed technological solutions 
 
 51.  
Sites condition access to their content on visitors’ acceptance of these TOU, which 
generally assume an agreement between the website and user that is enforceable by 
state contract law.  TOU may be deployed to all sorts of purposes.  They may set the 
terms and conditions for online purchases; they may limit the site’s liability for 
damage that its content and services cause to users.  A site may, through its TOU, 
obtain the rights to use and reproduce content users post to a website, for example, 
comments to a blog.  And TOU may condition or restrict the subsequent uses a site 
visitor may make of content that he or she access[es] on the website. 
Bradley E. Abruzzi, supra note 49, at 86. 
 52. The limited empirical studies demonstrate beyond my examples that EULAs are 
tilted in favor of the seller.  See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, What’s in a Standard Form 
Contract? An Empirical Analysis of Software License Agreements, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 677, 703 (2007) (finding that End User License Agreements “are almost always more 
pro-seller than the default rules of the UCC”). 
 53. The one-sided nature of consumer software license agreements reflecting the 
interests of the dominant party has been part of the American law of contracts since the 
1970s.  David Slawson observed that in 1971: 
[T]he overwhelming proportion of standard forms are not democratic because they are 
not, under any reasonable test, the agreement of the consumer or business recipient to 
whom they are delivered.  Indeed, in the usual case, the consumer never even reads 
the form, or reads it only after he has become bound by its terms. 
W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking 
Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 530 (1971). 
 54. Michael J. Madison, Reconstructing the Software License, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 275, 
310 (2003). 
 55. Peter L. Briggs, IBM Unbundling Biggest Software Event of 1989, COMPUTER 
WORLD (Dec. 24, 1969). 
 56. A Brief History of Software License Management: The Early Years (1988–1992), 
REPRISE SOFTWARE,  http://www.reprisesoftware.com/blog/2007/01/a-brief-history-of-
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such as copy-protection technologies, rather than rely solely upon contract 
to prevent software from being used on more than one computer.57  As 
software became mass-marketed, it became impractical for software 
contracts to be individually drafted and negotiated.58 
The mass-market license was a useful legal invention that enabled the 
commoditization of software as a digital product where the licensor could 
impose conditions of use and other restrictions.  Michael Madison recounts 
how customers acquiesced to licensing even though it imposed restrictions 
not found in the sale of goods: 
Customer acquiescence in initial licensing practice was motivated 
at least as much by business needs as by intellectual property 
considerations.  Even today, software consumers participate in 
licensing transactions because they are effectively required to in 
order to acquire use of needed computer software.  And the 
normative benefits of the alleged licensing “custom” have never 
been more questioned as a public policy matter.59 
In the prepackaged software industry, software producers typically 
enter into end-user license agreements (“EULAs”) in which third parties 
distribute licensed software in a given market.60  While software licenses 
are a useful invention in permitting the commoditization of digital 
products, these EULAS leave consumers with no meaningful consumer 
protection or significant remedies.61 
Since the 1980s, software makers, database developers, and website 
creators invented a number of groundbreaking contracting forms that 
deviated from the customary paradigm of entering into agreements:  offer, 
acceptance, and consideration.  TOUs for the consumer market are the most 
 
software-license-management-2/ (last visited June 4, 2012). 
 57.  
In addition, on PCs, a number of copy-protection technologies were popular (I say 
popular in the sense that they were used a great deal, not that people loved using 
them.)  On engineering workstations, software was often “node-locked” so that it 
would run on only one computer, usually identified by a machine serial number (or 
“host  ID”) which was an integral part of the workstation. 
Id. 
 58. “The mass marketing of software ultimately ensured that ‘the formal signed 
software license had become incompatible with the distribution of personal computer 
software . . . .  Ease of purchase became a key component in winning the business.’” Heath, 
supra note 50, at 14 (ellipsis in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 59. Madison, supra note 19, at 316 (citation omitted). 
 60. See generally Louis Columbus, ADMINISTRATOR’S GUIDE TO E-COMMERCE: A 
HANDS-ON GUIDE TO SETTING UP SYSTEMS AND WEBSITES USING MICROSOFT BACKOFFICE 
158 (Howard W. Sams & Co., 1999) (describing how software publishers use third parties 
to contract with consumers to distribute mass-market software). 
 61. See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 12, at 691 (describing academic and judicial 
criticism of mass-market licenses). 
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recent stage in the progression of the adhesion contract, in which the 
consumer adheres to the terms of the controlling party, the software 
publisher, or maker.62  The next section develops a typology of consumer 
TOUs and their concepts and methods.  The commoditization of software, 
website content, and social network sites employ terms of service to create 
what is in effect a liability-free zone through warranty disclaimers and 
remedy limitations. 
D.  A Typology of Adhesive TOUs 
Beginning in the 1980s, the U.S. software industry invented a number 
of standard form EULAs, including shrinkwraps, clickwraps, installwraps, 
browsewraps, and TOUs most recently imported by social media 
websites.63  The idea that a consumer agrees to current terms and conditions 
for which they have no notice is a legal fiction.  The late Arthur Leff was 
the first to reconceptualize standard form documents as consumer products 
and unmasked the empirical reality that standard form documents were 
disguised in the clothing of contract, but were in fact products.  One-sided, 
asymmetrical standard forms were not truly “the product of a cooperative 
process, but the creation (essentially) of only one of the parties.”64  With 
adhesion contracts, the weaker party has no choice but to acquiesce to the 
terms of the stronger party; the transaction is “one not of haggle or 
cooperative process but rather of a fly and flypaper.”65  Professor Leff 
observed that, “[t]he minute you shift your attention from the common 
element upon which your classification is based to some other, previously 
ignored, your classification explodes.  Or at least it ought to.”66  Four 
decades ago, David Slawson went even further contending that standard-
form contracts were not really contracts at all:  “The conclusion to which 
all this leads is that practically no standard forms, at least as they are 
customarily used in consumer transactions, are contracts.”67 
By the 1970s, more than ninety percent of all contracts were take it or 
 
 62. The one-sided nature of consumer software license agreements reflecting the 
interests of the dominant party has been part of the American law of contracts since the 
1970s.  David Slawson observed in 1971 that “the overwhelming proportion of standard 
forms are not democratic because they are not, under any reasonable test, the agreement of 
the consumer or business recipient to whom they are delivered.  Indeed, in the usual case, 
the consumer never even reads the form, or reads it only after he has become bound by its 
terms.”  Slawson, supra note 53, at 530. 
 63. Mass-market software takes diverse forms such as shrinkwrap, browsewrap, 
clickwrap, and installwrap.  See RUSTAD, supra note 1, at 291–344. 
 64. Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 143 (1970). 
 65. Id. (citation omitted). 
 66. Id. at 133. 
 67. Slawson, supra note 53, at 544. 
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leave it standard form terms.68  Legal commentators are critical of TOUs 
targeting consumers that have hidden terms and questionable methods of 
contract formation: 
[T]he contract formation process is flawed; the “take it or leave 
it” nature of the process is unfair; the “pay first, terms come 
later” sequence of events is flawed and unfair; it is too easy to 
hide terms; the method of contracting improperly extends 
intellectual property protection; this use of contracts is preempted 
either by the Copyright Act or the United States Constitution.69 
In some cases, terms of use are presented in a way that makes it 
impossible for users to manifest assent, let alone understand what terms to 
which they have assented.70  The grandfather of the TOU is the shrinkwrap 
license agreement.  Standard-form licensing agreements morphed into 
terms of use such as clickwrap, browsewrap, and the terms of use widely 
used in social networking sites.  Table One presents the standard form 
TOUs that have evolved since the 1980s.71 
 
 
 
TABLE ONE:  TYPOLOGY OF QUICKWRAP TERMS OF USE 
FORM OF TERMS OF 
USE FORMS 
FORMATION 
PRINCIPLE 
CONTROVERSIAL 
ASPECTS  
SHRINKWRAP OR BOX 
TOP MASS-MARKET 
LICENSES 
The ‘shrinkwrap 
license’ derives its 
name from the 
widespread software 
industry practice of 
printing mass-market  
Shrinkwrap imposes 
restrictions that a 
consumer may discover 
only after opening and 
installing the software; 
typical shrinkwrap 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Gomulkiewicz, supra note 12, at 691 (citation omitted). 
 70. Buzznet is a photo, journal, and video-sharing social media network, owned by 
Buzz Media.  This social network site enables its members to participate in communities 
that are created around ideas, events, and interests such as celebrities.  Buzznet, for 
example, signs users up without referring to terms of service or terms of use.  BUZZNET, 
http://www.buzznet.com (last visited June 4, 2012).  CouchSurfing, another U.S. social 
media website, requires users to submit to their privacy policy, but does not refer to it in its 
basic terms of use.  COUCHSURFING, http://www.couchsurfing.org (last visited June 4, 
2012). 
 71. “When most people think about software licensing, they think about standard form 
mass market EULAs.  These come in a variety of forms with a variety of colorful names 
such as ‘shrink wrap,’ ‘boot screen,’ ‘click-wrap,’ or ‘browse wrap’ (or, less charitably, as 
‘sneak wrap’ or ‘autistic’ licenses).”  GOMULKIEWICZ, supra, note 14, at 311 (2008). 
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licenses beneath the 
shrinkwrap or 
including them in the 
box containing 
products.  Shrinkwrap 
license agreements 
predicated the 
manifestation of assent 
on whether the 
consumer broke open 
the plastic wrapping 
surrounding a box 
containing software.
72
 
disclaims all warranties 
and limits remedies 
divesting the user of a 
meaningful adequate 
remedy.   
CLICKWRAPS  OR 
INSTALLWRAPS 
Users adhere to the 
terms of clickwraps or 
clickstreams by 
clicking on an icon “I 
agree.”
73
  Clicking the  
agreement is legally 
significant in that it 
indicates the user’s 
manifestation of assent 
to be bound by terms 
of use or other 
conditions of using 
content; installwraps 
employ pop-up screens 
during installation of 
software.  User must 
click “I agree” for the 
installment to 
proceed.
74
 
The mere act of 
downloading software 
does not indicate assent 
to be bound by terms of 
license agreement, 
where a link to such 
terms is not 
conspicuously located.  
BROWSEWRAP A “browsewrap” 
agreement is an 
alleged contract that 
Courts hold that 
consumers are bound 
despite the fact that he 
 
 72. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 73. Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns. Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 593–94 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001) (“A click-wrap license presents the user with a message on his or her computer 
screen, requiring that the user manifest his or her assent to the terms of the license 
agreement by clicking on an icon.”) (citation omitted). 
 74. Christian H. Nadan, Open Source Licensing: Virus or Virtue?, 10 TEX. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 349, 362 n.53 (2007) (describing a clickwrap agreement as one “requiring the 
user to click an ‘accept’ button before the installation will conclude (sometimes called an 
‘installwrap’ license)”). 
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binds anyone who 
views a website to the 
site’s “terms of use.” 
or she neither read the 
terms of use nor in any 
way affirmatively 
indicated his or her 
assent to be bound; the 
terms are as onerous as 
in shrinkwrap and 
clickwrap. 
TERMS OF USE  Social networks and 
other websites often 
employ a hybrid that 
combines the 
browsewrap
75
 with 
some affirmative act 
such as registration.  A 
minority of social 
networking sites use a 
clickwrap
76
 in 
conditioning access to 
their services. 
Social networking sites 
maintain that Terms 
and Conditions or 
Terms of Use bind a 
user by using the site.  
Users are instructed that 
if they do not agree to 
be bound by the terms 
of use, that they stop 
using the site 
immediately.  Many 
social networking sites 
also ask users to agree 
to terms of use upon 
registration. 
 
1.  Shrinking Rights in Shrinkwrap TOUs 
The software industry developed shrinkwrap, the earliest form of 
quickwrap, in the 1970s and vendors were widely using this contracting 
 
 75. Facebook, by far the largest social network site, structures its terms of use as a 
browsewrap with the following introductory clause:  “By using or accessing Facebook, you 
agree to this Statement.”  Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/terms.php?ref=pf (last updated April 26, 2011).  Badoo, a U.K.-
based social network site popular in Europe and Latin America instructs users that their 
“[t]erms apply whenever you visit Badoo, whether or not you have chosen to register with 
us, so please read them carefully.  By accessing, using, registering for or receiving services 
offered on Badoo (the ‘Services’) you are accepting and agreeing to be bound by the 
Terms.”  Badoo’s Terms and Conditions of Use, BADOO, http://www.badoo.com/terms (last 
updated May 15, 2012) (emphasis omitted). 
 76. Friendster, a social network site popular in Southeast Asia, but not in the United 
States or Europe, employs a clickwrap agreement to bind users.  Friendster instructs users to 
follow “the instructions on the ‘Sign Up’ page and checking the box labeled ‘I agree to 
Friendster’s terms of service.’”  User Terms and Conditions, FRIENDSTER, 
http://friendster.com/user_terms_and_conditions (last visited June 4, 2012). 
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form by the early 1980s.77  In the early years of the software industry, 
publishers boxed software with shrinkwrap plastic surrounding the 
package.  The shrinkwrap license receives its name from the practice of 
vendors printing shrinkwrap licenses beneath the shrinkwrap or on the box 
containing software products.  While some shrinkwrap license agreements 
are printed on the outside of the box, many cannot be seen until the 
software is paid for and the box opened.  Still other software vendors 
display the shrinkwrap license agreement only after the software is booted 
up and the terms are displayed on the user’s screen.  The first paragraph of 
a shrinkwrap agreement states that the opening of the package indicates 
acceptance of the license terms.78  “Vendors intend that, by opening the 
plastic wrap and actually using the software, customers will bind 
themselves to the terms of the shrinkwrap license.”79  In Justice Holmes’ 
famous 1897 essay, “The Path of the Law,” he discusses the atavistic 
contracting practices of early common law: 
But in the case of a bond the primitive notion was different.  The 
contract was inseparable from the parchment.  If a stranger 
destroyed it, or tore off the seal, or altered it, the obligee could 
not recover, however free from fault, because the defendant’s 
contract, that is, the actual tangible bond which he had sealed, 
could not be produced in the form in which it bound him.80 
The moment of the making of a shrinkwrap agreement is when the 
“customer removes the plastic or cellophane wrapping” from the box.81  
Shrinkwrap licenses have three common features:  “(1) notice of a license 
agreement on product packaging (i.e., the shrinkwrap), (2) presentation of 
the full license on documents inside the package, and (3) prohibited access 
to the product without an express indication of acceptance.”82 
The software industry developed the shrinkwrap TOUs, which was the 
earliest form of quickwrap.83  Software publishers developed the 
 
 77. “Exactly who first used a shrinkwrap license provision in a software transaction is a 
fact lost in the arcane mists of computer history.  Certainly, they were a feature of the 
licensing landscape by the early 1980s.”  Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and 
Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1241 n.5 (1995); see also Heath, supra note 
50, at 15 (arguing that “[m]ass marketed software licenses . . . enjoy a pedigree stretching 
back to at least the early 1980s.”) (citation omitted). 
 78. This example is drawn from Morgan Labs., Inc. v. Micro Data Base Sys. Inc., No. 
C96–3998 TEH, 1997 WL 258886, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 1997). 
 79. Lemley, supra note 77, at 1241–42. 
 80. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 473 
(1897). 
 81. Salco Distribs. LLC v. Icode, Inc., No. 8:05-CV-642-T-27TGW, 2006 WL 449156, 
at *5 n.5 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2006) (citing ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 
(7th Cir. 1996)). 
 82. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 428 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 83. RUSTAD, supra note 1, at 295. 
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shrinkwrap mass-market document to reallocate the risk of defective 
software to the consumer or user.84  Software publishers have been 
triumphant in creating a contractually based “liability-free” zone to insulate 
themselves from paying consequential damages or other significant 
remedies in the event that defective software failed causing damages to the 
user’s computer system.  Hence, defectively designed software costs 
consumers and other users millions of dollars per year in consequential 
damages.85 
The birthday of the first shrinkwrap agreement, or its inventor, is 
mysterious.86  Still, scholars agree that shrinkwraps were in wide use by the 
1980s and the software license has evolved over the past three decades.87  
“Exactly who first used a shrinkwrap license provision in a software 
transaction is a fact lost in the arcane mists of computer history.”88  Steven 
Heath tells the story of how the shrinkwrap license agreement came to be 
widely used by the software industry: 
This came to be known as a ‘shrinkwrap’ license, by simple 
virtue of the fact that it was physically included with the 
package’s cellophane wrapping.  Three initial forms were 
common:  the ‘envelope license,’ with the license printed on the 
exterior of a sealed envelope containing the product (usually a 
CD-ROM or disk); the ‘box-top’ license; read before opening a 
sealed box containing the product; and the ‘referral license,’ 
where the user is informed of a license that should be read before 
the manufacturer’s seal is broken.  Being an innovative response 
to changing market conditions, the shrinkwrap license has since 
 
 84. Scott, supra note 13, at 427 (arguing that software publishers use mass market 
licenses to reallocate the risk of bad software to the users). 
 85.  
Software vulnerabilities cost businesses and consumers tens of billions of dollars each 
year.  Every day brings news of freshly discovered security flaws in major software 
products.  While Microsoft, due to its prominence in the operating system market, gets 
the brunt of the criticism for these flaws, there are many other companies whose 
software is also targeted for security-related complaints. 
Id. at 426–27 (citations omitted). 
 86. Lemley, supra note 77, at 1241 (noting that it is unclear who first used the first 
shrinkwrap license and its origins are hidden from history). 
 87. Id.   
As custom, therefore, software licensing has a historical pedigree that stretches to a 
maximum of thirty years.  The structure and purpose of software ‘licenses’ that 
developed at that time, which had the effect (if not the intention) of opening the 
computer industry and facilitating competition, in fairness cannot be compared to 
contemporary licensing practice, which developers rely on to limit competition. 
Madison, supra note 19, at 312 (citation omitted). 
 88. Lemley, supra note 77, at 1241 n.5. 
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been refined, as symbolized by the emergence of electronic 
‘click-wrap’ and ‘browse-wrap’ licenses.89 
In the mid-1990s, mass-market TOUs “experienced a sea change,” 
where the “majority of courts . . . have enforced shrinkwrap licenses . . . .”90  
Prior to the mid-1990s, U.S. courts categorically rejected the software 
publisher’s theory that cracking open shrinkwrap was an enforceable 
license.91 
Today, the widespread outlook of American courts is that shrinkwrap 
licenses are “enforceable unless their terms are objectionable on grounds 
applicable to contracts in general.”92  Shrinkwraps are standard forms 
masquerading in the clothing of contract, but are not truly contracts.  Mark 
Lemley argues, “[s]hrinkwraps are not contracts at all in any meaningful 
sense of the word.  Rather, they are unilateral lists of terms that courts may 
choose to abide by in some circumstances.”93  A “reverse unilateral 
contract” elevates form over substance.94  For example, in Vault Corp. v. 
Quaid Software, Ltd.,95 the Fifth Circuit struck down a shrinkwrap license 
because the federal Copyright Act preempted such a contract.  The judicial 
surge against shrinkwrap quickly turned in 1996 when the Seventh Circuit 
upheld the enforceability of a shrinkwrap license that the software 
publishers structured as “money now, terms later.”96  Judge Frank 
 
 89. Heath, supra note 50, at 15 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 
 90. Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 459–60 (2006) (surveying 
case law and concluding that prior to the mid-1990s, courts generally struck down 
shrinkwrap license agreements); see, e.g., Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 
255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988) (affirming district court decision ruling that shrinkwrap was an 
unenforceable contract of adhesion and that the Louisiana’s Software License Enforcement 
Act validating shrinkwrap was preempted by the U.S. Copyright Act); Arizona Retail Sys., 
Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 766 (D. Ariz. 1993) (refusing to enforce terms 
of a shrinkwrap license because “whether the terms of the license agreement are treated as 
proposals for additional terms under U.C.C. § 2-207, or proposals for modification under 
U.C.C. § 2-209, the terms of the license agreement are not a part of the agreement between 
the parties.”) (citation omitted). 
 91. Lemley, supra note 90, at 459. 
 92. ProCD, Inc., v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, at 1449 (7th Cir. 1996).  See generally 
Lemley, supra note 90, at 459 (describing how no court enforced a shrinkwrap in the 1990s 
but today, “more courts and commentators seem willing to accept the idea that if a business 
writes a document and calls it a contract, courts will enforce it as a contract . . . .”). 
 93. Lemley, supra note 77, at 1291. 
 94. Id. at 1241 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 95. Vault Corp., 847 F.2d at 270 (holding a Louisiana state statute validating 
shrinkwrap license terms to be preempted by the federal copyright law); Dennis S. Karjala, 
Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 511, 532 
(1997) (“Wherever  the  line  is  ultimately  drawn  in  distinguishing  between 
nonpreempted  bargained  terms  and  preempted  adhesion  terms . . . most, if not all, 
shrinkwrap license terms purporting  to  expand  federal  copyright  rights  in  widely  
distributed  works should  be  preempted.”). 
 96. ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1452; see Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 
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Easterbrook, writing for the court, reasoned that shrinkwrap was a useful 
legal invention:  “Notice on the outside, terms on the inside, and a right to 
return the software for a refund if the terms are unacceptable (a right that 
the license expressly extends), may be a means of doing business valuable 
to buyers and sellers alike.”97 
Today, the dominant view of American courts is that shrinkwrap 
licenses are broadly enforceable.”98  Shrinkwrap license agreements are 
classic examples of flypaper contracts where the stronger party divests 
consumers of “all meaningful warranties and remedies, and the 
manufacturer reallocates the risk of loss to the user community for all 
failures of performance.”99 
2.  Clickwraps and Installwraps 
Clickwrap evolved as an internet-related contract evolving out of 
shrinkwrap agreements.100  The typical clickwrap agreement will require 
the user to express agreement by clicking the “I Agree” button.  If they do 
not click and agree, they are asked to leave the site.101  The clickwrap 
 
(7th Cir. 1998) (upholding a rolling contract requiring consumers to submit to arbitration 
because they had entered into an enforceable contract only after retaining the personal 
computer beyond the thirty-day period specified in the agreement); see also Brower v. 
Gateway 2000, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 575 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (upholding Gateway’s accept 
or return contract but remanding the case on the issue of whether the Federal Arbitration Act 
procedures applied rather than the ICC rules).  But see Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. 
Supp. 2d 1332, 1341 (D. Kan. 2000) (refusing to enforce Gateway’s accept or return 
computer contract). 
 97. ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1451 (citations omitted). 
 98. Id. at 1449; see Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150 (holding a shrinkwrap agreement including a 
mandatory arbitration clause to be enforceable); Koresko v. RealNetworks, Inc., 291 F. 
Supp. 2d 1157, 1162–63 (E.D. Cal. 2003) (enforcing a shrinkwrap agreement).  See 
generally Lemley, supra note 90, at 459 (describing how no court enforced a shrinkwrap 
agreement in the 1990s but today, “more courts and commentators seem willing to accept 
the idea that if a business writes a document and calls it a contract, courts will enforce it as a 
contract . . . .”). 
 99. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of 
Cybercrime, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1553, 1562 (2005) (citation omitted). 
 100. See, e.g., Stomp, Inc. v. NeatO, LLC, 61 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1081 n.11 (C.D. Cal. 
1999) (noting that clickwrap evolved out of shrinkwrap).  See generally Abruzzi, supra note 
49, at 105 (arguing that website terms of service evolved out of shrinkwrap licensing 
practices). 
 101. Courts have validated this method of entering into a license agreement so long as 
the user has adequate notice and an opportunity to manifest assent (or disapproval) of the 
terms.  See, e.g., Forrest v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1010–11 (D.C. Cir. 
2002) (holding that clickwrap agreement was enforceable and that adequate notice was 
provided of clickwrap agreement terms where users had to click “accept” to agree to the 
terms in order to subscribe); Koresko, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 1162–63 (ruling that consumer that 
clicked  box on the screen marked, “I agree” on website manifested assent to the terms of a 
clickwrap agreement); Stomp, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d at 1081 (upholding clickwrap agreement 
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standard form displays terms electronically and the user manifests assent 
by clicking the acceptance button.  Software and other information is 
distributed with an end user “clickwrap” or “clickstream” license.102  Like 
the shrinkwrap, the clickwrap deploys the metaphor of contract in its terms 
of use or conditions by premising the manifestation of assent upon clicking 
once or twice on an “I agree” icon or radio button.  As with shrinkwrap, 
there is no manifestation of assent to specific terms, but only “blanket 
assent” to terms skewed disproportionately in favor of the licensor.103 
Clickwraps have generally been successful in reducing risk for content 
providers arising out of internet consumer transactions.104  Lemley’s 2006 
survey of mass-market licenses found that “[e]very court to consider the 
issue has found ‘clickwrap’ licenses” to be a legitimate contracting form.105  
Courts presumptively enforce EULAs so long as the consumer has an 
opportunity to review the terms and manifest assent even if there is no 
evidence that the terms were read.106 
3.  Browsewrap TOUs 
A “browsewrap” is an internet-related quickwrap where a consumer 
purportedly assents by simply browsing the website and not by clicking on 
an agreement through a hyperlink or radio button.107  A federal court 
 
where user assented to terms by clicking “accept” button). 
 102. Most TOUs require the user to manifest assent to the TOU by clicking on the “I 
agree” icon or a hyperlink before they can proceed to download the software.  See, e.g., 
Moore v. Microsoft Corp., 741 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92–93 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (upholding 
TOU). 
 103.  
Both non-negotiated written agreements and clickwraps lack indicia of bargaining.  
The user is offered contractual terms on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis and the terms are 
generally more favorable to the licensor than to the licensee.  Provided that the terms 
are not unconscionable, however, courts have tended to enforce both types of 
agreements. 
Nancy S. Kim, The Software Licensing Dilemma, 2008 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1103, 1126 (internal 
citations omitted). 
 104. “No consumer was awarded punitive damages in a products liability action for bad 
software, the transmittal of a virus, or a faulty Internet security product.”  Michael L. 
Rustad, Punitive Damages in Cyberspace: Where in the World is the Consumer?, 7 CHAP. L. 
REV. 39, 47 (2004) (concluding from an empirical study of early cyberspace-related lawsuits 
from 1992–2002 that liability for defective software or information-based products was non-
existent). 
 105. Lemley, supra note 90, at 459. 
 106. Michael L. Rustad & Diane D’Angelo, The Path of Internet Law: An Annotated 
Guide, 2011 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 12, 24 (“Courts generally will enforce EULAs so long 
as the ‘terms are clear and acceptance is unambiguous, regardless of whether [the user] 
actually reads them.’”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
 107. A number of courts have enforced browsewrap even though they do not require the 
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described browsewrap as taking divergent forms, but its predicate is that 
this contracting form does not require the user to manifest assent because 
“[a] party instead gives his assent simply by using the website.”108  In 
contrast to a clickwrap that “appears on the screen when the CD or diskette 
is inserted and does not let the consumer proceed without indicating 
acceptance . . . a browse wrap license is part of the web site and the user 
assents to the contract when the user visits the web site.”109  The term 
browsewrap applies when a consumer is not required to click a radio button 
acknowledging the terms.110  The notice that supposedly binds the 
consumer may be a web page, link, or a small disclaimer on a web page 
that gives notice that the visitor’s use of a website is conditional on his or 
her agreeing to restrictive terms or conditions.111  Ronald Mann and Travis 
Siebeneicher conducted an empirical study of the terms and conditions of 
the online contracts of 439 of the 500 largest Internet retailers.112  Most 
internet retailers used browsewrap agreements as opposed to other 
quickwraps, such as clickstream or installwraps.113  Mann and 
Siebeneicher’s empirical study found the following percentages of pro-
seller or licensor terms: 
  
# of Cases Percentage 
Disclaimer of Implied Warranties 245 49% 
Limitation of Damage Types 243 49% 
Choice of Law 201 40% 
Choice of Forum 159 32% 
 
user to click a specific box.  These courts have found terms of use agreements binding the 
user through use of the website.  Courts considering browsewrap agreements have held that 
“the validity of a browsewrap license turns on whether a website user has actual or 
constructive knowledge of a site’s terms and conditions prior to using the site.”  Sw. 
Airlines Co. v. BoardFirst, L.L.C., 2007 WL 4823761, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007); 
Molnar v. 1-800-Flowers.com, Inc., 2008 WL 4772125, at *7 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (“[C]ourts 
have held that a party’s use of a website may be sufficient to give rise to an inference of 
assent to the terms of use.”).  But see Hines, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 368 (holding that a forum-
selection clause contained in browsewrap terms of use available through a link at the bottom 
of a website was not enforceable because it was not “reasonably communicated” to 
customer).  See generally John M. Norwood, A Summary of Statutory and Case Law 
Associated With Contracting in the Electronic  Universe, 4 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 415, 
439–49 (2006) (surveying leading clickwrap TOU caselaw). 
 108. Sw. Airlines Co., 2007 WL 4823761 at *4 (citation omitted). 
 109. Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981 (E.D. of Cali. 2000) (stating 
that this was the first court to enforce a browsewrap license agreement). 
 110. Ronald J. Mann & Travis Siebeneicher, Just One Click: The Reality of Internet 
Retail Contracting, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 984, 990 (2008). 
 111. Sw. Airlines Co., 2007 WL 4823761, at *4. 
 112. Mann & Siebeneicher, supra note 110, at 989–95. 
 113. Id. at 998. 
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Limitation of Damages (Caps) 108 22% 
Arbitration 44 9% 
Class Action Waiver 33 7% 
Contractual Statute of Limitations 28 6% 
Jury Trial Waiver 6 1%114 
 
The first court to rule upon the enforceability of a browsewrap was in 
Pollstar.115  The Pollstar court acknowledged that it was reluctant to refuse 
enforcement of browsewraps given other courts’ willingness to enforce 
“pay now, terms later” in shrinkwrap agreements.116 
Courts generally will not enforce a browsewrap absent evidence that a 
user has seen a website’s terms of use to infer that they manifested assent 
to a browsewrap.117  Nevertheless, the court in Hubbert v. Dell Corp. ruled 
that the mere posting of browsewrap terms was enough to bind the 
consumer.118  Consumers purchasing Dell computers were bound by the 
terms and conditions of sales posted on Dell’s Website, even though they 
were in no way asked to respond to terms presented only after they clicked 
on a hyperlink.119  Courts are often indisposed to enforce browsewraps if 
the content creator’s terms of use are inconspicuously posted. 
In DeFontes v. Dell Computers Corp.,120 the court declined to uphold 
Dell Computers’ Terms and Conditions Agreement accompanying a 
shipment of personal computers.  Courts are distrustful of browsewraps if a 
software publisher posts terms inconspicuously or adds new terms in a 
rolling contract without notice.121  TOUs for social media sites and their 
 
 114. Id. at 999. 
 115. Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 974 (E.D. of Cal. 2000). 
 116. Id. 
The court hesitates to declare the invalidity and unenforceability of the browse wrap 
license agreement at this time.  Taking into consideration the examples provided by 
the Seventh Circuit—showing that people sometimes enter into a contract by using a 
service without first seeing the terms—the browser wrap license agreement may be 
arguably valid and enforceable. 
Id. at 981. 
 117. Id. at 981 (ruling that fact issues remained as to whether website’s browsewrap 
license was sufficiently conspicuous). 
 118. Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E.2d 113, 121–22 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
 119. Dell’s current software license agreement and terms of use disclaim all warranties 
and substitute a limited remedy for UCC Article 2 remedies.  Dell Terms of Sale, License 
Agreements & Policies, http://www.dell.com/content/topics/global.aspx/policy/en/policy?c= 
us&l=en&s=gen&~section=015 (last updated Oct. 18, 2011). 
 120. DeFontes v. Dell Computers Corp., No. C.A. PC 03-2636, 2004 WL 253560, at *6 
(R.I. Super. Ct., Jan. 29, 2004). 
 121. See, e.g., Sw. Airlines Co. v. BoardFirst, L.L.C., 2007 WL 4823761, at *5 (N.D. 
Tex. Sept. 12, 2007) (“[T]he validity of a browsewrap license turns on whether a website 
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users are analogous to the asymmetrical relationship of flies with 
flypaper.122  The archetypical twenty-first century flypaper contract is the 
terms of service agreement employed widely for mass-market licenses, 
online websites, and networking websites.123 
Nevertheless, Ronald Mann and Travis Siebeneicher question the 
conjecture that browsewraps used by internet retailers are anti-consumer 
based upon their empirical study of TOUs for 439 of the 500 largest 
internet retailers.124  They conclude that as a rule online retailers used 
browsewrap agreements as opposed to other quickwraps such as 
clickstreams or installwraps.125  Their survey concluded:  “fewer than ten 
percent of these retailers have sales processes that create enforceable 
contracts on their sites and that relatively few of the contracts include terms 
thought to be detrimental to consumers.”126 
The Reporter for the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law 
of Contracts completed an empirical study that concluded that fifty-three 
out of fifty-four internet websites eliminated all warranty protection.127  
Consumer challenges to browsewraps have largely been unsuccessful even 
when the consumer neither read the terms nor assented to them.128  A 
Florida court, for example, upheld Sprint’s browsewrap agreement with a 
pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clause in Briceño v. Sprint Spectrum.129  
The Briceño court reasoned that the customer had fair notice of changes to 
the service agreement in a bill stuffer, which stated that the terms and 
conditions of Sprint’s telephone service had changed.  The plaintiff entered 
 
user has actual or constructive knowledge of a site’s terms and conditions prior to using the 
site.”). 
 122. All social networking sites are contracts of adhesion without the possibility of 
negotiation or individuated terms.  See generally supra note 63 and accompanying text, at 
143 (describing the formation of a contract of adhesion as “one not of haggle or cooperative 
process but rather of a fly and flypaper”) (footnote omitted). 
 123.  
Standard form contracts probably account for more than ninety-nine percent of all the 
contracts now made.  Most persons have difficulty remembering the last time they 
contracted other than by standard form; except for casual oral agreements, they 
probably never have.  But if they are active, they contract by standard form several 
times a day. Parking lot and theater tickets, package receipts, department store charge 
slips, and gas station credit card purchase slips are all standard form contracts. 
Slawson, supra note 53, at 529. 
 124. Mann & Siebeneicher, supra note 110, at 989–95. 
 125. Id. at 998. 
 126. Id. at 987 (footnote omitted). 
 127. Robert A. Hillman & Ibrahim Barakat, Warranties and Disclaimers in the 
Electronic Age, 11 YALE J. L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2009). 
 128. See, e.g., Chandler v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 358 F. Supp. 2d 701, 706 (S.D. 
Ill. 2005) (ordering arbitration in a case where a pre-dispute arbitration clause was added to 
the consumer’s contract for wireless services). 
 129. 911 So. 2d 176, 180–81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
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into a contract with Sprint for telephone services in 2000.130  Three years 
later, Sprint customers received a mailed invoice for these services and a 
notice to visit the Sprint website to view new terms of use.131 
Sprint also gave customers the option of receiving these new terms via 
a cell phone message.132  Subsequently, the plaintiff brought her phone to a 
Sprint store for repair.133  Sprint employees surreptitiously obtained the 
password to her email, accessed personal pictures of her, and distributed 
them to many others.134  The consumer filed suit against Sprint for the 
invasion of privacy and the interception of electronic communications for 
its employees’ outrageous conduct.135  The Florida court dismissed the 
plaintiff’s lawsuit, holding that a mandatory arbitration clause governed the 
dispute, included in the bill stuffer.136  The appellate court affirmed, giving 
“short shrift” to the consumer’s argument that the mandatory arbitration 
clause was unconscionable.137  The court did acknowledge that it might 
have come to a different conclusion if Sprint had added a monetary penalty 
for early termination.138  Nevertheless, the court did not find Sprint’s 
addition of the mandatory arbitration clause troublesome.  Courts have 
upheld browsewrap terms where a computer robot repeatedly accessed the 
plaintiff’s database.”139  The path of browsewrap law in the second decade 
of the twenty-first century demonstrates its favorable treatment in the 
courts. 
4.  Social Media Terms of Use 
The Social Network, a 2010 Hollywood blockbuster nominated for 
 
 130. Id. at 177. 
 131. Id. at 177–78. 
 132. Id. at 180. 
 133. Id. at 177. 
 134. Id. at 178. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 179. 
 137. Id. at 181. 
 138. Id. at 180.  
The only troubling fact is the uncertainty regarding whether or not Sprint would have 
enforced its early termination penalty clause in the event that Briceno had sought 
termination upon disagreeing with a proposed amendment to the Terms and 
Conditions.  However, there is no evidence that Sprint charged any other customers a 
termination penalty for cancellation of a contract due to their refusal to accept 
amendments to its Terms and Conditions.  We note that enforcement of an early 
termination fee, coupled with more onerous terms or amendments, could render an 
amendment unconscionable and, thus, unenforceable. 
Id. 
 139. See, e.g., Cairo v. Crossmedia Servs., Inc., No. C 04-04825 JW, 2005 WL 756610, 
at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2005) (enforcing forum selection clause in terms of use). 
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eight Oscars, was the compelling story of the founding of Facebook by 
Mark Zuckerberg, then a Harvard University undergraduate, and the 
ensuing lawsuit that occurred with fellow classmates over the ownership 
and control of what would soon become the most popular social media 
network in world history.140  At age twenty-seven, Zuckerberg has an 
estimated net worth of $17.5 billion as of March 2012.141  Facebook,142 
Habbo,143 Twitter,144 YouTube,145 Flickr,146 Second Life,147 and hundreds of 
other Web 2.0 sites are enrolling hundreds of millions of new users.148  In  
February of 2012, Facebook reported 750 million users followed by Twitter 
with 250 million and LinkedIn with 110 million.149  By way of example, 
Google+ launched in June 2011 and only a month later had more than 
twenty million users.150 
Social networking sites use TOU agreements, which are presented to 
end-users on a “take it or leave it” basis without any possibility of 
negotiation.151  Nearly every social media site makes user access 
 
 140. Facebook, Inc. v. Pac. Nw. Software, Inc., 640 F.3d 1034, 1042 (9th Cir. 
2011) (affirming lower court’s enforcement of settlement agreement between founder of 
Facebook and plaintiffs charging him with misappropriation); see also THE SOCIAL 
NETWORK (Columbia Pictures 2010) (describing, with some factual embellishment, the 
origins of Facebook). 
 141. Mark Zuckerberg, FORBES WORLD’S MOST POWERFUL PEOPLE, 
http://www.forbes.com/profile/mark-zuckerberg/ (last visited June 4, 2012). 
 142. FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/ (last visited June 4, 2012). 
 143. HABBO, http://help.habbo.com/home (last visited June 4, 2012). 
 144. TWITTER, http://twitter.com/ (last visited June 4, 2012). 
 145. YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/ (last visited June 4, 2012). 
 146. FLICKR, http://www.flickr.com/ (last visited June 4, 2012). 
 147. SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com/ (last visited June 4, 2012). 
 148. Top 15 Most Popular Social Networking Sites: June 2012, EBIZ/MBA, 
http://www.ebizmba.com/articles/social-networking-websites (last visited June 4, 2012).  
Facebook alone reported 700 million users worldwide by mid-2011.  Eric Eldon, Facebook 
Sees Big Traffic Drops in US and Canada as It Nears 700 Million Users Worldwide, 
INSIDEFACEBOOK, http://www.insidefacebook.com/2011/06/12/facebook-sees-big-traffic-
drops-in-us-and-canada-as-it-nears-700-million-users-worldwide/ (last updated June 15, 
2011). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Dan Gillmor, Google+: The Tweet Smell of Success, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED (July 
28, 2011, 2:30 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jul/28/ 
google-privacy-facebook. 
 151.  
Use of the Products and Services is subject to compliance with these Terms and 
Conditions.  You shall be authorized to use the Products and Services for personal or 
commercial use.  You acknowledge and agree that Virb LLC may terminate your 
access to the Virb or to any of the Products and Services should you fail to comply 
with the Terms and Conditions or any other guidelines and rules published by Virb 
LLC. 
General Terms and Conditions of Use, VIRB, http://virb.com/terms (last updated Aug. 1, 
2010); see also Additional Terms of Service for Orkut, GOOGLE (Mar. 1, 2012), 
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conditional upon acceptance of a TOU agreement that may take the form of 
a clickwrap, browsewrap, or a combination of these mass-market standard 
form documents.152  Social networking sites receive a benefit each time a 
user registers and agrees to TOUs since advertising revenue is based upon 
their number of users.153  Social networks will sometimes assert contractual 
formation for merely using the site, whereas others require a manifestation 
of assent such as clicking an agreement to registration terms. 
Social media site TOUs purport to bind users to a contract that 
establishes terms and conditions for using content, making online 
purchases, or waiving rights to user-generated content.154  The social 
network site purports to enter into transactions with millions of users who 
enter into a contract with functionally the same terms.155  Social network 
 
http://www.orkut.com/html/en-US/additionalterms.orkut.html; Terms and Conditions of 
Use, ANOBII, http://www.anobii.com/terms_of_service (last updated Jan. 26, 2011); Terms of 
Service, HI5 (Feb. 29, 2012), http://hi5.com/terms_of_service.html.  For example: 
Adobe, Inc., a leading software development and publishing company, claimed that 
all of its software products are subject to a shrinkwrap end user license agreement 
(EULA) that prohibits copying or commercial redistribution.  Adobe makes 
educational versions of its software packages available for license to students and 
educators at a discount; Adobe’s distributors are licensed to transfer educational 
versions only to resellers who have signed Off or On Campus Educational Reseller 
Agreements (OCRAs) with Adobe. 
Kurtis A. Kemper, Resale and Use of Licensed Technology, 2 COMPUTER & INFO. L. DIGEST 
§ 7:20 (2d ed. 2010) (updated October, 2011). 
 152. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 153. One company estimated in February 2011 that worldwide advertising spending on 
social networks will grow from $2.4 billion in 2009 to $8.1 billion in 2012.  Bazaarvoice, 
Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1/A) 3 (Oct. 7, 2011) (estimating significant growth in 
advertising spending on social networks in an SEC registration statement).  Additionally, as 
one law student noted:  
[A user has] actually paid for these convenient services with the private information 
that she provided the service providers by, among other things, posting personal 
information on [sic] their “private” profile.  Search engines and social networking 
services mine the information that users “give” in exchange for services, and then sell 
it to external developers or marketers. 
Jared S. Livingston, Comment, Invasion Contracts: The Privacy Implications of Terms of 
Use Agreements in the Online Social Media Setting, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 591, 593 
(2011) (footnote omitted). 
 154. A TOU may be deployed for all sorts of purposes.  It may set the terms and 
conditions for online purchases; it may limit the site’s liability for damage that its content 
and services cause to users.  A site may, through its TOU, obtain the rights to use and 
reproduce content users post to a website, for example, comments to a blog.  In addition, 
TOUs may condition or restrict the subsequent uses a site visitor may make of content that 
he or she access on the website. 
 155. See, e.g., Match.com Terms of Use Agreement, MATCH.COM, 
http://www.match.com/registration/membagr.aspx (last updated Apr. 9, 2012); Statements of 
Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/terms.php?ref=pf (last 
updated April 26, 2011); Terms of Service, YOUTUBE (June 9, 2010), 
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websites typically employ a browsewrap form that purports to bind the 
users if they merely access the website.156  Some social networking sites 
require users to manifest assent by completing registration.157  Other social 
networking sites require users to enter into clickwrap agreements.158  Social 
media websites protect and gain rights in user-generated intellectual 
property by relying on their TOUS, confidentiality procedures, and 
contractual provisions, as well as international, national, state, and common 
law rights.  Consumers around the world are waving goodbye to rights and 
remedies for user-generated content or control over their personal 
information and content including resale of their information.159 
 
http://www.youtube.com/t/terms; Terms of Service, EHARMONY, 
http://www.eharmony.com/about/terms (last updated Apr. 24, 2012);  Terms of Use 
Agreement, ZOOSK, https://www.zoosk.com/tos.php?from=footer (last updated Aug. 11, 
2011); Yahoo! Terms of Service, YAHOO!, http://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/utos-
173.html (last updated Nov. 24, 2008). 
 156. Bebo, for example, uses the browsewrap and does not require users to manifest 
assent after an opportunity to read terms.  Bebo’s browsewrap states:  “[b]y accessing or 
using the Bebo Service, you signify that you have read the following terms and conditions 
(the ‘Terms of Service’) and accept and agree to be bound by them, whether or not you 
register with Bebo.”  BEBO, http://www.bebo.com/TermsOfUse2.jsp (last updated Apr. 19, 
2011); see also Terms of Use, CARINGBRIDGE, (Mar. 28, 2012), 
http://www.Caringbridge.org/termsofuse (“By using this Service, you are bound by these 
Terms of Use.”). 
 157. For example, the Terms of Service on the Tagged website includes the following 
language: 
By completing the registration process for the Tagged website, you represent that you 
are 13 years of age or older, and can and will be legally bound by this Agreement.  If 
you are a minor, your parent or guardian must read and accept the terms of this 
Agreement before you register. 
Terms of Service, TAGGED, http://www.tagged.com/terms_of_service.html (last updated 
Sept. 30, 2011). 
 158. LinkedIn advises those who do not agree with the User Agreement not to access the 
website or to click “join now.”  User Agreement, LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com/ 
static?key=user_agreement (last updated on June 16, 2011). 
By clicking “Join Now,” you acknowledge that you have read and understood the 
terms and conditions of this Agreement and that you agree to be bound by all of its 
provisions.  By clicking “Join Now,” you also consent to use electronic signatures and 
acknowledge your click of the “Join Now” button as one.  Please note that the 
LinkedIn User Agreement and Privacy Policy are also collectively referred to as 
LinkedIn’s “Terms of Service.” 
Id. 
 159. See Abruzzi, supra note 49, at 86: 
Sites condition access to their content on visitors’ acceptance of these TOU, which 
generally assume an agreement between the website and user that is enforceable by 
state contract law.  TOU may be deployed to all sorts of purposes.  They may set the 
terms and conditions for online purchases; they may limit the site’s liability for 
damage that its content and services cause to users.  A site may, through its TOU, 
obtain the rights to use and reproduce content users post to a website, for example, 
RUSTAD_FINAL_5669015.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/9/2012  6:58 AM 
1114 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 14:4 
 
Facebook requires all users to submit to its TOU agreement as a 
condition of using its platform.160  Social media sites do not negotiate any 
TOU terms with their users, as content is presented on a “take it or leave it” 
basis.  Users are explicitly instructed that their only remedy is to leave the 
social networking site if they disagree with the terms of service.161  This 
standard term provides that a social network site may terminate the user’s 
account at any time without cause, penalty, or explanation.162  Additionally, 
many social networking sites list prohibited activities on the platform.163 
 
comments to a blog.  And TOU may condition or restrict the subsequent uses a site 
visitor may make of content that he or she access[es] on the website. 
 160. Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/ 
terms.php?ref=pf, (last updated Apr. 26, 2011). 
 161. By way of example, Tagged makes it clear that a Member’s only recourse is to stop 
using the service:  “Should Member object to any terms and conditions of the Agreement or 
any subsequent modifications thereto or become dissatisfied with Tagged in any way, 
Member’s only recourse is to immediately:  (1) discontinue use of Tagged; (2) terminate 
Tagged registration; and (3) notify Tagged of termination.”  Terms of Service, TAGGED, 
http://www.tagged.com/terms_of_service.html (last updated Sept. 30, 2011); see also Terms 
of Service, XANGA (June 7, 2011) http://help.xanga.com/about/legal/terms-of-use/ (“If you 
do not agree to any modification, you should stop using Xanga immediately.  You should 
return to this page on a regular basis to view any modification to the Terms of Use.”).  Also, 
Last.fm’s TOU advises users that disagree with terms to leave the site with the following:  
“IF YOU DO NOT AGREE TO BE BOUND BY ALL OF THESE TERMS OF USE, DO 
NOT USE THE PROPERTIES.”  Terms of Use, LAST.FM, http://www.last.fm/legal/terms 
(last updated Dec. 15, 2011). 
 162. Bebo reserves the right to terminate an account for any reason.  Bebo’s termination 
clause provides: 
Bebo may also, in its sole discretion and at any time, discontinue temporarily or 
permanently providing the Bebo Service, or any part thereof, with or without notice.  
You agree that any termination of access to the Bebo Service under any provision of 
the Terms of Service may be effected without notice, and acknowledge and agree that 
Bebo may immediately deactivate or delete your account and all related information 
and files in your account and/or bar any further access to such files or the Bebo 
Service.  Where possible, Bebo will use reasonable efforts to give Members fair 
notice of termination or suspension of their access to the Bebo Service.  Further you 
agree that Bebo shall not be liable to you or any third party for any termination or 
suspension of access to the Bebo Service or modification of the Bebo Service. 
Terms of Use,  BEBO, http://www.bebo.com/TermsOfUse2.jsp (last updated Apr. 19, 2011).  
Facebook’s termination provisions are based upon violation of the terms of use:  
If you violate the letter or spirit of this Statement, or otherwise create risk or possible 
legal exposure for us, we can stop providing all or part of Facebook to you.  We will 
notify you by email or at the next time you attempt to access your account.  You may 
also delete your account or disable your application at any time.  In all such cases, this 
Statement shall terminate, but the following provisions will still apply . . . . 
Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, ¶ 14 Termination, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/terms.php?ref=pf (last updated Apr. 26, 2011). 
 163. Tagged prohibits twenty-two activities.  Members, for example, may “not engage in 
any activity that constitutes harassment, including, but not limited to, excessive repetition 
when listing a person as a referral, repeated unwanted contact, interfering with a Member’s 
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To paraphrase Judge Frank Easterbrook, TOUs for social networking 
sites are mutating “faster than the virus in The Andromeda Strain.”164  In 
contrast to the older TOU methods such as shrinkwrap, clickwrap, and 
browsewrap, there is little by way of case law discussing the enforceability 
of social media terms of use.165  Social networking sites often require users 
to give the website a perpetual license166 to distribute user-generated 
content.167  Social networking TOUS will typically specify the conditions in 
which the user-generated content may be used and the end-user registrant 
must accept such conditions prior to access to the site’s user-generated 
content.168 
TOUs typically require consumers to hold social networking sites 
harmless and indemnify them, as well as paying their reasonable legal fees 
if a lawsuit is brought against the social media site because of illegal or 
objectionable content.169  Foreign users of Facebook “consent to having 
 
use of site or stalking.”  Terms of Service, TAGGED, 
http://www.tagged.com/terms_of_service.html (last updated Sept. 30, 2011) (prohibiting 
Members from “list[ing] the email addresses of people unknown to them”). 
 164. Frank H. Easterbook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
207 (describing rapid evolution of the World Wide Web). 
 165. The secondary literature on social networking sites tends to focus on problems such 
as the privacy of users rather than the enforceability of the TOU.  See, e.g., Livingston, 
supra note 153, at 591 (explaining the absence of policy terms that can protect social media 
users’ information). 
 166. At least one court has invalidated perpetual licenses based upon the same public 
policy found in the rule against perpetuities.  See McAllister Software Sys., Inc. v. Henry 
Schein, Inc., No. 1:06CV00093 RWS, 2008 WL 922328, at *4–5 (E.D. Mo. 2008). 
 167. Orkut’s Additional Terms of Use requires users to give the social network a license 
to distribute content.  Orkut requires users to agree to grant licenses to Google “to use your 
content or Items (collectively ‘Content’) to provide the services [which] terminate within a 
commercially reasonable time after you remove the Content from Orkut or delete your 
Orkut account.”  Additional Terms of Service for Orkut, GOOGLE (Mar. 1, 2012) 
http://www.orkut.com/html/en-US/additionalterms.orkut.html. 
 168. Common terms address user submissions, prohibited content (pornography, IP 
rights, rights of publicity, commercial content or endorsements, promotions, sweepstakes, 
software viruses, and other malicious or illegal content), community norms, responsibility 
for submissions posted on the service, ownership of the site, refusal to post or removal of 
postings, termination of accounts, ownership of content choice of law, choice of forum, 
privacy policies, warranty disclaimers, limitations of liability, intellectual property 
infringement, notice and takedown provisions, licenses to use submissions, third party 
websites and services (no endorsements), provisions for modifying the agreement, 
integration or merger clauses and provisions for the termination and modification of the 
agreement.  See, e.g., Terms of Use, CARINGBRIDGE (Mar. 28, 2012), 
http://www.Caringbridge.org/termsofuse (specifying the conditions in which user-generated 
content may be used). 
 169. For example, the User Agreement on LinkedIn includes the following language:  
You indemnify us and hold us harmless for all damages, losses and costs (including, 
but not limited to, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs) related to all third party 
claims, charges, and investigations, caused by (1) your failure to comply with this 
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[their] personal data transferred to and processed in the United States.”170  
One blog described Facebook’s revisions to their TOU agreement:  “We 
Can Do Anything We Want With Your Content.  Forever.”171 
The vast majority of social networking sites employ a browsewrap-
type agreement that conditions access to their services on agreement to the 
site’s terms of use often supplemented by a registration requirement.172  The 
latest stage in evolution of the consumer TOU is the social media TOU, 
which is a hybrid between the browsewrap and the clickwrap.  The typical 
social networking sites state that users are bound by using the site, but most 
also require users to agree to the terms during the registration process.173 
II.  THE PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF TERMS OF 
USE 
A.  Mass-Market Terms of Use for a Global Economy 
The law of consumer TOUs operates in an increasingly flattened 
global economy.  The ubiquity of one-sided TOUs for the U.S. consumer 
market is undisputed; however, these agreements are not enforceable in 
Europe.  Software and other content are being exported around the world.  
Microsoft Corporation now owns “a ninety-two percent share of the 
world’s operating system market.”174  Facebook,175 Habbo,176 Twitter,177 
 
Agreement, including, without limitation, your submission of content that violates 
third party rights or applicable laws, (2) any content you submit to the Services, and 
(3) any activity in which you engage on or through LinkedIn. 
User Agreement, LINKEDIN,  http://www.linkedin.com/static?key= user_agreement (last 
updated June 16, 2011) 
 170. Id. 
 171. Daniel Nemet-Nejat, Hey, That’s My Persona!: Exploring the Right of Publicity for 
Blogs and Online Social Networks, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 113, 129 (2009). 
 172. Some sites are a hybrid between a browsewrap and a clickwrap because they 
predicate the manifestation of assent upon either browsing a site or clicking agreement to 
the terms in a registration process.  See, e.g., User Agreement, LINKEDIN, 
http://www.linkedin.com/static?key=user_agreement (last updated June 16, 2011) 
(providing an example of a hybrid user agreement). 
 173. Terms of Use, DONTSTAYIN, http://www.dontstayin.com/pages/legaltermsuser/ (last 
updated June 14, 2011). 
These Terms & Conditions (‘the Terms’) apply to all users of the DontStayIn website 
(‘the Site’) and by using the Site, you agree to be bound by them.  If you do not agree 
to be bound by these Terms, please stop using the Site immediately.  You are also 
asked to expressly agree to these Terms at various parts of the website including, for 
example, on registration. 
Id. 
 174. Peter Thomas Luce, Hiding Behind Borders in a Borderless World: Extraterritorial 
Doctrine and the Inadequacy of U.S. Patent Protection in a Networked Economy, 10 TUL. J. 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 259, 260 (2007) (footnote omitted). 
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YouTube,178 Flickr,179 Second Life,180 and numerous other social media 
websites count hundreds of millions of users worldwide.  To understand the 
scope of such sites, consider the global nature of the internet as a 
communication medium.  Recall the classic television advertisement where 
a mechanic with a huge mallet and a two by four were trying to fit the 
wrong size battery into a car.181  European courts and consumer agencies 
are not comfortable with trying to accommodate U.S.-style terms of service 
agreements because many terms clash with mandatory consumer protection 
rules.  European courts and consumer agencies will not be comfortable 
with the “make it fit” mentality either.  Facebook, as a point of reference, 
reported 901 million subscribers around the world by March 2012.182  
Facebook has a substantial impact on the Eurozone: 
• Facebook adds an estimated €15.3 billion value to the 
European economy 
• Facebook helps to support 232,000 jobs across Europe 
• Increased businesses participation through advertising, 
customer referrals and enhanced brand value is worth 
around €7.3bn 
• The Facebook App Economy is worth €1.9bn and 
supports around 29,000 jobs.183 
The seamy side of Facebook’s success in Europe is that its privacy 
policies are increasingly scrutinized by European authorities.  The 
Consumer Council of Norway concluded that social networking sites such 
as Facebook deprive users of rights under the Data Protection Directive, 
which is law in the twenty-seven countries of the European Union.184 
 
 175. FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/ (last visited June 4, 2012). 
 176. HABBO, http://help.habbo.com/home (last visited June 4, 2012). 
 177. TWITTER, http://twitter.com/ (last visited June 4, 2012). 
 178. YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/ (last visited June 4, 2012). 
 179. FLICKR, http://www.flickr.com/ (last visited June 4 2012). 
 180. SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com/ (last visited June 4, 2012). 
 181. The classic television advertisement was used to describe the attempt of U.S. courts 
to make a UCC article fit the commercial realities of software licensing:  
The courts’ strained efforts of applying the law of sales to the licensing of intangibles 
is like the television commercial in which two mechanics are trying to fit an oversized 
automobile battery into a car too small to accommodate it.  The car owner looks on 
with horror as the mechanics hit the battery with mallets, trying to drive it into place.  
The owner objects and the mechanics say, “we’ll make it fit!”  The owner says, “I’m 
not comfortable with make it fit.” 
Commercial Law Infrastructure for the Age of Information, supra note 16, at 270. 
 182. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 183. Measuring Facebook’s Economic Impact in Europe, FACEBOOK (Jan. 24, 2012), 
http://newsroom.fb.com/Whats-New-Home-Page/Measuring-Facebook-s-economic-impact-
in-Europe-ae.aspx. 
 184. Øyvind Herseth Kaldestad, Facebook and Zynga Reported to the Data Inspectorate, 
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In the roughly forty years since IBM’s unbundling decision, the 
software industry has evolved into America’s third largest industry, 
accounting for an ever-increasing share of the export market.185  In the 
period between 1994 and 1996, revenues for Microsoft increased from 
$1.36 billion to $2.02 billion.186  The U.S. share of “the packaged software 
market was $136.6 billion or 45.9% of the world market” in 2008.187  The 
worldwide PC software market was $88 billion for that same year, a figure 
that includes “business and consumer applications (e.g., Intuit Quicken, 
Rosetta Stone, Corel WordPerfect or Quark QuarkXPress).”188  Global sales 
of personal computers are predicted to grow 10.5% this year to 388 million 
units.189  Social networks, too, cross national borders.  For example, Italy 
ranks first in “social network time per person just under six and a half 
hours per month (6:27:53), and Australia is a close second (6:02:34),” with 
the United States ranked third in social networking usage.190 
As a specific case study, SPSS, Inc. reported that its cross-border 
licensing activities were skyrocketing as revenues from these activities 
comprised fifty-nine percent of its total revenues.191  This software 
company acknowledged that “the burdens of complying with a wide variety 
of foreign laws and regulatory requirements” might affect its future 
revenues.192  The U.S. accounts for nearly two out of every three personal 
computer units worldwide and approximately sixty percent of global 
spending on IT goes to U.S. companies.193  Fifty percent of revenues for 
publicly traded software companies now are derived from the overseas 
 
FORBRUKERRÅDET, http://forbrukerportalen.no/Artikler/2010/Facebook_and_Zynga_ 
reported_to_the_Data_Inspectorate (last updated Jan. 7, 2011, 1:31 PM) (arguing that 
Facebook and an online gaming company result in users renouncing privacy rights 
guaranteed by the Data Protection Directive). 
 185. Garon, supra note 11, at 574 (stating by 1996 computer software was ranked as the 
“third largest segment of the U.S. economy, behind only the automotive industry and 
electronic manufacturing” and “projected to grow five times faster than the economy as a 
whole”) (quoting One Million New Positions Seen by 2006—Software Sets Pace for Future 
Job Growth, supra note 11, at 1–2)). 
 186. Microsoft Corporation, Annual Report 1996: Management’s Discussion and 
Analysis, available at http://www.microsoft.com/investor/reports/ar96/financials/md.htm 
(last visited June 4, 2012). 
 187. BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, SOFTWARE INDUSTRY: FACTS AND FIGURES 2 (citing 
IDC study). 
 188. Id. (quoting IDC study). 
 189. Dell and Hewlett-Packard: Rebooting Their Systems, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 10, 
2011, at 73. 
 190. Jennifer Van Grove, Social Network Usage Surges Globally, MASHABLE (Mar. 19, 
2010), http://mashable.com/2010/03/19/global-social-media-usage/. 
 191. SPSS, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 18, 2009). 
 192. Id. 
 193. BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, supra note 187. 
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market.194  U.S. companies exporting software and digital data will need to 
comply with procedural and substantive consumer protection in the target 
countries. 
B.  The General Theory of European Private International Law 
Private international law, as opposed to public international law, 
“determines the applicability of the legal systems and the jurisdiction . . . of 
different States in private legal relations.”195  The classic definition of 
private international law was that it set the ground rules for whether local 
courts should recognize foreign judgments.  “Rules of private international 
law may conveniently be referred to as conflict rules” governing three 
procedural problems:  cross-border jurisdiction, choice of law between 
foreign states, and the enforcement of foreign judgments.196  In a global 
economy, software companies need to know whether a judgment rendered 
in one country will be enforced in another country.  Europe has enacted 
regional rules governing cross-border jurisdictional questions in the EU’s 
principal legislation on jurisdiction.197  In the United States, personal 
jurisdiction can be either general or specific depending upon the nature of 
the contacts that the defendant has with the forum state.198  In Europe, 
“private international law” is the body of law that resolves jurisdiction, 
choice of law, and conflict of law issues.199  Social networking sites also 
frequently violate the Rome I Regulation choice of law provisions, which 
 
 194. Id. 
 195. LUDWIG VON BAR, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 
(2d ed. 1892). 
 196. PETER STONE, EU PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2d ed. 2010). 
 197.  
[T]he European Union has multiple instruments governing certain aspects of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, including the Brussels Convention, the Lugano 
Convention, and the Brussels Regulation.  It has also adopted directives in a number 
of areas, such as insolvency, growing out of its treaties.  It is not clear, however, that 
these regional rules influence the principles applicable under international law more 
generally. 
INT’L BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 17 
(2009) (comparing legislative jurisdiction, or the power of legislatures to make laws 
governing particular peoples and circumstances, to adjudicatory jurisdiction). 
 198. Conti v. Pneumatic Prods. Corp., 977 F.2d 978, 981 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting that a 
distinction between general and specific jurisdiction exists for the purpose of the due 
process analysis).  General jurisdiction is proper only where “a defendant’s contacts with the 
forum state are of such a ‘continuous and systematic nature’ that the state may exercise 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant even if the action is unrelated to the defendant’s 
contacts with the state.”  Third Nat’l Bank v. WEDGE Group, Inc., 882 F.2d 1087, 1089 
(6th Cir. 1989) (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952)). 
 199. STONE, supra note 196, at 3. 
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have an extraterritorial application.200 
Europe’s creation of harmonized private international law (PIL) is 
rooted in its unique formation of the twenty-seven members of the EU.201  
The principal EU legislations addressing PIL are the Brussels Regulation, 
which governs jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgment, and the Rome 
Regulation, which displaces the 1980 Rome Convention on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations.202  Europe’s harmonized private 
international law applies as the EU continues to enact new legislation.203  
Europe’s interest in harmonized PIL was prefigured by the Treaty of the 
European Community, which sought to create economic cooperation by 
eliminating obstructions to trade caused by divergence in the law.204  
“European governance” refers to the methods by which powers are 
exercised at the EU level embodying principles of “openness, participation, 
accountability, effectiveness and coherence.”205  The EU formed new legal 
institutions to carry out its objective of transcending national borders.206  
The twenty-seven Member States are represented as the Council of 
European Union, which drafts the legislation of Europe for its 495 million 
citizens.  The EU seeks to develop equal enforcement of consumer 
 
 200. Choice of law principles are employed by courts to determine which law applies 
when parties do not use a choice of law clause. 
 201. STONE, supra note 196, at vi (noting that the Eurozone’s PIL has expanded with the 
approval of a revised Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and judgment for the EFTA 
countries such as Norway). 
 202. Id. 
 203. The European Union is a Member State of the Hague Convention on Private 
International Law.  Id. 
 204.  
Signed in 1957 by the heads of government of France, Belgium, Luxembourg, West 
Germany, the Netherlands and Italy, the treaty was the result of eleven years of 
attempts to reconstruct the European continent after World War II.  The European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) laid the ground for the EEC by opening the 
markets for those products between several countries in continental Europe.  The 
Treaty of Rome adopted many of the institutional structures of the ECSC but set out 
to have far greater reach.  It tried to combine federalist and intergovernmental ideas.  
The idea of a United States of Europe had been posed by Sir Winston Churchill in 
1946 and was driven forward by Jean Monnet during the 1950s. 
EU Facts: Treaty of Rome, CIVITAS, http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSTREAT/TR1.htm 
(last updated July 27, 2011). 
 205. Eur. Comm’n, European Governance: A White Paper, July 25, 2001, at 8 n.1, 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_0428en01.pdf. 
 206.  
The EU’s robust competition policy dates from the Treaty of Rome.  It is the vital 
corollary to the rules on free trade within the European single market.  This policy is 
implemented by the European Commission which, together with the Court of Justice, 
is responsible for ensuring that it is respected. 
The EU at a Glance: The Single Market, EUROPA,  http://europa.eu/abc/12lessons 
/lesson_6/index_en.htm (last visited June 5, 2012). 
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protection throughout the EU for its “495 million inhabitants—the world’s 
third largest population after China and India.”207 
In 1993, the European Single Market was completed, embodying “the 
‘four freedoms’—the free movement of people, goods, services and 
capital.”208  The 1990s was the decade of two EU-wide treaties, “the 
‘Maastricht’ Treaty on European Union in 1993 and the Treaty of 
Amsterdam in 1999.”209  The EU has enacted mandatory substantive 
contract rules that set a “body of law support[ing] contract formation by 
setting clear standards for the drafters, while at the same time better 
protecting consumer interests.”210  The European Commission is charged 
with developing a single legal framework to advance free competition and 
trade to advance a single market.  The European Commission’s task is 
herculean because it must develop common principles for a culturally 
diverse block of twenty-seven EU Member States that follow radically 
different civil and common law traditions.211  The Commission has powers 
of initiative, implementation, management, and control, allowing the 
formation of harmonized regulations.212  The twenty-seven countries of the 
 
 207. Eur. Comm’n, General Policy Framework, EUROPA, 
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/top_layer/index_1_en.htm (last updated Mar. 23, 2012). 
 208. Id.  Moreover, “[t]he 1957 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community 
made it possible to abolish customs barriers within the Community and establish a common 
customs tariff to be applied to goods from non-EEC countries.  This objective was achieved 
on 1 July 1968.”  The EU at a Glance: The Single Market, supra note 206.  However, 
customs duties are only one aspect of protectionist barriers to cross-border trade.  In the 
1970s, other trade barriers hampered the complete achievement of the common market.  
Technical norms, health and safety standards, national regulations on the right to practice 
certain professions and exchange controls all restricted the free movement of people, goods 
and capital. 
 209. The History of the European Union, EUROPA, 
http://europa.eu/abc/history/index_en.htm (last visited June 5, 2012). 
 210. Robert L. Oakley, Fairness in Electronic Contracting: Minimum Standards for 
Non-Negotiated Contracts, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1041, 1065 (2005). 
 211. Germany has the largest population with 82.1 million and Malta only 0.4 million.  
See Ruth Sefton-Green, Multiculturalism, Europhilia, and Harmonization: Harmony or 
Disharmony, UTRECHT L. REV., http://www.utrechtlawreview.org/index.php/ulr/article/view 
File/140/136. 
 212.  
The European Commission is charged with developing a legal framework to advance 
free competition in the Single Market.  The Commission has powers of initiative, 
implementation, management, and control, which allows it to formulate harmonized 
regulations.  In the past decade, the Commission has approved Internet regulations 
such as the E-Commerce Directive, E-Signatures Directive, Distance Selling 
Directive, Data Protection Directive, Database Protection Directive, and the Copyright 
Directive.  The European Union recognizes that e-commerce cannot flourish without 
revamping the legal infrastructure. 
Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Harmonizing Cybertort Law for Europe and 
America, 5 J. HIGH TECH. L. 13, 24–25 (2005).  
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EU have enacted a thick regime of consumer protection to overcome the 
barriers of integration of the European market and to promote fair and 
equal competition.213  In the United States, courts vary in their consumer 
protection by jurisdiction.  By contrast, in the Eurozone, there is a growing 
acceptance of transnational regulatory agencies regulating and developing 
the market.214  The purpose of the EU was to create a seamless body of 
consumer protection, providing certainty for consumers and predictability 
for the business community.  European consumers view free market 
solutions with suspicion if there is no guaranteed minimal protection under 
national law.  The European Commission viewed consumer skepticism as 
one of the greatest barriers to the integration of the European market.  The 
EU’s approach is to assure consumers by providing them with the same 
protection in each of the twenty-seven Member States.  This unified 
approach has enabled Europe to take the lead in formulating harmonized 
rules for cross-border protection of consumers in contracts and commercial 
transactions.215 
Europe’s unique ceding of sovereignty to achieve uniform rules in 
private international law is a model for global consumer protection.216  At a 
minimum, U.S. software companies and social networking websites that 
target their services outside of the United States must comply with the 
mandatory consumer rules of the Eurozone.  If a browsewrap or clickwrap 
is directed to consumers in Europe, the agreement must be localized to 
comply with European Union directives on unfair contract terms, 
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments, choice of law, and other 
mandatory rules.217 
 
 213. Jane K. Winn & Brian H. Bix, Diverging Perspectives on Electronic Contracting in 
the U.S. and EU, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175, 184 (2006). 
 214. Jane K. Winn, Contracting Spyware by Contract, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345, 
1361 (2005). 
 215. Europeans have long sought to harmonize private international law.  “Similar 
efforts by the Dutch jurist Tobias Michael Carel Asser proved successful in 1893 with the 
founding of the Hague Conference on Private International Law.  In 1904 Japan became the 
first non-European state to participate in the Hague Conference.”  Hague Conference on 
Private International Law, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, (available by subscription 
at http://www.britannica.com). 
 216.  
Half a century of European integration has shown that the EU as a whole is greater 
than the sum of its parts:  it has much more economic, social, technological, 
commercial and political clout than if its member states had to act individually.  There 
is added value in acting together and speaking with a single voice as the European 
Union. 
Why the European Union?, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/abc/12lessons/lesson_1/ index_en.htm 
(last visited June 7, 2012). 
 217. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 212, at 47–49 (comparing U.S. and European 
contract, tort, and regulations governing software and Internet-related technologies). 
RUSTAD_FINAL_5669015.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/9/2012  6:58 AM 
2012] RECONCEPTUALIZING CONSUMER TERMS OF USE 1123 
 
1.  Brussels Regulation Home Court Advantage for Consumers 
The Brussels Regulation addresses the question of which court is 
competent to determine a case where a licensor is domiciled in one 
Member State and the licensee is domiciled in another.  The Brussels 
Regulation has nearly identical provisions to the Convention and applies to 
all EU Member States unless they exercise an opt-out right.218  The parties’ 
forum selection clause is an agreement where the parties to a contract agree 
in advance to an exclusive forum to settle any dispute arising out of a terms 
of service (TOS).219  The EU’s Brussels Regulation on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters replaced the 1968 Brussels Convention.220  The Brussels 
Regulation, effective since March 2002, applies to all twenty-seven EU 
Member States.221  The Brussels Regulation sets forth the general rule that 
“persons domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be 
sued in the courts of that Member State.”222  Article 15 of the Brussels 
Regulation provides that if a business pursues commercial or professional 
activities in the Member State, the consumer may file suit in the court 
where he or she is domiciled.223  Article 15(1)(c) extends the consumer 
home forum rule to entities that direct activities to Member States.224  The 
far-reaching consumers provisions apply equally to software vendors 
 
 218.  
The Brussels Regulation applies to every EU Member State except Denmark, which 
continues to follow the rules of the Brussels Convention.  Additionally, Switzerland, 
Iceland, and Norway continue to apply the 1988 Lugano Convention.  Similar to the 
Brussels and Lugano Conventions, the Brussels Regulation extends the bright line 
rules for jurisdiction and judgment to the new accession states, which have joined the 
European Union since the earlier Conventions. 
Michael L. Rustad, Circles of E-Commerce Trust: Old America v. New Europe, 16 MICH. 
ST. J. INT’L L. 183, 188 (2007). 
 219. Eslworldwide.com, Inc. v. Interland Inc., No. 06 CV 2503(LBS), 2006 WL 
1716881, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2006) (upholding forum selection clause in mandatory 
clickthrough agreement); Salco Distributors, L.L.C. v. iCode, Inc., No. 8:05 CV 642 T 
27TGW, 2006 WL 449156, at *2–3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2006) (finding that the EULA was 
referenced in the purchase order and that by failing to return the software within seven days, 
and after having the opportunity to review and accept the EULA three separate times during 
installation and registration of the software, plaintiff was bound by its terms, including the 
forum selection clause). 
 220. Regulations are automatically applicable to all EU member states.  Conventions are 
the equivalent of treaties.  When a new member state joins the European Union, regulations 
apply automatically, unlike the case with Conventions.  Council Regulation (EC) No. 
44/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 12) (EC) [hereinafter Brussels Regulation]. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at art. 2(1). 
 223. Id. at art. 15(1)(c). 
 224. Id. 
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targeting European consumers.  In business-to-business contracts, the rules 
are similar to the U.S. rules in that the parties may choose to submit to 
jurisdiction in advance.  Article 2 determines jurisdiction for both natural 
and legal persons based upon domicile.225 
Social networking sites, and other websites, that direct their content 
and services to consumers in Member States are likely to be subject to the 
Brussels Regulation.  The Schlosser Report, which is one of the two 
official reports on Brussels’ Convention,226 explains that the jurisdiction of 
the consumer’s residence rule applies “[I]f the trader has taken steps to 
market his goods and services there. . . . such as advertising in the press, on 
the radio or television, in the cinema, or by mailing catalogues, or he must 
have made a business proposal individually through an intermediary or 
representative . . . .” 227  While the Schlosser Report does not address 
software downloads per se, the new Regulation applies to the contract 
completed on an interactive website, as confirmed explicitly by the 
European Commission.228 
 
2.  How Social Networking Sites Violate the Brussels Regulation 
TOUs for social media services that compel consumers to litigate in 
distant forums are largely unenforceable because they violate mandatory 
European consumer regulations and directives.  The EU has a home court 
rule that prevents European consumers from litigating in distant forums.229  
Moreover, the European Union does not permit consumers to waive their 
rights by acceding to one-sided choice of law clauses in TOUs.230  
 
 225. Id. at art. 2. 
 226. PETER SCHLOSSER, REPORT ON THE CONVENTION ON THE ASSOCIATION OF THE 
KINGDOM OF DENMARK, IRELAND AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND 
NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS AND TO THE PROTOCOL ON ITS 
INTERPRETATION BY THE COURT OF JUSTICE, 1979 O.J. (C 59/71) (Mar. 5, 1979). 
 227. Jane Kaufman Winn & Michael Rhoades Pullen, Despatches from the Front: 
Recent Skirmishes along the Frontiers of Electronic Contracting Law, in Annual 
Cyberspace Law Survey, 55 The Bus. Law. 455 (1999). 
 228. Moritz Keller, Lessons for the Hague: Internet Jurisdiction in Contract and Tort 
Cases in the European Community and the United States, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & 
INFO. L. 1, 58 (2004). 
 229. The Brussels Regulation, for example, gives consumers the right to sue suppliers in 
their home court.  It provides that if a business “pursues commercial or professional 
activities in the Member State” then the consumer may sue in the court where he or she is 
domiciled.  Rustad, supra note 104, at 90 (2004).  See generally Brussels Regulation, supra 
note 220, at arts. 15–17. 
 230. Just by way of example, the Rome I Regulation imposes mandatory consumer rules 
on all contracting parties.  Council Regulation 593/2008, of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 17 June 2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 2008 O.J. (L 
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European-based social networking sites require all users, including 
consumers, to submit to jurisdiction in distant forums, contrary to the 
mandatory consumer rules of the Brussels Regulation.  ASmallWorld is 
“the world’s leading private online community” catering to international 
networks.231  This by-invitation-only website is chaired by Patrick Liotard-
Vogt, a Swiss online entrepreneur.232  ASmallWorld’s website requires 
consumers to: 
[A]gree to submit to the personal and exclusive jurisdiction of the 
courts located in England, United Kingdom.  If for any reason a 
court of competent jurisdiction finds any provision or portion of 
these terms and conditions to be unenforceable, the remainder of 
the terms and conditions will continue in full force and effect.233 
Skyrock.com, a French social networking music-sharing website, 
requires its users to agree to submit to jurisdiction in France.  Skyrock.com 
requires users to submit to General Terms of Use for Telefun Online 
Services that includes a clause conferring jurisdiction: 
THE PARIS TRIBUNAL DE GRANDE INSTANCE (LARGE 
CLAIMS COURT) HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER 
ALL DISPUTES BETWEEN THE PARTIES CONCERNING, 
IN PARTICULAR, THE FORMATION, PERFORMANCE, 
CONSTRUCTION AND TERMINATION OR RESCISSION 
OF THESE GTU AND STU, INCLUDING FOR PROTECTIVE 
MEASURES, URGENT PROCEEDINGS, INTERIM 
PROCEEDINGS, JOINDERS, EX PARTE PROCEEDINGS OR 
MULTIPLE RESPONDENTS.234 
Don’tStayIn, a rock music and clubbing social networking site, 
requires its users to submit to jurisdiction as well as choice of law in the 
United Kingdom: 
These Terms shall be governed by and construed in accordance 
with the laws of England.  You irrevocably submit to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of England to settle any 
 
177/6) (EC).  Article 1(1) explains that the “Regulation shall apply, in situations involving a 
conflict of laws, to contractual obligations in civil and commercial matters.”  Id. at art. 1(1).  
Article 6 defines a consumer as “being outside his trade or profession . . . with another 
person acting in the exercise of his trade or profession . . . .”  Id. at art. 6.  Rome I adopts the 
consumer’s home court rule, which means that the governing law for consumers is where 
she has her “habitual residence.”  Id. 
 231. About ASmallWorld, ASMALLWORLD, http://www.ASmallWorld.net/about (last 
visited June 7, 2012). 
 232. Id. 
 233. Terms of Use, ASMALLWORLD, http://www.ASmallWorld.net/terms (last visited 
June 7, 2012). 
 234. Terms of Service, SKYROCK, http://www.skyrock.com/safety/terms.php (last visited 
June 7, 2012). 
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dispute which may arise out of or in connection with these 
Terms.235 
These European-based websites violate article 15 of the Brussels 
Regulation because they purport to require consumers to submit to 
jurisdiction outside their home court.  Twitter, a micro-blogging service, 
permits users to send “tweets,” or text-based posts no greater than 140 
characters via instant messaging or cell phone text messaging.  Twitter 
offers its services “as is” without any warranties or assurance of security.236  
If a consumer ends up litigating against Twitter, they must submit to 
jurisdiction in San Francisco, California.237  Facebook’s terms of use 
agreement bind users to terms of use if they merely browse or access a 
website238 and one of the terms is a forum selection clause that states: 
You will resolve any claim, cause of action or dispute (claim) 
you have with us arising out of or relating to this Statement or 
Facebook exclusively in a state or federal court located in Santa 
Clara County.  The laws of the State of California will govern 
this Statement, as well as any claim that might arise between you 
and us, without regard to conflict of law provisions.  You agree 
to submit to the personal jurisdiction of the courts located in 
 
 235. Terms of Use, DON’TSTAYIN, http://www.dontstayin.com/pages/legaltermsuser/ 
(last updated June 14, 2007). 
 236.  
Without limiting the foregoing, TWITTER AND ITS PARTNERS DISCLAIM ANY 
WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS 
FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR NON-INFRINGEMENT.  We make no 
warranty and disclaim all responsibility and liability for the completeness, accuracy, 
availability, timeliness, security or reliability of the Services or any content thereon.  
Twitter will not be responsible or liable for any harm to your computer system, loss of 
data, or other harm that results from your access to or use of the Services, or any 
Content.  You also agree that Twitter has no responsibility or liability for the deletion 
of, or the failure to store or to transmit, any Content and other communications 
maintained by the Services.  We make no warranty that the Services will meet your 
requirements or be available on an uninterrupted, secure, or error-free basis.  No 
advice or information, whether oral or written, obtained from Twitter or through the 
Services, will create any warranty not expressly made herein. 
Terms of Service, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/tos (last updated May 17, 2012). 
 237. Id. 
 238. “Browsewrap is a term used to refer to a proposed agreement (such as website 
Terms of Use) that is posted, rather than presented as a clickwrap or click-to-accept 
contract, and, for this reason, may not actually be enforceable unless assent may be 
implied.”  2 IAN C. BALLON, E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW 14.01 (2d ed. 2012).  The 
federal court in Sw. Airlines Co. v. BoardFirst, L.L.C., No. 3:06-CV-0891-B, 2007 WL 
4823761, at * 4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007), noted that “[b]rowsewraps may take various 
forms but typically they involve a situation where a notice on a website conditions use of the 
site upon compliance with certain terms or conditions . . . .” 
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Santa Clara County, California for litigating all such claims.239 
While U.S. companies are not members of the EU, it is likely that 
European courts will not enforce judgments where consumers have been 
summoned to courts in distant forums, such as the United States  In the 
twenty-seven countries of the European Union, consumers have the 
absolute right to sue suppliers such as software vendors, content providers, 
and social networks in their home court.  Article 15 of the Brussels 
Regulation sets the ground rules for determining jurisdiction in all 
consumer contracts.240  The Brussels Regulation’s consumer protection 
rules are mandatory, non-waivable provisions.241  TOUs that attempt to 
impose choice of forum or venue clauses are unenforceable throughout the 
Eurozone. 
C.  The Rome I Regulation Governing Choice of Law 
Choice of law principles are used by courts to determine which 
country’s law applies to a contract, such as a TOU or other licensing 
agreement.  In December 2005, the European Legislature approved 
replacing the Rome I Convention of 1980 with a Community-Wide 
 
 239. Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/terms.php?ref=pf (last updated Apr. 26, 2011). 
 240. “Courts in Europe will not enforce one-sided choice-of-law or forum clauses in the 
business-to-consumer context.  European consumers, for example, are not permitted to be 
divested of their rights to litigate in their home courts by click wrap or other mass-market 
license agreements.”  Rustad, supra note 218 at 190. 
American consumers would greatly benefit from the Brussels Regulation because it 
bases the rule for which court is competent to entertain a claim based upon the 
consumer’s residence, which gives her a home court advantage. . . . [An] American 
company domiciled in a Member State can be sued in that state.  American online 
providers have been steadfastly opposed to the Brussels Regulation because they 
favor mass-market licenses, which require consumers to litigate in their home court 
and according to their rules.  U.S. consumers would benefit from the Brussels 
Regulation “home court” regime. 
Id. at 199. 
 241.  
Article 17 of the BRUSSELS Regulation provides that a consumer cannot waive her 
right to file or defend lawsuits in her local court.  European consumers, unlike their 
American counterparts, have an absolute right to sue a seller or supplier if it “pursues 
commercial or professional activities in the Member State of the consumer’s 
domicile.” . . .  In contrast to European courts, Americans [sic] courts broadly enforce 
choice of forum clauses even when they have the effect of compelling consumers to 
litigate in the seller’s home court at a great distance from their home. 
Michael L. Rustad & Maria Vittoria Onufrio, supra note 9, 51–52 (2010) (comparing U.S.-
style consumer software license agreements to European contracts that are subject to 
mandatory private international law rules). 
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Regulation.242  In application, the scope of both the Rome Convention and 
the Council Regulation No. 593/2008 were very broad because they applied 
to the parties of signatory states and even “to parties of non-signatory states 
when a choice of law dispute comes before a signatory state’s court.”243 
Article 1 of Rome I explains that the scope of the regulation is to 
articulate conflict of law rules for contractual obligations in civil and 
commercial matters.244  All social networking sites and websites are 
potentially subject to Rome I’s compulsory choice of law rules.  The Rome 
I Regulation adopted the consumer’s home court rule, which means that for 
consumer contracts the governing law is the place where a consumer has 
her “habitual residence.”245  The special consumer rules apply only to 
natural persons who have their place of residence in EU Member States.  
Article 6 defines a consumer as a “natural person for a purpose which can 
be regarded as being outside his trade or profession.”246  Article 6 applies to 
anyone “by any means [that], directs such activities to that country or to 
several countries including that country.”247 
All of the Member States of the EU adopted the Rome Convention 
(the predecessor to the Rome I Regulation) to resolve conflict of law 
disputes even when one of the parties was located outside of the EU.248  
Article 3 of the former Rome I Convention respects the law chosen by the 
parties in business-to-business transactions.  However, courts must be 
certain that a party’s choice of law clause will never have the effect of 
depriving the consumer of the protection afforded to him by the mandatory 
law of his habitual country.249  Courts in the Netherlands will apply 
 
 242. The Rome I Regulation became effective for the Member States of the European 
Union on December 17, 2009. 
 243. Jochen Zaremba, International Electronic Transaction Contracts Between U.S. and 
EU Companies and Customers, 18 CONN. J. INT’L L. 479, 491 (2003); see H. Matthew 
Horlacher, Note, The Rome Convention and the German Paradigm: Forecasting the Demise 
of the European Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 27 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 173, 176 (1994) (explaining reach of Convention). 
 244. “This Regulation shall apply, in situations involving a conflict of laws, to 
contractual obligations in civil and commercial matters.”  See European Parliament and 
Council Regulation 593/2008 (EC), at art. 1(1) [hereinafter Rome I] (noting that the 
“Regulation shall apply, in situations involving a conflict of laws, to contractual obligations 
in civil and commercial matters.”). 
 245. Id. at art. 6 (explaining mandatory rules for consumer transactions). 
 246. Id.  Cf. Brussels Regulation at art. 15. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Article 1 of the Rome I Convention stated:  “[t]he rules of this Convention shall 
apply to contractual obligations in any situation involving a choice between the laws of 
different countries.”  Article 2, titled “universal application,” added that “[a]ny law 
specified by this Convention shall be applied whether or not it is the law of a Contracting 
State.”  Horlacher, supra note 243, at 176. 
 249. Such mandatory consumer protection laws include those prohibiting unfair contract 
terms, limiting the enforceability of standard form contracts, creating rights of cancellation 
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European-wide choice of law principles even if the parties have chosen 
U.S. law, provided the transaction is a consumer transaction.250  “Dutch 
mandatory consumer protection rules apply between a Dutch customer and 
a U.S. seller even if the parties have chosen U.S. law, provided the 
prerequisites of Article 5(2) of the Rome Convention are fulfilled.”251  The 
Rome I Convention has functionally equivalent rules to the Rome I 
Regulation.  The only significant difference is that a convention must be 
approved through a treaty process, whereas a regulation applies 
automatically to new Member States. 
Article 5(2) of the Convention provides the sphere of application for 
consumer transactions.252  The Convention applies only if a specific 
invitation addressed to the consumer precedes the conclusion of the 
contract.253  The Convention also applies if the seller furnishes advertising 
targeted at the country of the consumer’s habitual residence.254  This 
provision tacitly assumes that the European consumer has otherwise 
completed the steps necessary to conclude a contract in that country, or 
alternatively, that the seller received the consumer’s order in that country.  
The language of the Rome Convention did not seem targeted to address 
dispute resolutions in the World Wide Web environment.  When the Rome 
Convention was drafted and signed, the World Wide Web did not exist yet, 
and as a result, the contracting parties could not take into consideration 
online transactions.  The EU was aware of the difficulties in applying 
article 5 of the Rome Convention to the new forms of commerce, and for 
this reason replaced it with the article 6 of the new Council Regulation 
No.593/2008, which applies to online transactions (as pointed out in the 
preamble). 
Article 6 of the Rome I Convention states that: 
[A] contract concluded by a natural person for a purpose which 
can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession (the 
consumer) with another person acting in the exercise of his trade 
 
during a “cooling off” period following the formation of the contract, or requiring that the 
seller make certain disclosures. 
 250. Zaremba, supra note 243, at 491; Horlacher, supra note 243, at 177 (explaining that 
a U.S. corporation and an Australian client form a contract with an English jurisdictional 
clause, or if an English court otherwise obtains jurisdiction over their contractual obligation, 
the English court must abide by the precepts of the Rome Convention when resolving any 
dispute concerning the parties’ choice of applicable law). 
 251. Zaremba, supra note 243, at 492. 
 252. See 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations of 26 
Jan. 1998, 1998 O.J. (C 027) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3, a choice of law 
made by the parties shall not have the result of depriving the consumer of the protection 
afforded to him by the mandatory rules of the law of the country in which he has his 
habitual residence . . . .”). 
 253. Id. at art. 5. 
 254. Id. 
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or profession (the professional) shall be governed by the law of 
the country where the consumer has his habitual residence, 
provided that the professional:  (a) pursues his commercial or 
professional activities in the country where the consumer has his 
habitual residence, or (b) by any means, directs such activities to 
that country or to several countries including that country, and 
the contract falls within the scope of such activities.255 
Certainly, an online transaction can be included in article 6(b).  It is 
interesting to note that article 6(b) reproduces exactly the content of article 
15(1)(c) of the Council Regulation EC No. 44/2001, which governs the 
cross-border jurisdiction issues over consumer contracts. 
Both regulations refer to the concept of directed activity as a condition 
for applying the consumer protection rule.  In this way, the factors used to 
establish the application of the consumer’s domestic laws are the same 
factors used to establish the jurisdiction of the consumer’s home state 
forum.  This means that a U.S. company, which solicits conclusion of on-
line contracts and concludes a contract in a European Member State where 
the consumer has his habitual residence, can be sued in this Member State 
and the consumer-friendly law of this Member State shall apply.  Legal 
academics contend that European consumers may never waive consumer 
protection available in their home court jurisdiction.256 
As a result, consumer protection issues pose a particular risk to a U.S. 
software company targeting consumers of any European country because of 
Rome I’s mandatory consumer protection rules for choice of law as well as its 
extraterritorial application.  Mandatory consumer protection rules mean that 
European consumers may never be divested of their home court or national 
consumer laws.257  Social networks such as Second Life sell virtual 
 
 255. Id. at art. 6. 
 256. The application of Brussels regulation is considered controversial by the doctrine.  
Nevertheless, courts apply the Regulation beyond European boundaries.  For a list of cases 
regarding the extraterritorial application of Brussels Regulation, see Kerry J. Begley, Note,  
Multinational Patent Enforcement: What the “Parochial” United States Can Learn from 
Past and Present European Initiatives, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 521, 547 (2007); see also 
Michael Rustad, E-Commerce: Challenge to Privacy, Integrity and Security in a Borderless 
World: Circles of E-Consumer Trust: Old E-America v. New E-Europe, 16 MICH. ST. J. 
INT’L L. 183, 199 n.53 (2007) (quoting Air Canada v. United Kingdom, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
150 (1995), where the European Court of Human Rights held that the seizure of an aircraft 
belonging to the Canadian applicant had not infringed article 1 of the First Protocol, 
suggesting that the fact that the applicant was a resident in Canada affected its rights under 
that provision). 
 257. The application of the Brussels Regulation to U.S. or other non-EU parties is a 
controversial extension of the pro-consumer rules.  Nevertheless, courts have applied 
Brussels Regulation consumer rules to non-EU sellers.  See Begley, supra note 256 at 547 
(citing cases where foreign courts have extended the Brussels Regulation’s consumer rules 
to non-EU sellers); see also Rustad, supra note 256, at 199 n.53 (2007) (quoting Air Canada 
v. United Kingdom, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 150 (1995)) (citing European Court of Human Rights 
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products and services but many other sites are used only for word-of-mouth 
advertising “amplified through the megaphone of technology like 
smartphones and computers.”258  If a social network site targets consumers 
in Member States, it is likely that the Rome I Regulation will determine the 
choice of law.  Similarly, if a software publisher or other content creator is 
from one Member State and its customer from another, Rome I will 
determine the choice of law a European court will apply.  Couchsurfing, a 
social networking site, would violate both the Brussels and Rome I 
Regulations because of its terms of service that require either mandatory 
arbitration or litigation in the company’s home court of New Hampshire.259  
U.S. software publishers and social networking sites ignore these 
compulsory rules to their peril if they are targeting European consumers 
with their licensing activities.260 
 
cases where the court held that the seizure of an aircraft belonging to a Canadian applicant 
did not infringe article 1 of the First Protocol, and suggested that the fact that the applicant 
was a resident in Canada affected its rights under that provision). 
 258. Ron Ruggless, Restaurant Social Media: Looking for the ROI, NATION’S 
RESTAURANT NEWS (Oct. 30, 2011), http://www.nrn.com/article/restaurant-social-media-
index-looking-roi. 
 259. The terms of use on the Cuchsurfing website include the following language: 
(a) Binding Arbitration.  For any Claim (excluding Claims for injunctive or other 
equitable relief) where the total amount of the award sought is less than Ten Thousand 
US Dollars (US$10,000), you or we may elect to resolve the dispute through binding 
arbitration conducted by telephone, on-line and/or based solely upon written 
submissions where no in-person appearance is required.  In such cases, the arbitration 
shall be administered by the American Arbitration Association in accordance with its 
applicable rules, or any other established ADR provider agreed upon by the parties.  
Any judgment on the award rendered by the arbitrator may be entered in any court 
having jurisdiction thereof. 
(b) Court.  Alternatively, any Claim may be adjudicated by a court of competent 
jurisdiction located in New Hampshire, USA or where the defendant is located (in our 
case Carroll County, New Hampshire, USA, and in your case your home address).  
You and we agree to submit to the personal jurisdiction of a state court located in 
Carroll County, New Hampshire or a US federal court located in Concord, New 
Hampshire. 
Terms of Use, COUCHSURFING, http://www.couchsurfing.org/terms.html (last updated July 
13, 2011 
 260.  
Foreign businesses operating in Europe also should not assume that a choice of law or 
exclusive jurisdiction clause selecting non-European law/courts will allow them to 
escape the consequences of this case.  Such businesses may be subject to jurisdiction 
in European courts whether they operate through a subsidiary or not.  For example, if 
a contract between a US business and a European consumer provided that New York 
law will govern the contract, a European court may strike the choice of law provision 
as being unfavorable to the consumer or an unfair contract term because it seeks to 
circumvent mandatory local law and/or European law provisions protecting 
consumers.  Thus, foreign businesses should not view choice of law or exclusive 
jurisdiction clauses as being a means to avoid the restrictive consumer laws in Europe. 
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III.  SUBSTANTIVE CONTRACTUAL PROTECTIONS FOR EUROPEAN 
CONSUMERS 
U.S. courts are reluctant to police substantive terms in consumer 
TOUs and generally police only the bargaining process.  The recent trend is 
for courts to enforce “cash now, terms later” agreements so long as they 
comply with minimal procedural standards.  The American Law Institute’s 
Principles of the Law of Software Contracts defers largely to software 
industry practices when it comes to consumer TOUs.261  However, the 
Principles adopt a provision requiring software publishers to give a non-
disclaimable warranty that its product “contains no material hidden defects 
of which the transferor was aware at the time of the transfer.”262  The duty 
to disclose hidden defects is not recognized in either UCC Article 2 or the 
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA).263  Neither 
UCITA nor the Principles of the Law of Software Contracts have extensive 
consumer rules.  The word consumer is found nowhere within UCC Article 
2 governing sales of goods.  The marketplace approach used in these source 
of law are dramatically different from the Eurozone’s social welfaristic 
approach to licensing, which favors non-waivable procedural and 
substantive protection. 
UCITA follows the majority rule of U.S. courts in its broad validation 
of rolling contracts.  However, UCITA gives consumers a right to a refund 
if they have not had an opportunity to review the terms.264  The 
predominant trend is for U.S. courts to legitimize software industry 
consumer licensing practices that disclaim warranties.265  A recent 
empirical study found that fifty-three out of fifty-four Internet retailers 
studied disclaimed all warranty protection for their products.266  The 
Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Consumer Protection criticized 
 
B2C in Europe and Avoiding Contractual Liability: Why Businesses with European 
Operations Should Review their Customer Contracts Now, DROIT & TECHNOLOGIES (Sept. 
15, 2004), http://www.droit-technologie.org/actuality-805/b2c-in-europe-and-
avo%20Id.ing-contractual-liability-why-businesses-with.html. 
 261. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS (2009). 
 262. Id. § 3.05(b). 
 263. Neither the UCC nor UCITA recognize a warranty to disclose hidden defects. 
UCITA broadly legitimates mass-market licenses for consumer transactions.  UCITA, 
adopted by Maryland and Virginia, enforces contracts where consumers have an opportunity 
to review terms and a means of manifesting assent.  Rustad &  Koenig, supra note 99, at 
1565 (2005) (discussing provisions of UCITA that validate mass-market licenses). 
 264. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Licensing of Information Assets, 2 INFO. LAW § 11:147 
(2009) (explaining conditions of consumers’ right to a refund). 
 265. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The Implied Warranty of Merchantability in 
Software Contracts: A Warranty No One Dares to Give and How to Change That, 16 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 393, 393 (1998) (describing trend in American courts). 
 266. See Hillman & Barakat, supra note 127, at 6 (describing results from study). 
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UCITA because it validated consumer TOUs in which the consumer 
received no presale disclosure of material terms.  “UCITA does not require 
that licensees be informed of licensing restrictions in a clear and 
conspicuous manner prior to the consummation of the transaction.”267 
Neither UCITA nor the Principles of the Law of Software Contracts 
have extensive consumer rules for software licenses.  The marketplace 
approach varies dramatically from the EU’s social welfaristic approach to 
licensing that favors mandatory rules.  U.S. courts will police contracts but 
largely defer to the consumers’ supposed freedom of contract and duty to 
read.268  These polar opposite approaches to protecting consumers result in 
disputes since the Internet does not respect national boundaries. 
A.  Unfair Contract Terms Directive 
When the European Legislature enacted the 1993 Unfair Contracts 
Term Directive (UCTD), consumers gained Eurozone-wide rights and 
remedies.269  The European Legislature put the touch of fire in community-
wide protection when it enacted the UCTD.  The European Legislature 
acknowledged that “[i]n consumer contracts, sellers and suppliers possess a 
considerable advantage by defining the terms in advance that are not 
individually negotiated.”270  The EU acknowledged that standard form 
contracts were valuable; so long as “abuses can be prevented, [they] can 
also work to the advantage of consumers.”271  The UCTD was a thunderbolt 
falling on an inch of ground, but lighting the horizons of consumers 
 
 267. Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n, Bureau of Consumer Prot., to John L. 
McClaugherty, Chair, Exec. Comm., Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 
(July 9, 1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/v990010.shtm. 
 268. Defenders of U.S.-style TOUs acknowledge that license agreements are written in 
dense and sometimes unclear language: 
Using simple, clear, and concise language is an ongoing challenge for software 
lawyers.  Contract terms expressed in dense legalese make it difficult for the EULA to 
provide useful information to the end user and to provide effective warnings against 
piracy. 
Gomulkiewicz & Williamson, supra note 30, at 366. 
 269. Council Directive 93/13, 1993 O.J. (L 95) (EC) [hereinafter Council Directive 
93/13]. 
 270. Unfair Contract Terms, EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/ 
unf_cont_terms/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2011). 
 271. Id.  
Whereas in accordance with the principle laid down under the heading “Protection of 
the economic interests of the consumers”, as stated in those programmes:  “acquirers 
of goods and services should be protected against the abuse of power by the seller or 
supplier, in particular against one-sided standard contracts and the unfair exclusion of 
essential rights in contracts . . . .”  
Council Directive 93/13, supra note 269, at 30. 
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throughout the Eurozone.  The preamble to the UCTD provided: 
Whereas persons or organizations, if regarded under the law of a 
Member State as having a legitimate interest in the matter, must 
have facilities for initiating proceedings concerning terms of 
contract drawn up for general use in contracts concluded with 
consumers, and in particular unfair terms, either before a court or 
before an administrative authority competent to decide upon 
complaints or to initiate appropriate legal proceedings; whereas 
this possibility does not, however, entail prior verification of the 
general conditions obtaining in individual economic sectors; 
Whereas the courts or administrative authorities of the Member 
States must have at their disposal adequate and effective means 
of preventing the continued application of unfair terms in 
consumer contracts . . . .272 
For the first time, this Directive recognized the right of European 
courts, administrative bodies, or consumer advocacy groups to police unfair 
contract terms because they have a “legitimate interest under national law 
in protecting consumers.”273 
The UCTD applies broadly to non-negotiated contracts between 
professionals and consumers.274  The UCTD requires each Member State to 
enact national legislation that meets the minimum standards.275  Contractual 
provisions determined to be unfair under the Directive are unenforceable.276  
 
 272. Counsel Directive 93/13, supra note 269, at 31. 
 273. Id. at art. 7(2).  One of the most commented-upon applications of the mentioned 
Directive is Union Federale des Consommateurs (UFC) “Que Choisir” v. AOL Bertelsmann 
Online France, Tribunal de Grande Instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] 
Nanterre, 1e ch., June 2, 2004, R.G. No. 02/03156 (tgin020604) (Fr.).  After the Council 
introduced the Directive 93/13/EC and its consequent implementation during the following 
years into the legal systems of  European Member States, a legal action against a electronic 
commerce to redress unfair terms became a reality.  This is not just an isolated case because 
in Germany, America Online agreed to cease and desist and to pay a fine of about 1000 
Euros each time it used violating terms, up to a maximum of 10,000 Euros per contract.  
Rustad & Onufrio, supra note 9. 
 274. Council Directive 93/13, supra note 269. 
 275. A consumer advocate contends that seven out of the twenty-seven EU Member 
States enacted national legislation implementing the Unfair Contract Directives that were 
not in conformity with the spirit of the legislation.  He contends that these Member States 
unfairly increased the burden for consumers by enacting legislation that refers to 
“significant imbalance” without expressly including the element of good faith.  Martin 
Ebers, Unfair Contract Terms Directive (93/13), CONSUMER LAW COMPENDIUM 341. 
 276. “Terms that are found unfair under the Directive are unforceable for consumers. 
The Directive also requires contract terms to be drafted in plain and intelligible language 
and states that ambiguities will be interpreted in favour of consumers.”  Unfair Contract 
Terms, EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/unf_cont_terms/index_ 
en.htm (last updated Apr. 7, 2007).  Member States vary in their treatment of unfair terms.  
“However, in some member states the contractual rights and obligations can generally be 
adjusted, not only concentrating on the specific unfair term.  Furthermore, in some member 
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The UCTD also requires contract terms to be drafted in plain and 
intelligible language and states that ambiguities shall be interpreted in favor 
of consumers.277  Courts in Europe apply the principle of interpretatio 
contra proferentem to enforce ambiguities in favor of consumers.278  
European courts may reject insufficiently precise contract terms in 
consumer contracts even if they are not substantively unfair.279  Article 3(1) 
of the UCTD, which defines unfairness, states that it applies to contracts 
that have not been individually negotiated.280  The Directive defines a 
contract “as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a 
significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the 
contract, to the detriment of the consumer.”281  The language of the 
Directive mandates courts to apply a two-part test to determine whether a 
given contractual provision is unfair.282  First, there must be a significant 
imbalance to the detriment of the consumer and that imbalance should be 
“contrary to good faith.”283  Nevertheless, the prevailing—and more correct 
interpretation of the UCTD—is that any contractual term in a consumer 
contract causing a significant imbalance is by definition contrary to the 
principle of good faith.284  Under this interpretation, a court, consumer 
 
states public bodies can request the incorporation of new terms in order to prevent a 
significant imbalance between the rights and obligations.”  Martin Ebbers, Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive (93/13), Consumer Law Compendium: Comparative Analysis 5 (2007), 
available at http://www.eu-consumer-law.org/consumerstudy_part2c_en.pdf (last visited 
June 8, 2012). 
 277. Council Directive 93/13, supra note 269, at art. 5., 
 278. PETRI MÄNTYSAARI, THE LAW OF CORPORATE FINANCE: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND 
EU LAW: VOLUME II: CONTRACTS IN GENERAL 96 (2009) (stating that court must apply 
contra proferentum to consumer contracts because of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive). 
 279.   
For example, in a judgment of January 7, 1997, in Assurances GAN v. Impec, the 
Belgian Court of Cassation deemed unfair a term waiving a guarantee in respect of 
“certain damages” on the grounds that an exclusion clause could not be validly relied 
on against the insured unless the clause in question was “clear, express and limited.”  
Likewise, in a judgment of May 23, 1996, in NCR-ANC v UAP, a French Court of 
First Instance ruled that an insurance contract was unfair because it did not subject 
increases in the premium to any clear contractual condition and gave the insurance 
company an unfair advantage because it did not have to justify any increase in the 
premiums. 
B2C in Europe and Avoiding Contractual Liability, supra note 260. 
 280. Council Directive 93/13, supra note 269, at art. 3(1) (“A contractual term which has 
not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of 
good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising 
under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer.”). 
 281. Id. 
 282. James R. Maxeiner, Standard-Terms Contracting in the Global Electronic Age: 
European Alternatives, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 109, 134 (2003). 
 283. Id. at 135. 
 284. Id. 
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administrative agency or authority will deploy the UCTD to strike down 
oppressive terms in consumer contracts such as TOUs.  The language in 
article 3 of the UCTD addresses newly emergent terms not found in the 
Annex.  An Annex to the UCTD is a non-exclusive list of terms considered 
suspect under article 3(3). 
This list invalidates many common terms in U.S.-style terms of use:  
disclaimer of warranties, limitations of licensor’s liability, unilateral 
modifications to contract terms, and the acceptance of the license 
agreement by performance.  If a given term in a license agreement is not 
addressed in the Annex of suspect terms, the court may turn to a more 
general test of unfairness.  However, article 8 provides that Member States 
have the discretion to adopt more stringent provisions.285  They could, for 
example, transform the gray list into a black list.286  This is because the 
UCTD sets only minimum standards, which can be heightened by the EU 
Member States in order to ensure a higher degree of protection than for the 
consumer in the United States.  Comparing the provisions of unfair terms 
and the American unconscionability doctrine, it becomes apparent that the 
UCTD recognizes a much lower limit for intervention by European courts 
than UCC § 2-302.287  The UCC’s doctrine of unconscionability applies 
only where the consumer is left with no meaningful choice, which is a 
difficult threshold to attain.288  “[T]he elements of procedural and 
substantive unconscionability must both be present before a court may 
refuse to enforce a contract.”289  An arbitration clause in a TOU is 
unconscionable only if:  (1) the “provision was presented on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis”; and (2) there was “an inequality of bargaining power that 
result[ed] in no real negotiation and an absence of meaningful choice.”290 
In contrast, European courts and consumer agencies may review all 
 
 285. Article 8 of Council Directive 93/13 provides:  “Member States may adopt or retain 
the most stringent provisions compatible with the Treaty in the area covered by this 
Directive, to ensure a maximum degree of protection for the consumer.”  Council Directive 
93/13, supra note 269, at art. 8. 
 286. A contractual term appearing on a gray list is essentially a presumption of 
unfairness that can be overcome by contrary evidence.  In contrast, black list terms are 
prohibited outright and are per se regarded as unfair.  WADE JACOBY, THE ENLARGEMENT OF 
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO: ORDERING FROM THE MENU IN CENTRAL EUROPE 71 n.32 
(2005). 
 287. See Nicola Lucchi, Countering the Unfair Play of DRM Technologies, 16 TEX. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 91, 118 (2007) (noting the lower limit for intervention in European 
courts). 
 288. See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Ashcraft, 791 F.2d 519, 522 (7th Cir. 1986) (reasoning 
that unconscionability is not available for courts to strike down contracts which are one-
sided where there is no evidence of deception, lack of agreement or compulsion). 
 289. Marin Storage & Trucking, Inc. v. Benco Contracting & Eng’g, Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 645, 654 (2001) (emphasis in original). 
 290. Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1281 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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non-negotiated contracts for unfairness  
 
taking into account the nature of the goods or services for which 
the contract was concluded and by referring, at the time of 
conclusion of the contract, to all the circumstances attending the 
conclusion of the contract and to all the other terms of the 
contract or of another contract on which it is dependent.291   
 
However, article 4(2) provides that this test does not apply to core terms, 
including “neither . . . the definition of the main subject matter of the 
contract nor . . . the adequacy of the price and remuneration.”292  The 
UCTD is a robust tool for European courts seeking to strike down one-
sided TOUs with hidden terms. 
B.  The Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices 
The EC Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial Practices is 
equally applicable to consumer license agreements and terms of service.  
For example, a consumer may decide whether to buy a product, or 
alternatively, to exercise some related contractual right based upon a 
misleading practice.293  The European Directive deploys two different 
concepts:  active misleading practice, which focuses on false or deceptive 
information provided to the consumer,294 and misleading practice, which 
addresses when the licensor omits key information.295  Article 6 covers 
misleading practices that shape economic behaviour, in particular, the 
existence and nature of the product, its main characteristics, and other 
qualities.296  Article 7 treats a commercial practice as misleading if material 
information that the average consumer needs to make an informed 
transactional decision is omitted from the consumer transaction.297 
Article 8 of the Directive states that unfair practice includes any 
 
 291. Council Directive 93/13, supra note 269, at art. 4(1). 
 292. Id. at art. 4(2). 
 293. Lucchi, supra note 287, at 119. 
 294. Council Directive 2005/29, art. 6, 2005 O.J. (L 149) (EC).  
 295. Id. at art. 7. 
 296. Id. at art. 6 (explaining meaning of misleading actions and giving examples). 
 297.  
A commercial practice shall be regarded as misleading if, in its factual context, taking 
account of all its features and circumstances and the limitations of the communication 
medium, it omits material information that the average consumer needs, according to 
the context, to take an informed transactional decision and thereby causes or is likely 
to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision that he would not have 
taken otherwise. 
Id. at art. 7(1). 
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aggressive commercial practice that significantly impairs the average 
consumer’s freedom of choice and therefore causes him to make a 
transactional decision he or she would not have made otherwise.298  In 
addition, the Uniform Commercial Practice Directive includes in the Annex 
a list of practices that shall be in all circumstances regarded as 
misleading.299  This Directive provides a possible template for establishing 
internet-related consumer protection for digital media transactions in the 
European electronic marketplace.300 
C. Distance Selling Directive 
The Distance Selling Directive accords consumers who purchased 
goods through home shopping and other distance communications the same 
rights as if they had purchased these goods in person.301  The European 
Legislature enacted the Distance Selling Directive to promote cross-border 
consumer confidence.302  The Distance Selling Directive 97/7/EC applies to 
home shopping, including e-commerce teleshopping and the use of the 
Internet.303  Sellers must also give a consumer written confirmation of 
information in any durable medium.304  The Distance Selling Directive 
requires suppliers to give consumers pre-contractual disclosures such as 
information about the identity of the supplier and the main characteristics 
of goods and services, which includes taxes, delivery costs, arrangements 
for payment, the existence of a right of withdrawal, the period for which 
the offer remains valid, and the minimum duration of the contract.305 
Any e-business or software company must make pre-contractual 
disclosures as well as confirmatory disclosures no later than the time it 
delivers hardware or software. 
Suppliers, including software publishers, may not penalize consumers 
for canceling a distance contract but they may assess costs of returning the 
item.306  European consumers have a minimum seven-day “cooling-off” 
period for contracts made away from the seller’s place of business that 
 
 298. Id. at art. 8. 
 299. Id. at Annex 1 (stating examples of misleading practices). 
 300. Lucchi, supra note 287, at 119. 
 301. The aim of EC legislation in the field of distance selling is to put consumers who 
purchase goods or services through distance communication means in a similar position to 
consumers who buy goods or services in shops.”  Distance Selling, EUROPA, 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/dist_sell/index_en.htm (last visited June 
8, 2012). 
 302. Council Directive 97/7, art. 4, 5, 1997 O.J. (L 144) (EC). 
 303. Id. at art. 7. 
 304. Id. at art. 5. 
 305. Id. at art. 4. 
 306. Id. 
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presumably includes websites or products purchased online.307  The 
consumers’ right of withdrawal does not apply to software contracts if the 
product is unsealed by the consumer.308  This means that the Directive’s 
right of withdrawal is also inapplicable to clickwrap agreements where the 
consumer downloads the software from the internet.309  Consumers have the 
right to cancel the contract if the seller is unable to deliver the goods or 
services within thirty days.310  These are non-waivable mandatory terms.  
The “cooling-off” period and guaranteed refund provisions gives European 
e-commerce consumers an opportunity to inspect goods and reject them 
just as if they were in a brick and mortar shop. 
Consumers have the right to cancel a distance sale if the seller is 
unable to deliver the goods or services within thirty days.311  The European 
Directive exempted certain distance sales from its application.  Examples 
of exempted distance sales include construction contracts, financial 
services, contracts made by vending machines, auctions, and public pay 
telephones.312  A remote software licensor must inform European 
consumers of their right of withdrawal and offer a refund payable within 30 
days.313  Article 2 of the Distance Selling Directive states the basic 
definitions key to the sphere of operation of the directive: 
(1) ‘distance contract’ means any contract concerning goods or 
services concluded between a supplier and a consumer under an 
organized distance sales or service-provision scheme run by the 
supplier, who, for the purpose of the contract, makes exclusive 
use of one or more means of distance communication up to and 
including the moment at which the contract is concluded; 
(2) ‘consumer’ means any natural person who, in contracts 
covered by this Directive, is acting for purposes, which are 
outside his trade, business or profession; 
(3) ‘supplier’ means any natural or legal person who, in contracts 
covered by this Directive, is acting in his commercial or 
professional capacity; 
(4) ‘means of distance communication’ means any means, which, 
without the simultaneous physical presence of the supplier and 
the consumer, may be used for the conclusion of a contract 
 
 307. Id. at art. 6 
 308. Id. at art. 6(3). 
 309. Software downloadable from the internet technically has no seal or shrinkwrap 
plastic.  But the principle will likely be extended to downloadable software.  The software 
industry would no longer be profitable if the right of withdrawal applied to downloadable 
software. 
 310. Council Directive 93/13, supra note 269, at art. 7. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. at art. 3. 
 313. Council Directive 973/13, supra note 269, at art. 7(2). 
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between those parties.  An indicative list of the means covered by 
this Directive is contained in Annex I; 
(5) ‘operator of a means of communication’ means any public or 
private natural or legal person whose trade, business or 
profession involves making one or more means of distance 
communication available to suppliers.314 
D.  The Directive on Consumer Rights 
The EU Commission considered the Distance Seller’s Directive to be 
outdated and not fully responsive to the new market demand, especially in 
light of the most recent technological changes such as website contracts.315  
The new directive provided a standard set of EU-wide consumer rights.316 
The new consumer rights directive replaces a “patchwork of 27 sets of 
different rules.”317  This EU regulatory fragmentation was considered a 
relevant barrier to cross-border transactions because it increased costs to 
traders and undermined consumer confidence in internal markets.318  The 
Commission was cognizant that the only way to eliminate these trade 
barriers was to create a uniform regulatory framework protecting consumer 
at the Union level.319  The Directive on Consumer Rights displaces the 
97/7/EC distance-selling directive and the 85/577/EC directive on the 
protection of consumers regarding contracts negotiated away from business 
premises.  The Directive does not permit EU Member States to enact 
national legislation that conflicts with the Directive.320  This includes more 
 
 314. Id. at art. 2. 
 315. EU Council and the European Parliament approved a New Consumer Rigths 
Directive, POLISH PRESIDENCY IN THE EU, http://www.prezydencja.uokik.gov.pl/en/new-
directive (last visited June 8, 2012). 
 316. Press Release, Europa, Consumers: Commission Proposes EU-Wide Rights for 
Shoppers, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1474&format 
=HTML&aged=0&language=EN (last visited June 8, 2012). 
 317.  
These Directives contain certain minimum requirements; Member States have added rules in 
an uncoordinated manner over the years, making EU consumer contract laws a patchwork of 
27 sets of differing rules for example:  a mix of differing information obligations, differing 
cooling off periods ranging from 7 to 15 days and differing obligations in relation to refunds 
and repairs.   
Id. 
 318. “The aim is to boost consumer confidence and at the same time to cut red tape 
which is holding back business within national borders—denying consumers more choice 
and competitive offers.  A standard set of consumer contract terms will cut compliance costs 
substantially—by up to 97% for EU wide traders.”  Id. 
 319. Id. 
 320. EU Parliament & Council Directive on Consumer Rights 2011/83/EU (Oct. 25 
2011), amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and EU Parliament & Council Directive 
1999/44/EC and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and EU Parliament & Council 
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or less stringent provisions to ensure a different level of consumer 
protection, unless otherwise provided for in the Directive.321 
The new Directive provides a list of uniform disclosures that the seller 
must give to the consumer before the conclusion of the contract including:  
the main characteristics of the goods or services, the identity of the trader, 
the geographical address at which the trader is established, the trader’s 
contact information, the total price of the goods or services inclusive of 
taxes and all additional delivery or postal charges, and whether any returns 
charges are payable by the consumer.322 
The seller also must inform the consumer about whether they have a 
right of withdrawal.323  Where a right of withdrawal exists, the conditions 
and procedures for exercising that right must be specified.324  Conversely, 
the circumstances under which the consumer will lose his right of 
withdrawal must also be disclosed.325  The trader must also inform the 
consumer of any technical protection measures of digital content, which 
includes not only digital rights management but also more invasive 
technologies such as DVD regional codes or tracking and monitoring 
tools.326  In addition, the trader must inform the consumer of any relevant 
interoperability of digital content with hardware and software that the 
trader has knowledge or a reason to know of its existence.327  Under the 
new Directive the original period of seven days to withdraw from a 
distance contract is extended to fourteen days starting the day on which the 
consumer acquires physical possession of the goods.328  If the trader has not 
provided the consumer with the information on the right of withdrawal, the 
withdrawal period shall expire twelve months from the end of the initial 
withdrawal period.329  The Directive’s provision on the right of withdrawal 
does not apply to the supply of sealed audio or video recordings and sealed 
 
Directive 97/7/EC, at art. 4 (“Member States shall not maintain or introduce, in their 
national law, provisions diverging from those laid down in this Directive, including more or 
less stringent provisions to ensure a different level of consumer protection, unless otherwise 
provided for in this Directive.”). 
 321. “This Directive should therefore lay down standard rules for the common aspects of 
distance and off-premises contracts, moving away from the minimum harmonisation 
approach in the former Directives whilst allowing Member States to maintain or adopt 
national rules in relation to certain aspects.” EU Parliament & Council Directive on 
Consumer Rights 2011/83/EU (Oct. 25 2011), amending EU Parliament & Council 
Directives 93/13/EEC and 1999/44/EC and repealing EU Parliament & Council Directives 
85/577/EEC and 97/7/EC, at pref. cl. 2. 
 322. Id. at art. 6(a–g). 
 323. Id. at art. 6(h). 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. at art. 6(k). 
 326. Id. at art. 6(r). 
 327. Id. at art. 6(s). 
 328. Id. at art. 9. 
 329. Id. at art. 10. 
RUSTAD_FINAL_5669015.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/9/2012  6:58 AM 
1142 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 14:4 
 
computer software that are unsealed by the consumer after delivery.330  
They also do not apply to digital content not supplied on a tangible medium 
if the performance began with the consumer’s prior express consent 
regarding loss of his right of withdrawal.331 
If the trader wishes the consumer to bear the costs of return, the trader 
is obliged to clearly inform the consumer about this risk before the 
purchase, otherwise the trader  will bear such costs.332  In light of the new 
rules of transparency, the trader shall seek the express consent of the 
consumer to any extra payment in addition to the remuneration agreed upon 
for the trader’s main contractual obligation.333  If the trader has not obtained 
the consumer’s express consent but has inferred it by using default options, 
such as pre-checked boxes that the consumer must uncheck in order to 
avoid the additional payment, the consumer shall be entitled to 
reimbursement of this payment.334  Member States shall prohibit traders 
from charging consumers extra fees because of the use of a particular 
means of payment, such as a credit card.335 
The Directive was approved by the Parliament on June 23, 2011 and 
by the Council on October 11, 2011.  After the entry into force of the 
Directive, the Member States shall have two years to implement its 
provisions into their national law.  Consumer groups were broadly satisfied 
with the new regulation as it  strikes a fair balance between consumer rights 
and business interests.336 
IV.  TEN THINGS WRONG WITH U.S. -STYLE TERMS OF SERVICE: A 
ROADMAP FOR REFORM 
TOUs are a controversial new form of standard form contract, where 
consumers divest themselves of all rights where the licensor skews terms 
and conditions in its favor.  Robert Gomulkiewicz found over one hundred 
law review articles that were critical of these standard form contracts for 
the period from 1984 to 1994.337  The empirical reality is that few social 
networking site users would be aware that they waive their implied 
 
 330. Id. at art. 16(i). 
 331. Id. at art. 16(m). 
 332. Id. at art. 14. 
 333. Id. at art. 22. 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. at art. 19. 
 336. SMEs Balk at New Consumer Rights Directive, EURACTIV (June 27, 2011), 
http://www.euractiv.com/consumers/smes-balk-new-consumer-rights-directive-news-
505974. 
 337. Gomulkiewicz, supra note 265, at 393 (finding 116 law review articles published in 
the decade between 1984 and 1994 addressing TOUs; most articles called for radical 
reformation of this contracting practice for the consumer market). 
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warranty of merchantability, surrender their right to file suit in a court of 
law, and agree to submit to arbitration in a distant forum by the mere act of 
cracking open shrinkwrap, clicking on an icon labeled “I agree” or merely 
accessing a website.  In the past fifteen years, a large number of academics 
have called for radical reform of standard form TOUs.338  U.S. consumers 
have a love/hate relationship with standard form contracts because they are 
efficient notwithstanding their one-sided nature.339  An industry pundit 
accuses software lawyers of employing the legal fiction of a contract while 
imposing outrageously unfair terms on the consumer marketplace: 
We seem to have sunk to a kind of playground system of forming 
contracts.  Tag, you agree!  Lawyers will tell you that you can 
form a binding agreement just by following a link, stepping into a 
store, buying a product, or receiving an email.  By standing there, 
shaking your head, and shouting “NO NO NO I DO NOT 
AGREE,” you agree to let the other guy come over to your 
house, clean out your fridge, wear your underwear and make 
some long-distance calls.340 
The next section presents ten things that need to be reformed so that 
U.S.-style TOUs may safely export their information-based platforms to 
Europe and beyond.  Content creators will not be able to limit, modify, or 
supersede mandatory consumer rules if they export information-based 
consumer products to any of the twenty-seven countries of the European 
Union.  U.S. companies are already facing lawsuits and consumer actions 
because of their failure to conform their TOUs to legal cultures that respect 
privacy and consumer rights.  CompuServe, for example, was assessed a 
fine of up to €250,000 and a contempt of court judgment against the CEO if 
the provider should continue to incorporate unfair terms in its terms of 
 
 338. See, e.g., Richard Warner, Turned on its Head?: Norms, Freedom, and Acceptable 
Terms in Internet Contracting, 11 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1 (2008) (critiquing TOUs 
and clickwrap agreements for incorporating anti-transfer, anti-assignment, anti-reverse 
engineering and other terms inconsistent with norms). 
 339. Professor Amy Schmitz describes the way in which American consumers have: 
. . [a] love/hate relationship with form terms.  On the one hand, consumers admit that 
they have no interest in reading form contracts, enjoy the convenience and efficiency 
of form contracting, and routinely accept forms “dressed up” as deals without 
stopping to read or question their content.  On the other hand, consumers are often 
frustrated with the effectively nonnegotiable nature of these contracts and complain 
that they lack the requisite time or understanding to read or negotiate companies’ 
impenetrable purchase terms. 
Amy J. Schmitz, Pizza-Box Contracts: True Tales of Consumer Contracting Culture, 45 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 863, 864–65 (2010) (arguing that consumers bear some responsibility 
for acquiescing to the stronger party “run[ning] roughshod over their rights”). 
 340. Cory Doctorow, Shrinkwrap Licenses: An Epidemic of Lawsuits Waiting to Happen, 
INFO. WEEK, Feb. 7, 2007, at 1. 
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use.341  Germany, like all EU countries, adopted the Data Protection 
Directive.  The German Data Protection Authority is considering legal 
action against Facebook because they are collecting biometric features of 
users without informing them or obtaining their consent.342  This section 
presents ten pathways to reforming U.S.-style TOUs.  U.S. companies, at a 
minimum, will need to address these issues if they export information-
based consumer products to the European Union.  The troublesome features 
of TOUs need to be localized to avoid liability and protect consumer rights 
in the Eurozone. 
A.  First Point: What’s Wrong With Warranty Disclaimers 
Warranty disclaimers that eliminate all protection for consumers are 
ubiquitous in U.S.-style TOUs.343 Software publishers contend that 
warranty provisions limiting liability result in lower product pricing and 
that such a result could not occur if a software publisher had unlimited 
liability.  The unfair aspect of TOUs is that they eliminate all warranties, 
thereby eliminating consumer breach of warranty remedies in the event that 
software or other content is defective and causes harm.  In Professor 
Marotta-Wurgler’s study, a little over a third of her sample included limited 
warranties in their TOUs (not advertised separately).344  To put it bluntly, 
European courts are unreceptive to TOUs that disclaim all warranties and 
provide no meaningful remedy for service interruptions.  The Union 
Fédérale des Consommateurs v. AOL France345 court refused to enforce 
AOL’s standard term contract that disclaimed all liability for service 
interruptions.  French courts take a proactive role in policing consumer 
TOUs.  In Union Féderale de Consommateurs v. AOL France346 the French 
court struck down thirty-six clauses in AOL France’s (hereinafter AOL) 
 
 341. Maxeiner, supra note 282 at 164. 
 342. See, e.g., Steven Musil, Facebook Faces Lawsuit Over Facial Recognition Feature, 
CNET (Nov. 10, 2011, 5:10 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57322815-
93/facebook-faces-lawsuit-over-facial-recognition-feature/ (“Facebook has introduced this 
feature in Europe, without informing the user and without obtaining the required consent.  
Unequivocal consent of the parties is required by both European and national data 
protection law.”). 
 343. Bebo, a social networking site, is typical in disclaiming warranties and limiting the 
possibility of a consumer recovering any damages arising out of the use of its platform.  
Terms of Use, BEBO, http://www.bebo.com/TermsOfUse2.jsp (last updated Apr. 19, 2011); 
see also Terms of Service, TAGGED, http://www.tagged.com/terms_of_service.html 
(providing membership services on “AN ‘AS IS’ BASIS, WITHOUT ANY WARRANTIES 
OF ANY KIND”) (last updated Sept. 30, 2011). 
 344. Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 52, at 703. 
 345. R.G. N 02/03156 (tgin020604), Tribunal de Grande Instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary 
court of original jurisdiction] Nanterre, 1e ch., June 2, 2004 (Fr.). 
 346. Id. 
RUSTAD_FINAL_5669015.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/9/2012  6:58 AM 
2012] RECONCEPTUALIZING CONSUMER TERMS OF USE 1145 
 
standard terms of use agreement, and further required the online provider to 
remove those clauses from their TOUs within one month.  Additionally, the 
court fined AOL for each day it delayed removing the objectionable 
clauses.  The court ruled that AOL had a duty to notify its French 
customers of the resulting changes to its terms of use.  The French court 
imposed a fine of €30,000 against AOL and ordered the online provider to 
publish the substantive parts of the court’s judgment on its website and in 
three national daily newspapers.347  Some of the unenforceable clauses in 
AOL’s TOU included: 
• [E]ntitle the ISP to unilaterally modify the offered 
service without the consumer’s express consent (except 
where allowed by law); 
• entitle the ISP to unilaterally modify the amount of the 
service fees in fixed-term agreements without the 
consumer’s express consent, even if the consumer may 
terminate the agreement; 
• limit all obligations of the ISP to best effort obligations; 
• exonerate the ISP from its obligation to ensure access to 
the offered service in the event of a breakdown; 
• allow the ISP to terminate the agreement in the event of 
the consumer in the even “imprecise” obligations (e.g., 
“abnormal use of service”) or the consumer’s refusal to 
pay, even if such refusal is justified; 
• make the consumer liable both for liquidated and normal 
damages in the event of termination of the agreement for 
breach; and 
• provide that notices sent by e-mail are effective after the 
expiration of an excessively short period of time (e.g., 
two weeks), even if the consumer did not consult them.348 
This list of invalidated terms includes many of the standard terms 
incorporated in U.S. style terms of service, clickwrap, and browsewrap 
agreements. On September 15, 2005, the Cour d’Appel of Versailles 
affirmed the decision of the lower court on all counts find AOL France’s 
TOU to be unfair.349  The court’s decision confirms the notion that French 
courts do not endorse these one-sided clauses routinely upheld in U.S. 
courts.  There is little doubt that U.S. courts would enforce the same 
clauses struck down by the French court in the AOL case.350  Courts and 
 
 347. Bradley Joslove & Andréi Krylov, Standard American Business to Consumer Terms 
and Conditions in the EU, 18 MICH. INT’L L. 1, 2–3 (2005). 
 348. Id. at 2.  
 349. R.G. N [degree] 04/05564, J.C.P. IV 150905, Cour d’Appel [CA] [regional court of 
appeal] Versailles, 1e ch. (Sept. 15, 2005), available at http://www.clauses-
abusives.fr/juris/cav150905.pdf. 
 350. Jane K. Winn & Mark Webber, The Impact of EU Unfair Contract Terms Law on 
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consumer agencies in other European countries would likely adopt the 
French courts’ sceptical attitude to U.S.-style TOUs.  The common 
denominator of European case law is the existence of unwaivable 
mandatory terms protecting consumers.  U.S. software companies cannot 
side step the more restrictive mandatory consumer rules by the simple 
expedient of parties’ choice of law or exclusive jurisdiction clauses.351  
Software publishers routinely include one-sided forum selection clauses in 
their consumer TOUs.352  U.S.-style social networking sites also require 
consumers to submit to litigation (or arbitration) in potentially distant 
forums.353  Social networking sites that require pre-dispute mandatory 
arbitration for all disputes create absolute immunity because they know that 
consumers will not be able to exercise this impractical dispute resolution 
method. 
The United Kingdom, which shares a common law tradition with the 
United States, has implemented radically different consumer rules.  The 
UK consumer protection agencies police TOUs in the consumer 
marketplace.  In July of 2006, the UK’s Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”) 
investigated Dell’s TOUs.354  In the aftermath of the OFT investigation, 
Dell acceded to changing its online terms and conditions to make them 
more fair to UK consumers.  Dell struck a number of anti-consumer 
provisions, such as provisions that limited liability for negligence to the 
price of the product, exclusions of liability for consequential damages or 
 
U.S. Business-to-Consumer Internet Merchants, 62 BUS. LAW. 209, 225 (2006); Winn & 
Bix, supra note 213, at 183 (2006). 
 351. B2C in Europe and Avoiding Contractual Liability, supra note 279; OAKLEY, supra 
note 210, at 1067 (asserting that “the Directive also specifically provides that consumers in 
member states should not lose the protection of the Directive by virtue of a choice-of-law 
provision in a non-member country”). 
 352. See, e.g., Guadagno v. E*Trade Bank, 592 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1271–72 (C.D. Cal. 
2008) (upholding a forum selection clause requiring users to waive their right to joining 
class action and submitting to pre-dispute mandatory arbitration); Eslworldwide.com, Inc. v. 
Interland, Inc., No. 06 CV 2503, 2006 WL 1716881, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2006) 
(upholding forum selection clause including in clickwrap agreement); Siebert v. Amateur 
Athletic Union of U.S., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1039 (D. Minn. 2006) (upholding forum 
selection clause for pre-dispute mandatory arbitration); Adsit Co., Inc. v. Gustin, 874 
N.E.2d 1018, 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (upholding Adsit’s Terms of Use agreement 
containing a forum selection clause and choice of law clause where user was required to 
click on a button reading “I Accept” that was placed strategically at the bottom of the 
webpage containing the policy; clickwrap agreement also was displayed on an internet 
webpage).  See generally Rustad & Koenig, supra note 99, at 1564 (describing the 
widespread software industry practice of drafting TOUs with oppressive provisions that 
deprive consumers of any meaningful remedy). 
 353. See, e.g., Miller v. Facebook, Inc., No. C 10-00264 WHA, 2010 WL 1292708, at *2 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2010) (enforcing Facebook’s choice of forum clause in secondary 
copyright infringement case). 
 354. Press Release, Office of Fair Trading, Dell to Improve Terms and Conditions for 
Consumers (July 6, 2006), http://www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2006/111-06. 
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compensation clauses, exclusions of liability for oral representations made 
by sales representatives not confirmed in writing, and the requirement that 
consumers notify Dell of any errors in its confirmation of the consumer’s 
order immediately.355 
Ofcom, which is an independent regulator for the UK 
telecommunications industry, struck down objectionable UK Online terms 
of use when ruling that UK Online’s small print terms were potentially 
unfair to consumers.356  The OFT had:  
warned e-tailers before against telling consumers to tick a box 
saying ‘I have read and understood the terms and conditions.’ 
[And the OFT requested that e-tailers] ask [the consumer] to 
check a box indicating that they accept the terms and conditions . 
. . and highlight the importance of reading them.357 
 In June of 2010, Ofcom negotiated with UK’s three largest landline 
providers (BT, TalkTalk, and Virgin Media) to ensure that consumers were 
not assessed early termination charges.358  Ofcom’s investigation of UK 
Online resulted in an amendment by UK Online to its standard consumer 
contracts, limiting the liability for substandard service.359  UK Online 
agreed to remove specific clauses purported to “eliminate liability for delay 
in providing its service” and to “exclude liability for indirect, special or 
consequential losses, loss of profits, business interruption and loss of data, 
losses caused by any virus, denial of service, spamming or hacking [that] 
was deemed potentially unfair.”360  Ofcom also concluded that it was 
unacceptable to force consumers to indemnify UK Online against all 
claims, liability, damages, costs, and expenses, including legal fees arising 
out of the non-compliant TOU provisions.361 
In the wake of the Ofcom investigation, UK Online amended a clause 
providing a penalty for late payment; a daily interest charge on late 
payments, originally set at four percent above the base lending rate of 
Barclays Bank, was reduced by three percent for being disproportionately 
high.362  Moreover, UK Online also amended a clause, which enabled UK 
Online to modify their terms of use at any time by merely emailing changes 
to consumers.363  This clause did not give consumers a right to terminate if 
 
 355. Id. 
 356. Ofcom’s Plain English Police Target UK Online, OUT-LAW.COM (May 11, 2006), 
http://www.out-law.com/page-6910. 
 357. Id. 
 358. Id. 
 359. Id. 
 360. Id. 
 361. Id. 
 362. Id. 
 363. Id. 
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the changes were to their disadvantage.364  Ofcom required UK Online to 
give consumers a right to cancel the contract if UK Online’s unilateral 
modifications were unacceptable to them.365  Ofcom is able to force 
providers like UK Online to modify their TOUs because the provider has 
obligations to conform their agreements to the UK’s Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts Regulations of 1999.366 
The mandatory consumer rules apply only to business-to-consumer 
terms of use, social licenses, and other TOUs that are not business-to-
business (B2B) contracts.  Nevertheless, business customers also have 
rights under the UK’s Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (UCTA).  The 
UCTA places a number of restrictions on the contract terms that can be 
incorporated in B2B contracts, as illustrated by Kingsway Hall Hotel Ltd. v. 
Red Sky IT (Hounslow) Ltd.367  In Kingsway, the High Court found that 
provisions excluding a software vendor’s liability for implied warranties 
pertaining to quality and fitness purposes were unreasonable under the 
UCTA.  If the UK courts are willing to invalidate a B2B licensing 
agreement, they will be even more vigilant in protecting consumers against 
unfair or deceptive U.S.-style TOUs. 
B.  Second Point: American TOUs That Waive Consumer Rights 
In the United States, TOUs permit consumers to waive protection in 
their own jurisdiction.368  A pro-consumer approach should entitle 
consumers to access all remedies.  In Europe, a supplier/seller cannot 
circumvent mandatory consumer rules by virtue of oppressive choice of 
law.  Otherwise, the consumer legislation would disregard the private 
autonomy of parties.  This is true with the exception of situations where the 
chosen law offers the same guarantees and protections offered by the 
national law of the consumer’s home country.  There is compelling 
empirical evidence for the proposition that U.S.-style TOUs are worse than 
existing law, such as article 2 of the UCC  In Professor Marotta-Wurgler’s 
study of TOUs, she found that ninety percent of her sample TOUs 
 
 364. Id. 
 365. Id. 
 366. This was UK’s statutory enactment of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive 
mandated by the European Union. 
 367. Kingsway Hall Hotel Ltd. v. Red Sky IT (Hounslow) Ltd., 2010 EWHC 965 (TCC) 
(Eng.). 
 368. See, e.g., Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 11 Civ. 918 (RJH), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12991, 
at *40 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 24, 2012) (ordering Facebook’s motion to transfer action and 
enforcing choice of forum clause).  See generally Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 
U.S. 585, 595 (1991) (enforcing choice of forum clause outside consumer’s home court); 
see also M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972) (forum selection 
clauses “are prima facie valid and should be enforced . . . .”). 
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disclaimed warranties, while another eighty-nine percent eliminated all 
consequential damages.369  She concluded that while the terms contained in 
TOUs vary across software markets, licensors provide fewer rights than 
consumers would expect under UCC article 2.370  Throughout Europe (and 
the rest of the world), statutes prohibit the wholesale waiver of rights. 
The defenders of the market-based approach might ask why one-sided 
agreements cannot be challenged on unconscionability grounds.  Indeed, 
pursuant to UCC article 2, consumers have a right to challenge any contract 
on unconscionability grounds.371  In fact, plaintiffs have had some success 
challenging oppressive contracts employing the UCC’s doctrine of 
unconscionability.372  However, to prevail in such an action, courts require 
a finding of both procedural and substantive unconscionability.373  
Procedural unconscionability requires an unfair bargaining process 
(“bargaining naughtiness”), whereas substantive unconscionability pertains 
to overly harsh terms.374  The procedural issue is often relevant in TOUs 
where the location of the terms of use on a website may include a flawed 
contract formation process. 
A court reviewing a TOU for unconscionability may refuse to enforce 
the agreement in its entirety, invalidate the unconscionable provision, or 
“limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any 
unconscionable result.”375  The fact that a consumer has less bargaining 
power than a software vendor is not outcome determinative because the 
 
 369. Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 52, at 703. 
 370. Id. at 713. 
 371. U.C.C. § 2-302 (2004). 
 372. See, e.g., Riensche v. Cingular Wireless, L.L.C., No. C06-1325Z, 2006 WL 
3827477, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 27, 2006) (holding that the forum selection clause was 
substantively unconscionable); Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1173, 1176 
(N.D. Cal. 2002) (refusing to enforce pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clause in user 
agreement ruling that the forum selection clause was substantively and procedurally 
unconscionable).  Additionally, the doctrine of unconscionability has been applied in a wide 
array of contexts.  See, e.g., Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000, 1006 (Wash. 2007) 
(holding a class action waiver unconscionable); Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
344, 358 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (holding a class action waiver unconscionable and 
unenforceable); Aral v. EarthLink, Inc., 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229, 238 (Cal. 2005) (holding a 
class action waiver unconscionable). 
 373. See Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 575 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) 
(explaining that New York requires “a showing that a contract is ‘both procedurally and 
substantively unconscionable when made’”) (quoting Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 73 
N.Y.2d 1, 10 (1988)).  California’s test for substantive unconscionability is whether the 
clause or contract “shock[s] the conscience.”  Am. Software, Inc. v. Ali, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
477, 480 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).  The test for procedural unconscionability is whether “the 
manner in which the contract was negotiated” was unfair.  Id. at 479. 
 374. Maxwell v. Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 58 (1995) (quoting Arthur Leff, 
Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 
(1967)). 
 375. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2004). 
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purpose of the unconscionability doctrine is to prevent “oppression and 
unfair surprise,” not to rectify bargaining power imbalances.376  With the 
exception of instances in which the seller creates outrageous terms, UCC 
article 2 unconscionability is often asserted, but seldom successfully 
deployed to strike down one-sided clauses.  The doctrine of 
unconscionability applies most often in fact patterns where the customer 
has little knowledge about a complex computer system and the licensor 
lulls the inexperienced person into complacency on the basis that their 
software is adequate for the task.377  In one such instance, CompuServe was 
assessed a fine of up to €250,000 and a contempt of court judgment against 
the CEO if the provider should continue to incorporate unfair terms in its 
agreements.378 
The European Commission (EC) has targeted U.S. software 
companies in recent years for anticompetitive practices.  In May 2008, the 
EC fined Intel $1.06 billion.379  Microsoft Corporation paid a $12 million 
fine imposed by the German Government for violating Germany’s anti-
competition law.380  On March 24, 2004, the EC held that Microsoft had 
abused its dominant position under Article 82 of the European Community 
Treaty by refusing to supply and to authorize the use of interoperable 
information to the producers of competing operating systems381 and by 
tying together the Windows client PC operating system and the Windows 
Media Player.382  The EC imposed a fine of €497 million on Microsoft,383 
 
 376. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2004) (stating that the test is one of evaluating one-
sidedness under the circumstances prevailing at the making of the contract to prevent 
“oppression and unfair surprise”). 
 377. MICHAEL D. SCOTT, SCOTT ON INFO. TECH. L., § 7.11 at 7-41 to -42 (summarizing 
license agreements provisions on warranty disclaimers that were unconscionable). 
 378. Maxeiner, supra note 282 at 164. 
 379.  
The European Commission has imposed a fine of €1 060 000 000 on Intel Corporation 
for violating EC Treaty antitrust rules on the abuse of a dominant market position 
(article 82) by engaging in illegal anticompetitive practices to exclude competitors 
from the market for computer chips called x86 central processing units (CPUs).  The 
Commission has also ordered Intel to cease the illegal practices immediately to the 
extent that they are still ongoing.  Throughout the period October 2002–December 
2007, Intel had a dominant position in the worldwide x86 CPU market[.] 
Press Release, Europa, Antitrust: Commission Imposes Fine of €1.06 bn on Intel for Abuse 
of Dominant Position; Orders Intel to Cease Illegal Practices (May 13, 2005), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/745. 
 380. Kurt Mackie,  Microsoft to Appeal Uniloc Case, Pay Other Fines, MICROSOFT 
CERTIFIED PROF’L MAGAZINE (Apr. 9, 2009), 
http://mcpmag.com/articles/2009/04/09/microsoft-to-appeal-uniloc-case-pay-other-
fines.aspx. 
 381. Comm’n Decision, Case COMP C-3/37.792, at 779–91 (Mar. 24, 2004). 
 382. Id. at 792–989. 
 383. Id. at 1080. 
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further ordering it to make available the interoperability information384 and 
to allow its use on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.385 
The EC also ordered Microsoft to market a version of the Windows 
client PC operating system without the Windows Media Player and to 
refrain from using any technological, commercial, contractual, or any other 
means which would have the equivalent effect of tying Windows Media 
Player to Windows.386  Microsoft appealed this judgment before the EU 
Court of First Instance (CFI), but the CFI upheld the EC’s decision in its 
principal points.387  On October 22, 2007, about a month after the decision 
of the Court of First Instance, Microsoft reached an agreement with the 
European authorities granting access to its communications protocol for a 
one-time fee of €10,000.388  But Microsoft classified these protocols as 
trade secrets, not patents.  If competitors want more information than those 
trade secrets, they must license Microsoft’s patents, paying a royalty of 0.4 
percent of the competing product’s sales.  Microsoft had originally 
demanded 5.95 percent of sales as royalties.389 
The EC required Microsoft Corporation to change its licensing 
practices in Europe.390  Microsoft now uses a ballot approach, giving 
consumers a choice of browsers in a neutral window rather than in an 
Internet Explorer window.391  Microsoft also added an “E” to the title to 
identify the European version of Windows 7 and advised original 
equipment manufacturers that they could install a browser of their choice 
so users could begin to surf the Web immediately after purchase.392  The 
 
 384. Id. at 899–1004. 
 385. Id. at 1005–09. 
 386. Id. at 1011–14. 
 387. Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. 00000, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-
bin/gettext.pl?lang=en&num=79929082T19040201&doc=T&ouvert=T&seance=ARRET. 
 388. William H. Page & Seldon J. Childers, Bargaining in the Shadow of the European 
Microsoft Decision: The Microsoft-Samba Protocol License, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 
332 (2008). 
 389.  
On October 22, 2007, about a month after the decision of the Court of First Instance, 
the EC’s antitrust commissioner, Neelie Kroes reached an agreement with Microsoft’s 
CEO Steve Ballmer that would require Microsoft to license its intellectual property, 
other than patents, for a nominal one-time fee of [euro] 10,000, and its patents for 
modest per-unit royalties. 
Id. at 343 (2008). 
 390. Id. at 343–44 (noting that the European authorities required Microsoft to change its 
licensing practices particular as to open source licenses). 
 391. Lance Whitney, EU Resolves Microsoft IE Antitrust Case, CNET.COM (Dec. 16, 
2009, 5:28 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-10805_3-10416402-75.html. 
 392. Britta Wuelfing, Competition Laws: Microsoft 7 Without IE in Europe, LINUXPRO 
MAG. (June 15, 2009), http://www.linux-magazine.com/Online/News/Competition-Laws-
Microsoft-7-without-IE-in-Europe. 
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European approach to consumer protection is predicated upon mandatory 
terms, while the American approach is premised on allowing the free 
market to prevail with limited policing of contracts. 
C.  Third Point:  “Terms Now, Pay Later” or Rolling Contracts 
Rolling contracts are increasingly used in internet-related TOUs.  
Skype reserves the right to modify its TOUs at any time by publishing the 
revised Terms of Use on its Website.393  MyLife, a social networking site, 
reserves the right to modify and amend terms of use from time to time, for 
any reason, and without prior notice; use of the website indicates the user’s 
approval or acceptance of any changes.394  LinkedIn, the world’s largest 
network for professionals,395 also claims that it can unilaterally modify its 
terms of use from time to time.396  Microsoft’s Window’s Live social 
network site also asserts its right to modify its terms of use: 
If we amend the contract, then we’ll notify you before the change 
takes effect.  We may give this notice by posting it on the service 
or by any other reasonable means.  If you don’t agree to the 
change, we’re not obligated to keep providing the service, and 
you must cancel and stop using the service before the change 
becomes effective.  Otherwise, the new terms will apply to 
you.397 
Skype maintains that a consumer’s continued use of its products after 
changes to the terms are published constitute acceptance to be bound by the 
 
 393. Terms of Use, SKYPE, http://www.skype.com/intl/en-us/legal/terms/voip/ (last 
updated May 2012). 
 394. See, e.g., User Agreement, MYLIFE.COM (Dec. 28, 2011), 
http://www.mylife.com/UserAgreement.pub (asserting right to update terms and that 
continued use of the service signifies the user’s acceptance of the new terms and 
conditions); see also, Terms of Service, TAGGED (Sept. 30, 2011), 
http://www.tagged.com/terms_of_service.html (reserving “the right to modify or amend this 
Agreement at any time, for any reason, or for no reason at all, at Tagged’s sole discretion”). 
 395. LinkedIn is today’s fastest growing recruiting company.  For the first time ever, 
employees can maintain their own resumes for recruiters to search in real time, giving 
LinkedIn the opportunity to eat the lucrative $400 billion recruiting industry.  Marc 
Andreessen, Why Software is Eating the World, WALL ST. J. ESSAY (Aug. 20, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903480904576512250915629460.html(last 
visited Oct. 19, 2011). 
 396. LinkedIn’s Terms of Use states:  “You must comply with all applicable laws, the 
Agreement, as may be amended from time to time with or without advance notice . . . .”  
User Agreement, LINKEDIN.COM, http://www.linkedin.com/static?key=user_agreement (last 
updated June 16, 2011). 
 397. Microsoft Corp., Microsoft Service Agreement for WindowsLive ¶ 8, available at 
http://explore.live.com/microsoft-service-agreement?mkt=en-us (last updated Aug .31, 
2011). 
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terms and conditions of the revised version of the Terms of Use.398  The 
“rolling contract” that gives the licensor the right to modify contract terms 
at will is a growing trend.399 
The Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Consumer Protection 
expressed concern that the UCITA departed from traditional consumer 
protection by approving consumer software licenses that did not comply 
with the FTC’s rules on presale disclosure of material terms.400  UCITA 
validates rolling contracts if the user had reason to know that terms would 
come later, had a right to a refund if the terms were declined, and manifests 
assent after an opportunity to review the terms.401  “UCITA does not 
require that licensees be informed of licensing restrictions in a clear and 
conspicuous manner prior to the consummation of the transaction.”402  
Rolling contracts are challengeable by the European consumer protection 
agency, which is responsible for policing unfair or deceptive trade 
practices.  The Norwegian Consumer Agency challenged iTunes’ terms of 
use on the basis that it was structured as a rolling contract. 
The typical U.S.-style TOUs disclaim all express and implied 
warranties, including fitness for a particular purpose and non-infringement 
of third party rights.  Content creators often offer their products on an “as 
is” or “without any warranties of any kind” basis, which do not even 
 
 398. Id. 
 399. Peter Laird, The Good, The Bad and the Ugly of SaaS Terms of Service, Licenses, 
and Contracts, LAIRD ON DEMAND BLOG (June 12, 2008) 
http://peterlaird.blogspot.com/2008/06/good-bad-and-ugly-of-saas-terms-of.html (“Box.net, 
Coghead, Concur, Salesforce, Taleo, Zoho:  these companies have contracts that can change 
at any time without any notice.”). 
 400.  
Unlike the law governing sales of goods, UCITA departs from an important principle 
of consumer protection that material terms must be disclosed prior to the 
consummation of the transaction.  UCITA does not require that licensees be informed 
of licensing restrictions in a clear and conspicuous manner prior to the consummation 
of the transaction.  For example, UCITA allows licensors of software to disclose these 
restrictions after the transaction has been completed, such as when the licensee opens 
the software box and discovers the terms of the license.  Thus, in effect there may be 
no “meeting of the minds” prior to the consummation of the transaction.  Moreover, 
UCITA adopts a definition of the term “conspicuous” that has the effect of allowing 
material license terms not to be disclosed clearly and conspicuously at any point 
before or after the transaction is completed. 
Letter of Fed. Trade Comm’n’s Bureaus of Consumer Prot. and Competition and of the 
Policy Planning Office to John L. McClaugherty, Chair, Exec. Comm., Nat’l Conference of 
Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws (July 9, 2009), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/be/v990010.shtm (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
 401. Nimmer, supra note 264 at § 11:147 (2009). 
 402. Letter from the Fed. Trade Comm’n to John L. McClaugherty, Exec. Comm. Chair, 
Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws (July 9, 1999) available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/be/v990010.shtm. 
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warrant functionality of the platform.  A Norwegian consumer action 
against iTunes’ one-sided TOUs illustrates the sharp divide between U.S. 
and European consumer protection.  iTunes enables online customers to 
download either complete albums or individual songs from artists all over 
the world.  Although Norway is just a European Economic Area (EEA) 
member, its copyright and consumer protection law fully complies with the 
EC Copyright and the Uniform Contract Terms Directive.403  The 
Norwegian ombudsman found a large number of problematic terms, 
including the provider’s full disclaimer of liability for every kind of loss of 
data, corruption, attack, virus, interference, hacking, or other security 
intrusions.404 
On January 25, 2006, the Norwegian Consumer Council presented a 
complaint with the Consumer Ombudsman against iTunes for violation of 
fundamental consumer rights.  Norwegian Consumer Ombudsman Bjørn 
Erik Thon ruled that iTunes violated Norwegian consumer law.  In 
particular, Mr. Thon considered a number of iTunes’ clauses unreasonable 
violations of Section 9(a) of the Norwegian Marketing Control Act.  The 
Norwegian Ombudsman also found iTunes’ assertion of the right to 
unilaterally modify terms of condition or add new rules, policies, terms, or 
conditions on uses as questionable.405 
The Swedish Consumer Council has filed a similar complaint referring 
to relevant passages in the Swedish Consumers Act.406  Apple/iTunes 
replied to the Norwegian complaint and proposed revisions of some of its 
contract terms.407  There is little doubt that the activism of consumer 
agencies or Ombudsmen is a fundamental step towards an effective 
protection for consumers in Europe. 
 
 403. Lucchi, supra note 287, at 95.   
The Agreement creating the European Economic Area (EEA) entered into force on 1 
January 1994.  It allows the EEA EFTA States (Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein) to 
participate in the Internal Market on the basis of their application of Internal Market 
relevant acquis.  All new relevant Community legislation is dynamically incorporated 
into the Agreement and thus applies throughout the EEA, ensuring the homogeneity 
of the internal market. 
European Economic Area, EUROPEAN UNION: EXTERNAL ACTION, http://eeas.europa.eu/eea/ 
(last visited June 10, 2012). 
 404. For a list of iTunes’ questionable terms and conditions, see iTunes’ Questionable 
Terms and Conditions, FORBRUKERRÅDET (Jan. 25, 2006, 3:03 PM), 
http://forbrukerportalen.no/Artikler/2006/1138119849.71. 
 405. Id.  
 406. Norway, Sweden, Denmark May Fine Apple Over iTunes, OUT-LAW.COM (June 8, 
2006), http://www.out-law.com/page-6990 [hereinafter Norway]. 
 407. Henrik Nilsson & Jill Hagberg, iTunes Terms Service Scrutiny Nordic Consumer 
Ombudsmen, TWOBIRDS.COM, http://www.twobirds.com/German/News/Articles/Seiten/ 
iTunes_Terms_Service_scrutiny_Nordic_Consumer_Ombudsmen.aspx (last visited June 10, 
2012). 
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It is not unreasonable to assume that Norway will refuse enforce U.S.-
style TOUs.  In the United States, software companies use choice of 
jurisdiction and choice of law clauses to divest consumers of their home 
court consumer protection.  In Europe, choice of law rules favoring 
consumers are mandatory, non-waivable provisions and, therefore, a U.S. 
software company cannot use contractual terms to divest consumers of 
mandatory Norwegian consumer protection.  In the iTunes case, a 
consumer could theoretically be required to litigate a claim in Luxembourg 
according to English law if the iTunes contract is enforceable.  The 
Ombudsman ruled that, because iTunes-Norway targets Norwegian 
consumers in its iTunes-Norway website, the consumer’s case should be 
decided under Norwegian law, not English law.408  Moreover, the website’s 
domain name and language are Norwegian, and prices are stated in 
Norwegian kroner.  Apple/iTunes also had actions pending by the Swedish 
Consumer Counsel who objected to the contracting practice of reserving 
“the right at any time to amend the terms of an agreement.”409 
The legal advisor for the Swedish Consumer Council contended that 
rolling contracts would not be enforceable in a “Swedish court in a 
business to consumer relationship.”410  If U.S. software publishers wish to 
do business in the Eurozone, they will need to localize their TOUs to 
comply with European Union directives on unfair contract terms, 
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments, choice of law, and other 
mandatory rules.411 
The Swedish ombudsman objected to an iTunes rolling contract 
provision, which allowed iTunes to amend their contract unilaterally.412  
Norway, Sweden, and Denmark all planned to issue rulings on the iTunes 
 
 408. “According to the ruling, iTunes breaks section 9a of the Norwegian Marketing 
Control Act.  The regulator said it was not reasonable that the consumer must sign up to a 
contract regulated by English law, rather than Norwegian law.”  John Oates, iTunes Guilty 
of Breaking Norwegian Law, THE REGISTER (June 7, 2006, 2:29 PM), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/06/07/norway_rules_itunes_unfair/. 
 409. Norway, supra note 406. 
 410. Id. 
 411. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 212, at 47–49 (comparing U.S. and European 
contract, tort, and regulations governing software and Internet-related technologies). 
 412. “The contracts, like [A]nglo-[A]merican contracts, keep the right at any time to 
amend the terms of an agreement,” said Jonas Adols, legal advisor to the Swedish Consumer 
Council.  “In my eyes that includes everything including price.  You would never get away 
with that before a Swedish court in a business to consumer relationship.’”  Norway, supra 
note 406.  The Norwegian consumer advocate also objected to iTunes’ full disclaimers of 
liability for loss of data, corruption, attack, viruses, interference, hacking, or other security 
intrusions.  Id.  On January 25, 2006, the Norwegian Consumer Council filed a complaint 
with the Consumer Ombudsman against iTunes for violating fundamental consumer rights.  
Norwegian Consumer Ombudsman Bjørn Erik Thon contended that some of iTunes Terms 
of Use were unreasonable, violating section 9a of the Norwegian Marketing Control Act.  
Id. 
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terms of service.413  In Europe, the stronger contracting party does not have 
unfettered discretion to change the terms and post the revisions on a 
website.  Article 7 of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive provides that 
“Member States shall ensure that, in the interests of consumers and of 
competitors, adequate and effective means exist to prevent the continued 
use of unfair terms in contracts concluded with consumers by sellers or 
suppliers.”414 Article 7 gives European courts a powerful tool to invalidate 
rolling contracts. 
Few cases illustrate the chasm between the U.S. and European 
approaches to TOUs better than recent Italian cases interpreting Europe-
wide directives.  A recent test of European norms arose out of a consumer 
transaction in Firenze, Italy, after a consumer bought a notebook computer 
with pre-installed Microsoft software (Window XP and Works 8).415  The 
consumer, Mr. Pieraccioli, did not wish to use the Windows-based 
operating system on his computer and offered to return the software and 
requested a refund.416  The seller, Hewlett Packard Italia, refused to give a 
refund on the grounds that the software was inseparable from the 
hardware.417 
In the Italian case, the consumer had no access to the terms of 
software license agreement prior to purchasing the hardware.418  The court 
determined that a European consumer had a right to reject the terms of the 
software license agreement and to return the software for a full refund of 
the value of the Microsoft product.419  Microsoft’s TOU that accompanied 
the software gave the consumer the right to contact the producer of the 
hardware and request information in order to return the software and obtain 
the refund.420  The court reasoned that a computer without software is 
obviously less valuable and the consumer was due a refund.421  The court 
entered judgment in favor of the consumer for €140.00 in addition to the 
legal costs. 
On July 28, 2010, the Tribunal from Firenze affirmed the decision of 
the Justice of Peace.422  The Tribunal pointed out that the hardware and the 
 
 413. Id. 
 414. Council Directive 93/13, supra note 269, at art. 7. 
 415. Giudice di Pace di Firenze-Sentenza n. 5834/2007, available at 
http://www.interlex.it/testi/giurisprudenza/fi07_5384.htm (last visited June 10, 2012). 
 416. Id. 
 417. Id. 
 418. Id. 
 419. Id. 
 420. Id. 
 421. Id. 
 422. Tribunale di Firenze, 28 luglio 2010, n. 19651-2007 (It.), available at 
http://www.aduc.it/generale/files/file/allegati/Sentenza_appello_HP.pdf.  For a comment on 
the case, see Annamaria Fasulo, Software Windows preinstallato sul PC. Corte Appello 
conferma motivazioni Aduc per il rimborso: Analisi [Windows software is preinstalled on 
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software are technically separate products governed by different legal 
rules.423  The Tribunal clarified that the hardware contract is a sale 
agreement while the software is licensed.424  The Tribunal stated that the 
licensee must actually accept a license agreement for it to be enforceable.425  
In this case, Pieraccioli had no ability to accept the terms of the license 
agreement until after he purchased the hardware, accessed the computer, 
and reviewed the terms.426  The court reasoned that if the consumer refuses 
the terms, he has the right to obtain the refund of the money associated with 
the software’s costs if he returns the software.427  The court rejected the 
argument presented by HP Italia that the consumer was able to buy 
hardware without the pre-installed software somewhere else.  The judge 
ruled that the consumer is free to buy a computer along with Original 
Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) software, even if the market offers 
computers without OEM software.428  This choice does not impair the 
consumer’s right to a refund in the event he does not agree to the terms and 
conditions of the software agreement. 
In the aftermath of this case, an Italian consumer association filed a 
class action against Microsoft to obtain reimbursement of license costs for 
consumers who return the preloaded Microsoft operating system.429  Free 
Software Foundation Europe (FSFE) welcomes this initiative because a 
higher degree of transparency and the establishment of a clear 
reimbursement mechanism are necessary steps to create free competition in 
the operating system market that provides consumers real choices.430  In 
Europe, software publishers, websites, and networking sites must give 
customers full disclosure and an opportunity to accept the agreement.431  In 
 
your PC.  Appeals Court confirms Aduc reasons for the refund: Analysis], ADUC (Sept. 15, 
2010, 8:58 AM), http://www.aduc.it/articolo/software+windows+preinstallato+sul+pc+corte 
+appello_18122.php. 
 423. Id. 
 424. Id. 
 425. Id. 
 426. Id. 
 427. Id. 
 428. Id. 
 429. See Class Action contro Microsoft: L’Adesione della Free Software Europe, ADUC 
[Ass’n for the Rights of Users and Consumers] (Mar. 21, 2011, 12:46 PM), 
http://www.aduc.it/comunicato/class+action+contro+microsoft+adesione+della+free_18876
.php (last visited Feb. 4, 2012). 
 430. See FSFE Welcomes ADUC’s Class Action Against Microsoft, FSFE, 
http://fsfe.org/news/2011/news-20110321-01.en.html (last visited June 10, 2012). 
 431. “The European Union’s Unfair Contract Directive gives, in effect, all European 
consumers a fundamental right to read, review, and understand standard terms before 
concluding a contract.  The Directive is viewed by the Commission as the chief tool to 
achieve a fair result and to prevent unfair surprise and oppression.”  Rustad & Onufrio, 
supra note 9, at 65 (discussing Council Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
(93/13/EEC) (Apr. 5, 1993)). 
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Italy, an obligation of full disclosure and an opportunity to accept the 
agreement applies to business-to-business agreements432 as well as 
business-to-consumer transactions.433 
An example of how this provision of Italian contracting law works 
arose out of software licensing case in a small town in Southern Italy.434  
The plaintiff, a small company, purchased a personal computer and other 
hardware components on the Internet.435  The buyer, Cartotecnica Tigri di 
T.G. (Crt. T.), assented to a clickwrap agreement and then paid by 
submitting credit card information on the seller’s website, E. S.p.a.436  
When the computer never arrived, the buyer filed a breach of contract suit 
against the Northern Italian seller.437  The seller moved to compel a forum 
selection clause, which required that “all disputes relating to this 
Agreement shall be subjected to the decision of the Tribunal of Monza.”438  
As a preliminary matter, the judge in Partanna held that the business-to-
business clickwrap license agreement could be enforceable.439  The Italian 
Civil Code requires that a consumer-buyer demonstrate double approval for 
seller-oriented clauses such as forum selection clauses.440 
Article 1340 of the Italian Civil Code requires that a buyer double sign 
an abusive contract, otherwise the contract is unenforceable.441  The double 
signature can be executed on the internet through a digital signature or 
through a double click.442  The first click is necessary to approve the 
 
 432. Art. 1341 of the Italian Civil Code provides that general contractual terms and 
conditions drafted by one of the parties are effective against the other party if the latter, at 
the time of the agreement, was aware of them or should have been aware of them by using 
ordinary care.  Moreover, the article’s second paragraph provides that certain types of 
clauses, which are considered—in light of their nature—particularly burdensome for the 
contracting party, must be accepted by way of a specific acceptance in order to be effective.  
Such specific acceptance, in a traditional paperwork context, is usually made by way of an 
additional signature by the contracting party, placed at the bottom of the contract below the 
first signature.  See GIACOMO PARMIGIANI & FEDERICA BOCCI, BENCHMARKING OF EXISTING 
NATIONAL LEGAL E-BUSINESS PRACTICES, DG ENTR/04/68: Country Report—Italy (Sept. 
19, 2006). 
 433. However, even if a consumer is aware of an unfair contractual term in a standard 
contract and nevertheless signs the contract by way of a specific acceptance, this term can 
be regarded as void and the nullity of such term may be ascertained directly by the courts.  
See Giuseppe Cassano, Contratto via Internet e Tutela della Parte Debole: Commento a 
GdP Partanna n. 15/2002 (Jan. 2, 2002). 
 434. Giudice di Pace di Partanna, 12 Novembre 2001, available at 
http://www.ricercagiuridica.com/sentenze/index.php?num=868 (last visited June 10, 2012). 
 435. Id. 
 436. Id. 
 437. Id. 
 438. Id. 
 439. Id. 
 440. Id. 
 441. Id. 
 442. Id. 
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contractual regulation, while the second click is necessary to approve 
clauses favoring the seller.443  This case was controversial in Italy, and 
some commentators pointed out that a double click alone is insufficient to 
make a clickwrap agreement enforceable.444  According to the Decreto 
Legislativo 23 gennaio 2002,445 the instrument necessary to validate an 
online contract is the digital signature.  Italian companies are not generally 
equipped to offer this option on the internet.  As a result, the only way the 
seller can obtain the buyer’s double signature is by sending a hard copy of 
the contract via mail to the buyer.  The same problem arises with regard to 
shrinkwrap licenses, which are also considered unenforceable by Italian 
courts.446  In fact, even when a buyer is aware of the license terms (they are 
printed on the outside of the box), he is not able to double sign the license 
contract and give assent to the abusive clauses. 
Some software vendors attempt to circumvent this requirement by 
requiring buyers to double sign an application for warranties.  However, 
article 1340 of the Italian Civil Code applies only to business-to-business 
license agreement.  In consumer transactions, the Italian Consumer Code 
applies rather than the Italian Civil Code.  The Italian Civil Code 
implements the Directive 93/13/EC, which considers abusive clauses 
unenforceable. 
D.  Fourth Point:  What’s Wrong With Mandatory Arbitration in B2C 
Transactions 
One-sided arbitration clauses have a chilling effect on a consumer’s 
ability to file lawsuits against information-based platforms.  Pre-dispute 
mandatory arbitration eliminates the possibility that consumers have a 
 
 443. Id. 
 444. Professor Cassano contends that the double click is not enough to bind a party to 
unfair contract terms, but would be enough to hold a party pre-contractually liable if he 
refused to sign the abusive clauses reproduced in the hard copy of the contract.  Cassano 
explains that when a party manifests his assent to the license terms by clicking the radio 
button “I agree,” he creates an illusion that the agreement may still be concluded.  As a 
result, if the party fails to double sign the hard copy of the contract and send it back to the 
seller, he should compensate the seller for any damages caused by reasonable reliance.  He 
concludes that the double click method is insufficient to bind a consumer to unfair contract 
terms if he does not sign the hard copy.  See Giuseppe Cassano, Condizioni Generali di 
Contratto e tutela del Consumatore nell’era di Internet, 1 DIRITTO DELL’INTERNET 5 (2007); 
Aurelio Gentili, I Documenti Informatici: Validità ed Efficacia Probatoria, 3 DIRITTO 
DELL’INTERNET 297 (2006); Giuseppe Cassano e Iacopo Pietro Cimino, Contratto Via 
Internet e Tutela della Parte Debole, 10 I CONTRATTI 869 (2002).  According to the Decreto 
Legislativo (23 gennaio 2002), the instrument necessary to validate an online contract would 
be the digital signature. 
 445. Cassano, supra note 433. 
 446. Giuseppe Cassano, Condizioni Generali di Contratto e tutela del Consumatore 
nell’era di Internet, 1 DIRITTO DELL’INTERNET 5, 14–15 (2007). 
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meaningful remedy for bad software, the invasion of privacy on social 
network sites, and other consequential damages.  For example, it is 
prohibitively expensive for a Florida teenager to arbitrate in Los Angeles or 
Chicago (the forum chosen by Habbo, a website targeting teenagers).447  
Habbo.com’s terms of service require a teenager to waive his or her right to 
judicial remedies, while retaining Habbo.com’s right to litigate against the 
teenager: 
You irrevocably waive all rights to seek injunctive or other 
equitable relief and agree to limit your claims to claims for 
money damages (if any).  You agree that any suit, action or 
proceeding arising out of or relating to these Terms of Use or any 
of the transactions contemplated herein or related to the Services 
or any contests or services thereon (including without limitation, 
statutory, equitable or tort claims) shall be resolved solely by 
binding arbitration before a sole arbitrator under the rules and 
regulations of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”); 
provided, however, that notwithstanding the parties’ decision to 
resolve any and all disputes arising under these Terms of Use 
through arbitration, Sulake may bring an action in any court of 
applicable jurisdiction to protect its intellectual property rights or 
to seek to obtain injunctive relief or other equitable from a court 
to enforce the provisions these Terms of Use or to enforce the 
decision of the arbitrator.  The arbitration will be held in Los 
Angeles, California or Chicago, Illinois, whichever is closest to 
your place of residency.  The arbitrator shall apply the 
substantive laws of the State of California, shall issue a written 
decision, and shall have the power to award any legal remedies 
consistent with these Terms of Use except for punitive, 
exemplary or special damages.  The parties will split the 
arbitrator’s fee; provided, however, that if any court or arbitrator 
would find such requirement unconscionable or unenforceable, 
Sulake will have the option to pay all of such fees and proceed 
with arbitration.  You agree that the provisions in this paragraph 
will survive any termination of your account(s) or the Services.448 
Requiring a consumer to file suit in a distant forum functions as an 
absolute immunity for the social networking site where the cost and 
inconvenience of filing a lawsuit far exceed what can be recovered if the 
consumer prevails.  The reality is that consumers will be unable to find 
counsel to represent them if courts enforce mandatory arbitration clauses.449  
 
 447. See Terms and Conditions, HABBO.COM, https://help.habbo.com/entries/278067-
terms-and-conditions-us (last visited June 10, 2012) (setting out the governing law and 
requiring waiver of injunctive relief). 
 448. Id. 
 449. “More broadly, the difficulty of acquiring counsel to accept such cases with little to 
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Match.com requires users to submit to consumer arbitration under the 
American Arbitration Association.450  Match.com requires users to be 
responsible for paying their share of the costs of retaining an arbitration 
and the costs of administrative fees according to the American Arbitration 
Association’s (AAA’s) fee schedule for consumer disputes.451  For claims 
under $1000, Match.com pays all fees and users may apply to the AAA for 
a fee waiver.452  However, in all cases the users give up their rights to file 
suit, join class actions, or lodge appeals.453  Other social networks require 
consumers to pay administrative fees and their share of the cost of the 
arbitrator irrespective of the size of the claim.  The American Arbitration 
Association charges consumers two fees:  an administrative fee and an 
arbitration fee.454  The AAA fees and deposits in pre-dispute mandatory 
arbitration clauses will often exceed the total damages sought by the 
individual consumer according to the most recent schedule of fees: 
If the consumer’s claim or counterclaim does not exceed 
$10,000, then the consumer is responsible for one-half the 
arbitrator’s fees up to a maximum of $125.  This deposit is used 
to pay the arbitrator.  It is refunded if not used. 
If the consumer’s claim or counterclaim is greater than $10,000, 
but does not exceed $75,000, then the consumer is responsible 
for one-half the arbitrator’s fees up to a maximum of $375.  This 
deposit is used to pay the arbitrator.  It is refunded if not used. 
If the consumer’s claim or counterclaim exceeds $75,000, or if 
the consumer’s claim or counterclaim is non-monetary, then the 
consumer must pay an Administrative Fee in accordance with the 
Commercial Fee Schedule.  A portion of this fee is refundable 
pursuant to the Commercial Fee Schedule.  The consumer must 
also deposit one-half of the arbitrator’s compensation.  This 
deposit is used to pay the arbitrator.  This deposit is refunded if 
not used.  The arbitrator’s compensation rate is set forth on the 
panel biography provided to the parties before the arbitrator is 
 
no possibility of financial compensation effectively insulates” the stronger party from 
liability or damages.”  Alexander J. Casey, Arbitration Nation: Wireless Services Providers 
and Class Action Waivers, 6 WASH J. L. & TECH & ARTS 15, 27 (2010). 
 450. Match.Com: Arbitration Procedures, MATCH.COM, http://www.match.com/ 
registration/arbitrationProcedures.aspx (last visited June 10, 2012). 
 451. Id. 
 452. Id. 
 453. Match.com Terms of Use Agreement, MATCH.COM, 
http://www.match.com/registration/membagr.aspx (last visited June 10, 2012). 
 454. Am. Arb. Ass’n, Consumer Arbitration Costs, available at 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22039 (last visited June 10, 2012) (fees effective Jan. 1, 
2010). 
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appointed.455 
Geni.com’s Terms of Use Agreement, like the agreement for 
Habbo.com, gives either the social media site or the user the right to settle 
disputes through arbitration in Los Angeles.456  Geni.com reserves the 
social networking site’s right to its legal remedies and ability to file for 
“injunctive relief in a court of competent jurisdiction.”457  Tagged.com 
requires users to give the social media site notice and to wait thirty days 
before instituting arbitration.458  The user also agrees to “attempt in good 
faith to resolve the dispute” described in the user’s notice.459 
Users may elect to seek arbitration by submitting a check or money 
order payable to the AAA for the appropriate filing fee.460  Academia.edu, a 
social networking site for academics, requires users to submit to the AAA 
consumer arbitration process in lieu of any legal remedy.461  Cafemom.com, 
a social networking site for mothers-to-be, requires all claims to be settled 
 
 455. Id. 
 456. The TOUs for Genic.om includes the following language:  
This Agreement and any dispute regarding the Geni Services shall be governed by the 
laws of the State of California, USA, without regard to conflict of law provisions and 
you agree to exclusive personal jurisdiction and venue in the state and federal courts 
of the United States located in the State of California, City of Los Angeles.  Either 
Geni or you may demand that any dispute between Geni and you about or involving 
the Geni Services must be settled by arbitration utilizing the dispute resolution 
procedures of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) in Los Angeles, 
California, USA, provided that the foregoing shall not prevent Geni from seeking 
injunctive relief in a court of competent jurisdiction. 
Terms of Use, GENI.COM, http://www.geni.com/company/terms_of_use (last visited Feb. 10, 
2012). 
 457. Id. 
 458. Terms of Service, TAGGED.COM, http://www.tagged.com/terms_of_service.html (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2012). 
 459. Id. 
 460. The American Association’s current fee is based upon the size of the claim in 
dispute.  The consumer must pay between $125 and $375, while the business or social 
network will pay the rest of the costs of arbitration. Am. Arb. Ass’n, Consumer Arbitration 
Costs, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp? Id.=22039 (last visited Feb. 10, 2012). 
 461. The TOUs for Academia.edu include the following language: 
If there is any dispute about or involving the Academia.edu Services, you agree that 
the dispute shall be governed by the laws of the State of Oregon, USA, without regard 
to conflict of law provisions and you agree to exclusive personal jurisdiction and 
venue in the state and federal courts of the United States located in the State of 
California.  Either Academia.edu or you may demand that any dispute between 
Academia.edu and you about or involving the Academia.edu Services must be settled 
by arbitration utilizing the dispute resolution procedures of the American Arbitration 
Association (AAA) in Los Angeles, California, USA, provided that the foregoing 
shall not prevent Academia.edu from seeking injunctive relief in a court of competent 
jurisdiction. 
Terms of Use, ACADEMIA.EDU, http://academia.edu/terms (last visited June 10, 2012). 
RUSTAD_FINAL_5669015.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/9/2012  6:58 AM 
2012] RECONCEPTUALIZING CONSUMER TERMS OF USE 1163 
 
by AAA’s procedures that require consumers to split the fees and the cost 
of arbitrators.462 
Pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses are included in terms of 
service documents because they benefit content creators and effectively 
operate as an anti-remedy.  The legal significance of such a clause is that 
the consumer forfeits his or her right to have any dispute resolved by a 
judge or jury.  Instead, the agreement mandates that any disputes be 
resolved exclusively through a private system of binding arbitration (and 
without the possibility of an appeal).  U.S. courts enforce these clauses 
even if the practical effect is to divest consumers of any meaningful 
remedy because of the expense or inconvenience to the consumer.463  
Slightly less than 10 percent of terms of service agreements studied by 
Mann and Siebeneicher contain a pre-dispute mandatory arbitration 
clause.464 
 
 462. The Terms of Service for Cafemom.com include the following language:  
These TOS are governed by, and will be interpreted in accordance with, the laws of 
the State of New York, without regard to any choice of law provisions.  You agree 
that, with the exception of injunctive relief sought by CafeMom for any violation of 
CafeMom’s proprietary or other rights, any and all disputes relating to these TOS, 
your use of the Site or the Services shall be resolved by arbitration in accordance with 
the then-current rules of the American Arbitration Association (the ‘AAA’) before an 
independent arbitrator designated by the AAA. The location of arbitration shall be 
New York, New York, USA. 
Terms of Service, CAFEMOM.COM, http://www.cafemom.com/about/tos.php (last visited June 
10, 2012). 
 463. Compulsory arbitration clauses in mass-market license agreements, computer 
contracts, or terms of service have been upheld by numerous U.S. courts.  See, e.g., 
Chandler v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 358 F. Supp. 2d 701, 706 (S.D. Ill. 2005) (ordering 
arbitration in case where a pre-dispute arbitration clause was added to the consumer’s 
contract for wireless services); Lieschke v. RealNetworks, Inc., No. 99 C 7274, 99 C 7380, 
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1683, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 2000) (enforcing arbitration clauses in 
terms of service agreement); Westendorf v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
(CBC) 1110, at *2–3 (Del. Ch. 2000) (holding that the plaintiff was bound to an arbitration 
clause because she kept her computer for thirty days, thereby accepting Gateway’s terms 
and conditions for sale of the computer and related services); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, 
L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 530, 532–33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (validating forum 
selection clause where subscribers to online software were required to review license terms 
in scrollable window and to click “I Agree” or “I Don’t Agree”); Brower v. Gateway 2000, 
246 A.D.2d 246, 256 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (ordering enforcement of arbitration clause in 
Gateway’s standard computer contract); Barnett v. Network Solutions, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 200, 
203–04 (Tex. App. 2001) (upholding forum selection clause in online contract for 
registering internet domain names that require users to scroll through terms before accepting 
or rejecting them); cf. Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns. Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(holding that user’s downloading software where the terms were submerged did not 
manifest assent to arbitration clause); Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1341 
(D. Kan. 2000) (declining to enforce arbitration clause on grounds that user did not agree to 
standard terms mailed inside the computer box). 
 464. Mann & Siebeneicher, supra note 110, at 999. 
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A growing number of U.S.-based websites impose pre-dispute 
mandatory arbitration on consumers purchasing their services.465  
Match.com imposed arbitration for all disputes, except for small claims that 
may be filed only in Dallas County, Texas.466  The terms of use for 
Match.com provide binding arbitration administered by the American 
Arbitration Association as an exclusive means of resolving disputes.  The 
one exception to the exclusivity of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration is that 
a user may bring an action in small claims court.  Pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements in the consumer market are, in effect, anti-remedies that shield 
the dominant party from the possibility of a lawsuit, and immunity breeds 
irresponsibility.467 
Senator Dick Durbin summarized Congressional testimony that 
described pre-dispute arbitration as a “field of dreams” for the stronger 
party but a “nightmare for employees and consumers.”468  Arbitration is a 
procedure where the employer or licensor is able to have the advantages of 
a repeat player against a consumer, who is a one-shotter.469  Professors 
Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin summarize the case against compulsory 
arbitration clauses in consumer transactions: 
Opponents of mandatory arbitration in consumer contracts 
characterize these clauses as a limited and often unsatisfactory 
 
 465. See Terms and Conditions, HABBO.COM, https://help.habbo.com/entries/278067-
terms-and-conditions-us (last visited June 10, 2012) (requiring mandatory arbitration); 
Terms of Service, TAGGED.COM, http://www.tagged.com/terms_of_service.html (last visited 
June 10, 2012) (same). 
 466. Terms of Use Agreement, MATCH.COM, at para. 23 
http://www.match.com/registration/membagr.aspx (last revised June 10, 2012) (stating that 
“[i]n the event that this arbitration agreement is for any reason held to be unenforceable, any 
litigation against Match.com (except for small-claims court actions) may be commenced 
only in the federal or state courts located in Dallas County, Texas.”). 
 467. Professors Eisenberg, Miller and Sherwin found that seventy-five percent of 
consumer contracts they studied included pre-dispute arbitration clauses.   
Using a sample of 26 consumer contracts and 164 nonconsumer contracts from large 
public corporations, we compared the use of arbitration clauses in firms’ consumer 
and nonconsumer contracts.  Over three-quarters of the consumer agreements 
provided for mandatory arbitration but less than 10% of the firms’ material non-
consumer, non-employment contracts included arbitration clauses. 
Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller, & Emily Sherwin, Empirical Studies of Mandatory 
Arbitration, Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in 
Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 871, 871 (2008). 
 468. Statement of The Hon. Richard J. Durbin United States Senator 
from Illinois before United States Senate, Comm. on the Judiciary (July 23, 2008) (“A high-
level manager of one of these firms has called mandatory arbitration a ‘field of dreams.’  
But as Harvard Law Professor and arbitration judge Elizabeth Bartholet has testified before 
this Committee, mandatory pre-dispute arbitration can be a nightmare for employees and 
consumers.”).  
 469. Id. 
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mode of dispute resolution imposed by economically powerful 
corporations on unsophisticated consumers without genuine 
consent.  Consumers are deprived of jury trials; instead their 
claims are judged by private arbitrators who may seek to 
ingratiate themselves with companies that frequently use their 
services.  Damage awards may be lower in arbitration than in 
litigation, though evidence supporting this claim is inconclusive.  
Critics also maintain that mandatory arbitration of consumer 
disputes is detrimental to the public interest in open resolution of 
legal controversies.  Arbitration proceedings are typically private 
and do not result in published opinions; therefore, decisions 
rendered by arbitrators contribute nothing to the body of law 
[and] have little deterrent effect on future wrongdoing.470 
MyLife.com, which currently has 200 million profiles, requires 
registrants to agree to their terms of use applicable to all members.471  
MyLife.com requires users to agree to pre-dispute mandatory arbitration 
for all disputes.472  Fotik.com, an online photo sharing community, imposes 
compulsory arbitration on its users.473  There is little by way of case law on 
the enforceability of arbitration provisions in internet-related terms of 
use.474  In many social media disputes, the cost of arbitrating a claim will 
far exceed any monetary remedy sought. 
 
 
 470. Eisenberg et al., supra note 467, at 872–73 (citations omitted). 
 471. User Agreement, MYLIFE.COM, http://www.mylife.com/UserAgreement.pub (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2012). 
 472. Users “agree to arbitrate all disputes and claims arising out of or relating to this 
Agreement between MyLife.com and [users].”  Id. at para. 7. 
 473. The terms of service agreement for Fotki.com includes the following language:  
In the event a dispute shall arise between the parties to this agreement, it is hereby 
agreed that the dispute shall be referred to a United States Arbitration and Mediation 
(USA&M) office to be designated by USA&M National Headquarters for arbitration 
in accordance with the applicable USA&M Rules of Arbitration.  The arbitrator’s 
decision shall be final and legally binding and judgment may be entered thereon.  
Each party shall be responsible for its share of the arbitration fees in accordance with 
the applicable Rules of Arbitration.  In the event a party fails to proceed with 
arbitration, unsuccessfully challenges the arbitrator’s award, or fails to comply with 
the arbitrator’s award, the other party is entitled to costs of suit, including a reasonable 
attorney’s fee for having to compel arbitration or defend or enforce the award. 
Terms of Service Agreement, FOTKI.COM, http://help.fotki.com/terms/ (last updated Dec. 23, 
2009). 
 474. In the pre-Conception case of Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., a Pennsylvania 
federal court struck down Second Life’s arbitration clause on the grounds it was 
unconscionable.  487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 611 (E.D. Pa. 2007).  The court found that the 
developer failed to give the consumer sufficient information on the costs and rules of 
arbitration in the International Chamber of Commerce.  Id. at 606.  The court reasoned that 
Second Life could have explained the arbitration procedure in either the terms of use or a 
hyperlink to another page. 
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Nevertheless, U.S. courts broadly validate mandatory arbitration 
provisions in consumer transactions.475  European courts will not enforce 
pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses because they clash with a 
Eurozone norm of the consumer’s right to litigate in their home court.476  In 
Oceano, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that a clause that selects 
the seller’s principal place of business as the relevant jurisdiction is an 
unfair term because it may result in a trial far from the consumer’s 
domicile.477  After Asturcom, where the ECJ raised the European Directive 
at the level of public policy, other courts may rule that European consumers 
are protected from inconvenient choices of forum or from an enforcement 
of a foreign arbitral award.478  The ECJ’s extraterritorial application of 
mandatory consumer rules has implications for U.S. software companies 
exporting their products to the European consumer market. 
Professor Marotta-Wurgler’s empirical study of U.S.-style TOU 
agreements found that in her sample of 647 license agreements, sellers used 
choice of law and forum selection clauses strategically.479  In her study, she 
did not regard “choice of law provisions per se as being less buyer 
 
 475. See, e.g., Lieschke v. RealNetworks, Inc., No. 99 C 7274, 99 C 7380, 2000 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 1683, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 2000) (upholding end user agreement in website 
agreement including mandatory arbitration clause citing presumption in favor of arbitration 
under Federal Arbitration Act); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572, 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (upholding a Gateway standard clause requiring users to submit to 
mandatory arbitration even though the standard form was included in the box with the 
personal computer and software); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 530, 
532–33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (upholding arbitration agreement presented in a 
clickwrap agreement). 
 476. Article 6.2 of the Unfair Contracts Directive  (Council Directive 93/13/EC) requires  
Member States to: 
[T]ake the necessary measures to ensure that the consumer does not lose the 
protection granted by this Directive by virtue of the choice of the law of a non-
Member country as the law applicable to the contract if the latter has a close 
connection with the territory of the Member States. 
Council Directive 93/13, supra note 269, at art. 6(2). 
 477. Joined Cases C-240/98 to C-244/98, Oceano Grupo Editorial SA v. Rocio Murciano 
Quintero and Salvat Editores SA v. José M. Sánchez Alcón Prades, 2000 E.C.R. I-4941 
(June 27, 2000), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61998J0240:EN:HTML. 
 478. “For all practical purposes, Asturcom establishes that the enforcement of a final 
arbitral award must not be granted where domestic law allows for a public policy review of 
final arbitral awards and the national court in its review finds that the arbitration clause is 
unfair under Directive 93/13 . . . .  However, the Asturcom reasoning goes much further by 
generally making article 6 of Directive 93/13 part of public policy . . . .  This opens the door 
for a comprehensive revision au fond of the arbitral award contrary to general principles of 
arbitration law.”  ECJ Case C 40/08 Asturcom—EU Unfair Terms Law Confirmed as a 
Matter of Public Policy, 28 ASA BULLETIN No. 2 (June 2010), available at 
http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/ASA_Graf_7210.pdf. 
 479. Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 52, at 701. 
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friendly.”480  The widespread use of U.S. choice of law clauses in TOU 
agreements is “a strategic gerrymandering of the dispute-resolution 
process.”481  It is “the specification of a particular forum or a mandatory 
arbitration provision” that makes these provisions pro-licensor.482  Software 
licensors are able to engage in forum gerrymandering because they are not 
prohibited from doing so by statute.  Courts will only refuse to enforce 
choice of law agreements to the extent it would vary a rule that may not be 
varied by agreement under the law of the jurisdiction whose law would 
apply.483  For access contracts and electronic delivery contracts, the choice 
of law is the law of the jurisdiction where the licensor was located at the 
time the agreement began.484  In business-to-business license agreements, 
the parties have the discretion to choose the law that applies, which is 
consistent with the Rome I Regulation governing choice of law for the 
twenty-seven Member States of the EU.485 
The Rome I Regulation adopted the consumer’s home court rule, 
which means that for consumer contracts, the governing law is the place 
where a consumer has her “habitual residence.”486  The distinctive 
consumer rules pertain only to natural persons who have their place of 
residence in European Member States.  A consumer must be “regarded as 
[one] being outside his trade or profession” that deals with another person, 
the professional, “acting in the exercise of his trade or profession.”487  
Article 6 applies to anyone “direct[ing] such activities” to that Member 
State or to several States.488  American-style choices of forum clauses in 
business-to-consumer licensing transactions are not enforceable because 
they require European consumers to waive consumer protection.489 
European courts will annul all forum selection clauses that attempt to 
deprive the consumer of mandatory consumer protection in their home 
court.  Forum selection clauses will frequently collide with either national 
law or article 6.2 of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive.  The Unfair 
 
 480. Id. 
 481. Id. at 702. 
 482. Id. at 701. 
 483. ABA Working Group, 2002 Amendments to UCITA. 
 484. Priscilla Walter, UCITA: ESTABLISHING A LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR E-
COMMERCE 4 (2002). 
 485. EU Parliament & Council Regulation on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations No 593/2008, June 17, 2008 (EC) (Rome I). 
 486. See id. at art. 6 (explaining mandatory rules for consumer transactions). 
 487. Id. 
 488. Id. 
 489. See B2C in Europe and Avoiding Contractual Liability, supra note 260; Oakley, 
supra note 210, at 1067 (asserting that “the Directive also specifically provides that 
consumers in member states should not lose the protection of the Directive by virtue of a 
choice-of-law provision in a nonmember country.  That would make, for example, the 
choice of Virginia law in an AOL contract inapplicable within the European Union.”). 
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Contract Terms Directive provides: 
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that 
the consumer does not lose the protection granted by this 
Directive by virtue of the choice of the law of a non-Member 
country as the law applicable to the contract if the latter has a 
close connection with the territory of the Member States.490 
On the surface, UCITA seems to give the courts wide discretion “to 
avoid a result contrary to public policy, in each case to the extent that the 
interest in enforcement is clearly outweighed by a public policy against 
enforcement of the term.”491  However, no U.S. court has refused to enforce 
a TOU agreement on either First Amendment or fair comment grounds.  
The case law on fundamental public policies applicable to consumer TOU 
agreements offers almost no guidance to the industry.  Courts have set the 
“public policy” bar too high to be of any help in policing unfair contract 
terms.  The question of whether a public policy is fundamental is an 
amorphous concept that is of no help to U.S. consumers challenging 
oppressive forum selection clauses. 
The court in Asturcom applied the Unfair Term Directive to a mobile 
phone subscription contract between a Spanish company, Asturcom 
Telecomunicaciones, and a Spanish consumer, Maria Cristina Rodriguez 
Nociera.492  The mobile phone contract contained an arbitration clause 
under which any dispute concerning the performance of the contract was to 
be referred for arbitration to the Asociación Europea de Arbitraje de 
 
 490. Council Directive 93/13, supra note 269, at art. 6(2).  Another case illustrating this 
principle has been applied by European Court of Justice in Ingmar G.B. Ltd. v. Eaton 
Leonard, Case C-381/98, Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber), Nov. 9, 2000, [2000] 
ECR 1-9305.  This case regards the Council Directive on commercial agents, which imposes 
an obligation on the Member States to enact a provision for the indemnification of 
commercial agents upon the termination of their contracts.  In this case, an agent was 
performing his activities in the UK on behalf of a California firm and the law chosen by the 
parties to govern the agency contract was the law of California, which did not include such 
indemnification.  The ECJ stated: 
[I]t is essential for the Community legal order that a principal established in a non-
member country, whose commercial agent carries on his activity within the 
Community, cannot evade those provisions by the simple expedient of a choice-of-law 
clause.  The purpose served by the provisions in question requires that they be applied 
where the situation is closely connected with the Community, in particular where the 
commercial agent carries on his activity in the territory of a Member State, 
irrespective of the law by which the parties intended the contract to be governed. 
Even if this was not a consumer law case, the principle established here is the same as that 
expressed by the previously mentioned article 6.2 of the Directive 93/13/EC. 
 491. UCITA § 105(b). 
 492. Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v. Cristina Rodríguez Nogueira, Case C-40/08, 
2009 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62008, at para. 27 (Oct. 6, 2009), available at 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62008J0040:EN:HTML. 
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Derecho y Equidad.493  The terms of service did not mention that the 
location for arbitration was in Bilbao, Spain.494  After the consumer failed 
to make payment on her account after a number of notices, Asturcom 
obtained an arbitral award ordering Mrs. Nociera to pay the amount of 
money due.495  The consumer neither participated in the arbitration nor 
brought an action for the annulment of the final award.496  Asturcom sought 
to enforce a consumer arbitral award but the Juzgado de Primera Instancia 
(Court of first Instance) refused enforcement ruling that the agreement to 
arbitrate was unfair.497 
The Spanish court demonstrated legal realism in its presumption that 
the consumer had, in effect, an anti-remedy.  The court reasoned that the 
travel costs that would be incurred by the consumer would exceed the sum 
at issue in the lawsuit.498  Another shortcoming of arbitration is that 
arbitrators have no power to rule on their own accord that a given 
arbitration clause is invalid.  Secondly, Law 1/2000 does not contain any 
provision dealing with a proper jurisdictional court’s or tribunal’s 
assessment as to whether arbitration clauses are unfair when adjudicating 
an action for enforcement of an arbitration award that has become final.499 
The Juzgado de Primera Instancia No 4 de Bilbao expressed doubts as 
to whether a pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clause was compatible with 
EU Community consumer law.  The court asked the ECJ for an opinion 
determining whether it could hold a hearing as to the Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive and whether it had power to apply res judicata to the 
domestic arbitral award.500  It also asked the ECJ whether the Directive 
gave it the power to annul arbitral awards that it deemed to be unfair.501  
 
 493. Id. at para. 20. 
 494. Id. 
 495. Id. at para. 22. 
 496. Id. at para. 23. 
 497. Id. at para. 25. 
 498. Id. 
 499. Id. at para. 26. 
 500.  
The Unfair Contract Terms Directive . . . introduces a notion of ‘good faith’ in order 
to prevent significant imbalances in the rights and obligations of consumers on the 
one hand and sellers and suppliers on the other hand.  This general requirement is 
supplemented by a list of examples of terms that may be regarded as unfair.  Terms 
that are found unfair under the Directive are not binding for consumers.  The 
Directive also requires contract terms to be drafted in plain and intelligible language 
and states that ambiguities will be interpreted in favour of consumers.  Member States 
must make sure that effective means exist under national law to enforce these rights 
and that such terms are no longer used by businesses. 
General Contractual Rights: Unfair Contract Terms, EUROPA, 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/gen_rights_en.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2011). 
 501. Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v. Cristina Rodríguez Nogueira, Case C-40/08, 
2009 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62008, at para. 27 (Oct. 6, 2009), available at 
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The ECJ ruled that the national court had this power, highlighting the 
system of mandatory rules in Directive 93/13 as predicated upon the 
assumption that the consumer is in a vulnerable position vis-à-vis the seller 
or supplier in terms of bargaining power as well as level of knowledge.502  
article 6 of the Directive provides national courts with a mechanism for 
policing unfair contract terms in TOUs.503  The ECJ highlighted article 6’s 
mandatory provision, which aims to establish equality between the rights 
and obligations of the parties.504 
The court drew upon Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores505 
and Mostaza Claro506 in its ruling that the imbalance which exists between 
the consumer and the seller or supplier may be corrected only by positive 
action unconnected with the actual parties to the contract.507  As a result, 
the ECJ held that the national court is required to assess of its own motion 
whether a contractual term is unfair.508  The ECJ distinguished Asturcom 
from Mostaza Claro because the arbitral award in the former case had 
become final under Spain’s doctrine of res judicata.509  The Spanish court 
acknowledged the role of res judicata for creating certainty in the law.510  
However, the ECJ acknowledged that even the doctrine of res judicata is 
subject to the EU Principles of effectiveness and equivalence.511  Res 
judicata, the ECJ reasoned, must not be a barrier preventing consumers 
from exercising mandatory rights conferred by European Union law.512  
Spanish law, in this case, gave the consumer a time limit of two months 
from the notification of the arbitral award to exercise an action of 
annulment.513  According to the ECJ, this period satisfied the principle of 
effectiveness.514 
The court then focused on the principle of equivalence.515  The 
principle of equivalence requires courts to ensure that consumers do not 
 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62008J0040:EN:HTML. 
 502. Id. at para. 29. 
 503. Id. at para. 30. 
 504. Id. 
 505. Joined Cases C-240/98 to C-244/98, Océano GrupoEditorial and Salvat Editores 
2000 E.C.R. I-4941 (June 27, 2000), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61998J0240:EN:HTML. 
 506. Case C-168/05 Elisa María Mostaza Claro v. Centro Móvil Milenium SL 2006 
E.C.R. I-10421 (Oct. 26, 2006), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62005J0168:EN:HTML. 
 507. Id. at para. 31. 
 508. Id. at para. 32. 
 509. Id. at para. 33. 
 510. Id. at para. 36. 
 511. Id. at para. 38. 
 512. Id. at para. 39. 
 513. Id. at para. 15. 
 514. Id. at para. 46. 
 515. Id. at para. 49. 
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have less protection under community law than they would under domestic 
law.  This doctrine requires that the conditions imposed by domestic law 
under which courts and tribunals apply a rule of community law of their 
own motion, must not be less favorable than those governing the 
application of the rules of domestic law of the same ranking.516  In other 
words, the main issue was how to determine which claims are equivalent.  
On this point, the court held that in view of the nature and importance of 
the public interest underlying the protection which Directive 93/13 confers 
on consumers, article 6 of the directive must be regarded as a provision of 
equal standing to national rules that rank within the domestic legal system 
as rules of public policy.517  It is likely that a national court or tribunal may 
motion to challenge a pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clause in a 
consumer TOU.  A court or other tribunal could employ domestic rules of 
public policy to strike down pre-disputed arbitration clauses as unfair under 
article 6.518 
By raising article 6 of the Unfair Term Directive to the level of public 
policy, the court empowers European consumers to challenge all pre-
dispute mandatory arbitration clauses as an unfair contracting practice.  
Consumers may not only question the fairness of a specific arbitration 
clause, but also challenge the fairness of any other TOU term interpreted or 
rendered by a given arbitral tribunal by citing the European-wide 
Directive.519  This finding opens the door to a more comprehensive review 
of such contractual provisions.  Furthermore, the courts may judicially 
review TOUs and other contracts ex officio without an action filed by a 
party.  More important, as pointed out by some commentators, even though 
in the present case the court had to deal with a purely domestic case, “it can 
be expected that, as in the case of competition law rules in Eco-Swiss, the 
ECJ would likewise consider the EU law related to unfair terms to rank as 
public policy in a defense against the enforcement of a foreign arbitral 
award under the New York Convention.”520  Article V (2)(b) provides that 
“Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if 
the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement 
is sought finds that the recognition or enforcement of the award would be 
contrary to the public policy of that country.”521 
This finding has implications for all U.S.-style TOUs that contain pre-
 
 516. Id. 
 517. Id. at para. 52. 
 518. Id. at para. 53. 
 519. Bernd Ulrich Graf & Arthur E. Appleton, ECJ Case C 40/08 Asturcom – EU Unfair 
Terms Confirmed as a Matter of Public Policy, 28 ASA BULLETIN No. 2/2010, 416 (2010). 
    520.   Id. at 417. 
 521. Id. at 417; Christian Koller, Round Two: Arbitration Clauses in B2C Contracts v. 
EU Public Policy (Nov. 20, 2009), available at http://www.arbitration-
austria.at/arbaut_blog_rss_view.php?blogID=59. 
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dispute mandatory arbitration clauses.  U.S. content providers should 
assume that it is likely that no European court will enforce such provisions 
nor a U.S. arbitral decision against a European consumer, thus rendering 
ineffective the arbitration clause often used by American companies in 
their consumer license agreements. 
Italian courts, interpreting European directives, are not receptive to 
enforcing forum selection clauses in consumer transactions.  Sky Italia, an 
Italian cable company, threatened to sue Mr. Mita Enrico because he used a 
smart card in a bar, a public place, breaching the license agreement.522  The 
license contract allowed a consumer to watch TV programs in the privacy 
of his own home, but not in a public place.  Specifically, Sky threatened to 
enforce a contract term that unilaterally determined an amount between 
€2,500.00 and €6,960.00, as damages for breach of contract.523 
Sky Italia answered the consumer’s lawsuit by bringing its own breach 
of contract claim and moving to compel a forum selection clause, which 
required that all disputes relating to the agreement were subject to the 
decision of the Tribunal of Milano, the city where they were located.524 
At the hearing of December 31, 2006, Sky Italia decided to not 
enforce the forum selection clause.  As pointed out by the judge, if Sky 
Italia has been insistent in pursuing the enforcement of the forum selection 
clause it would not succeed.525  After that the judge established that the art. 
1469-bis c.c. implementing the European Directive 93/13/CE applies to the 
present case, he reported the interpretation of the art. 1496-bis comma 2 n. 
19 of the Italian Civil Code provided by the Corte di Cassazione 
establishing that a clause, which selects as a forum a place that is different 
from the consumer’s residence or domicile, must be regarded as unfair and 
therefore void.526  This is true unless the seller proves that the clause was 
individually negotiated.527 
Then, the judge evaluated the unfairness of the clause that unilaterally 
determined an amount of money to be paid by the consumer in case of 
breach of contract in light of the Italian law implementing the Unfair Term 
Directive.528 
 
 522. Giudice di Pace di Casarano, 11 Gennaio 2010, available at 
http://www.informazione.it/pruploads/06dee925-a945-4b09-a3ba-
f7865d1b002e/Sentenza%20SKY%20Avv.%20Storella%2016-03-2010%20.pdf. 
 523. Id. 
 524. Id. 
 525. Id. 
 526. Id. 
 527. Id. 
 528. He took in consideration the art. 1469-bis, comma 3, n.6 implementing the Unfair 
Term Directive that regards as unfair a clause requiring any consumer who fails to fulfill his 
obligation to pay a disproportionately high sum in compensation.  Also, it relies on the art. 
1469-ter comma 1 providing that “the unfairness of a contractual term shall be assessed, 
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The judge reasoned that the purpose of the Unfair Contracts Directive 
was to protect the consumer as the weaker party from undue influence and 
pressure by the seller.529  The court also found that Sky Italia presented its 
agreement on a “take it or leave it” basis; the consumer was presented with 
a pre-drafted contract.530  The Directive provides that “[w]here any seller or 
supplier claims that a standard term has been individually negotiated, the 
burden of proof in this respect shall be incumbent on him.”531  As a result, 
the judge determined that a seller could not rely on a unilaterally pre-
drafted declaration included in a standard contract to satisfy the burden of 
proof; the court reasoned that this standard form contract violated the spirit 
of Directive 93/13, which serves to protect the consumer as the weaker 
party.532  After verifying that Sky Italia had provided the consumer a pre-
drafted contract to be signed without any specific negotiation of the single 
clauses, the judge turned to the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (“UCTD”) 
to evaluate the unfairness of the non-negotiated clause.533 
The UCTD regards it as unfair to require “any consumer who fails to 
fulfill his obligation to pay a disproportionately high sum in 
compensation.”534  The court considered the annual Sky membership of 
€564.00 to be excessive535 and reasoned that Sky Italia had the burden to 
prove the amount of the membership for public use to allow the court to 
determine the amount of damage suffered by Sky.536  Because Sky did not 
produce this information, the court took into consideration the annual 
membership provided in the contract between Sky and Mita Enrico to 
evaluate its unfairness.537  The judge refused to enforce the non-negotiated 
unfair clause and awarded the consumer €1,590.00 to defray his legal 
 
taking into account the nature of the goods or services for which the contract was 
concluded” and the comma 4 providing that “the terms or aspects of a term that have been 
individually negotiated cannot be regarded as unfair.”  Where any seller or supplier claims 
that a standard term has been individually negotiated, the burden of proof in this respect 
shall be incumbent on him.  According to the jurisprudence, an individual negotiation does 
not require just the simple approval of the unfair clause by the consumer, but requires an 
active participation of the consumer.  The declaration of the consumer that the single term 
was subject to a previous negotiation, if included in a pre-formulated standard contract, is 
not enough to prove that an individual negotiation took place.  As a result, the judge 
excluded that a seller could rely on a unilaterally pre-drafted declaration, included in a 
standard contract, in order to satisfy the burden of proof. 
 529. Id. 
 530. Id. 
 531. Council Directive 93/13, supra note 269, at art. 3 comma 2. 
 532. Giudice di Pace di Casarano, supra note 522. 
 533. Id. 
 534. Council Directive 93/13, supra note 269. 
 535. Giudice di Pace di Casarano, supra note 522. 
 536. Id. 
 537. Id. 
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expenses.538 
While these cases involved Italian licensors and licensees, a court is 
likely to stretch the UCTD to govern consumer contracts between 
European consumers and American companies.  This is even more 
probable after Asturcom Telecomunicaciones, where the ECJ established 
that article 6 of the Council Directive 93/13 rose to the level of European-
wide public policy.  If consumers can submit costs to an impartial body at 
no cost, European courts will likely not object to such proceedings.539 
E.  Fifth Point:  What’s Wrong With Anti-Class Action Waivers 
Class action waivers have the practical effect of denying justice to 
large number of consumers by divesting them of the right to pursue relief 
under state consumer law.  Class actions are, in effect, the keys to the 
courtroom since they enable consumers to curtail unfair and deceptive trade 
practices.  Without class actions, vendors of goods and services may avoid 
judicial process and continue unfair practices with impunity.  Immunity 
breeds irresponsibility in the information-age economy where an increasing 
number of companies are divesting consumers of any remedy by including 
class action waivers in their terms of service.540  Match.com prohibits its 
users from filing class actions, class arbitration, or other representative 
actions or proceedings.541  Tagged’s TOU establishes mandatory arbitration 
as the baseline but does not require them to waive their right to join class 
actions and allows actions in small claims courts: 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, and in lieu of arbitration, either 
you and/or Tagged may bring an individual action against the 
other in small claims court.  Additionally, you and/or Tagged 
 
 538. Id. 
 539. Since 1993, consumers have been able to submit disputes at no cost to the Juntas 
Arbitrales de Consumo, a domestic arbitration body whose role is to supervise consumer 
arbitrations.  GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION 
AGREEMENTS: DRAFTING AND ENFORCING 829 (3d ed. 2010). 
 540.  
A class action by consumers produces several salutary byproducts, including a 
therapeutic effect upon those sellers who indulge in fraudulent practices, aid to 
legitimate business enterprises by curtailing illegitimate competition, and avoidance to 
the judicial process of the burden of multiple litigation involving  identical claims.  
The benefit to the parties and the courts would, in many circumstances, be substantial. 
Vasquez v. Super. Ct. of San Joaquin Cnty., 484 P.2d 964, 968–69 (Cal. 1971).  Without the 
mechanism of class action, a consumer with a small dollar claim will be unable to obtain 
redress for his or her claim. 
 541. Terms of Use, MATCH.COM, http://www.match.com/registration/membagr.aspx (last 
visited June 10, 2012) (“YOU ALSO GIVE UP YOUR RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN A 
CLASS ACTION OR OTHER CLASS PROCEEDING. Your rights will be determined by a 
NEUTRAL ARBITRATOR, NOT A JUDGE OR JURY”). 
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may bring any Claim against the other to the attention of a 
federal, state and/or local government entity, which may elect to 
seek relief against Tagged on your behalf, and/or against you on 
Tagged’s behalf. 
You agree that you and Tagged hereby have voluntarily and 
intentionally waived any and all right to a trial by jury, and 
(except as otherwise specifically provided in this Agreement) any 
and all right to participate in a class action.542 
Match.com, a popular dating networking site, requires that users agree 
to pre-dispute mandatory arbitration covering all disputes except for small 
claims.543  Match.com’s terms of service strip consumers of their right to 
join a class action as a condition of membership:  “[W]hether you choose 
arbitration or small-claims court, you may not under any circumstances 
commence or maintain against Match.com any class action, class 
arbitration, or other representative action or proceeding.”544 
Social networking sites likely include mandatory arbitration clauses 
strategically so that consumers are unable to file class actions.545  
Match.com, the dating website, requires users to enter into a terms of use 
agreement, whether they register or not with the service.546  
VampireFreaks.com requires users to submit to arbitration and waive their 
right to joining a class action.547  Hi5 requires users to submit to pre-dispute 
 
 542. Terms of Service, TAGGED, http://www.tagged.com/terms_of_service.html (last 
updated Sept. 30, 2011). 
 543. The TOUs for Match.com include the following language:  
The one exception to the exclusivity of arbitration is that you have the right to bring 
an individual claim against Match.com in a small-claims court of competent 
jurisdiction.  But whether you choose arbitration or small-claims court, you may not 
under any circumstances commence or maintain against Match.com any class action, 
class arbitration, or other representative action or proceeding. 
Terms of Use, MATCH.COM, http://www.match.com/registration/membagr.aspx (last updated 
Apr. 9, 2012). 
 544. Id. 
 545. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical 
Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 
DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 335 (2007) (arguing that these clauses were included in consumer 
contracts to side-step class actions or aggregate dispute resolution). 
 546. The TOUs for Match.com include the following language:  
By using the Match.com Website, (the ‘Website’) you agree to be bound by these 
Terms of Use (this ‘Agreement’), whether or not you register as a member of 
Match.com (‘Member’).  If you wish to become a Member and make use of the 
Match.com service (the ‘Service’), please read these Terms of Use.  If you object to 
anything in this Agreement or the Match.com Privacy Policy, do not use the Website 
or the Service. 
Terms of Use, MATCH.COM, http://www.match.com/registration/membagr.aspx (last updated 
Apr. 9, 2012). 
 547. Terms of Use and Agreement, VAMPIREFREAKS.COM, 
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mandatory arbitration but retains the right to seek legal remedies for 
itself.548 
Class action waivers are increasingly common in consumer 
transactions such as “credit card agreements, mobile or other telephone 
service, and securities transactions.”549   In AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion,550 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration 
Act (“FAA”) prohibited California from refusing to enforce mandatory 
consumer arbitration clauses that prohibit class actions.551  The U.S. 
Supreme Court decided the issue of “whether the FAA prohibits States 
from conditioning the enforceability of certain arbitration agreements on 
the availability of class-wide arbitration procedures.”552  The Concepcions, 
who were consumers, entered into a cellular telephone service agreement 
drafted by the wireless provider.553  The consumers filed a class action 
against AT&T for falsely advertising a mobile phone discount when, in 
fact, the carrier charged a sales tax on the full retail price of the 
telephone.554 
The Court noted how the AT&T agreement “provided for arbitration 
of all disputes between the parties, but required that claims be brought in 
the parties’ individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in 
any purported class or representative proceeding.”555  AT&T asserted that it 
had the right to make unilateral modifications to the terms of service, which 
it did several times.556  The Court stated that “the clause in § 2 of the FAA 
[Federal Arbitration Act] that requires enforcement of an arbitration 
agreement . . .” does not “preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle 
 
http://vampirefreaks.com/termsofservice.php (last updated Dec. 22, 2007) (stating that 
mandatory arbitration is the exclusive forum for all disputes arising out of the platform and 
requires waiver of class action rights). 
 548.  
Each party shall bear its own costs (including attorney fees) and disbursements arising 
out of the arbitration, and shall pay an equal share of the fees and costs of the ADR 
Provider.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, hi5 may seek injunctive or other equitable 
relief to protect its intellectual property rights in any court of competent jurisdiction.  
Please note that the laws of the jurisdiction where you are located may be different 
from California law.  You shall always comply with all the international and domestic 
laws, ordinance, regulations and statutes that are applicable to your use of the 
Services. 
Terms of Service, HI5, http://hi5.com/terms_of_service.html (last updated Feb. 29, 2012). 
 549. BORN, supra note 539, at 115 (discussing class action waivers in arbitration 
agreements). 
 550. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
 551. Id. 
 552. Id. at 1744. 
 553. Id. 
 554. Id. 
 555. Id. 
 556. Id. 
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to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”557  Concepcion’s 
emblematic principle “is that a state law that prohibits the arbitration of 
claims is preempted by the FAA.”558  The Concepcion Court reasoned that 
it is important that “arbitration agreements [be] on an equal footing with 
other contracts . . . and [that they be] enforce[d] . . . according to their 
terms.”559 
Prior to the Court’s decision in Concepcion, California treated class 
action waivers in arbitration clauses to be unenforceable, as in Gatton v. T-
Mobile U.S.A., Inc., because they are procedurally and substantively 
unconscionable.560  The Gatton court, for example, found that the way 
wireless providers presented the arbitration clause to consumers was 
unconscionable as was its prohibition on consumers filing class actions.561  
In addition, the court found the anti-class action provision to be 
substantively unconscionable since providers such as T-Mobile rarely, if 
ever, will file class actions against their customers.562 
In the wake of Concepcion, Sony recently modified its terms of use 
agreement to include an anti-class action waiver.563  “[C]onsumers must 
waive the right to participate in any class-action lawsuit filed after August 
20, [2011] against the gaming and content delivery portion of Sony.”564  
Consumers may opt out of the class action waiver by sending a written 
letter to Sony’s headquarters.565  In Nelson v. AT&T Mobility LLC,566 a 
California court refused to enforce an arbitration clause with an anti-class 
action waiver where a consumer was seeking an injunction under 
California state law. 
Pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses prohibiting class actions 
strip consumers of their rights.  A forum selection clause is a provision in 
 
 557. Id. at 1748. 
 558. Id. at 1747. 
 559. Id. at 1745 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 560. Gatton v. T-Mobile U.S.A., Inc., 152 Cal. App. 4th 571, 588 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 
2007); see also In re RealNetworks, Inc., Privacy Litigation, No. 00-C-1366, 2000 WL 
631341, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2000) (holding that an agreement that is stored digitally, and 
that cannot be printed or saved in any readily discernible manner, is a “written agreement,” 
and that an arbitration clause is not unconscionable merely because the agreement does not 
draw attention to it). 
 561. Id. at 588 (finding that “evidence of procedural unconscionability is limited,” but 
that the evidence of substantive unconscionability [was] strong enough to tip the scale and 
render the arbitration provision unconscionable”). 
 562. Id. at 586. 
 563. Christopher MacManus, Questioning Sony’s New Class Action Waiver, CNET 
NEWS (Sept. 18, 2011), http://news.cnet.com/8301-17938_105-20107825-1/questioning-
sonys-new-class-action-waiver. 
 564. Id. 
 565. Id. 
 566. Nelson v. AT&T Mobility LLC, No. C10-4802 TEH, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
92290, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2011). 
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which the parties agree on an exclusive forum to settle any dispute arising 
out of the mass-market license agreements.  The U.S. Supreme Court in 
Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute,567 validated a forum selection clause that 
prescribed Florida as the forum for all disputes involving the cruise line.  
The Court reasoned that unless the consumer proved that he or she acceded 
to this provision because of fraud or overreaching, the forum selection 
clause was enforceable, provided the consumer was given notice of the 
provision and an opportunity to reject it.568  The vast majority of U.S. 
courts enforce forum selection clauses even though in the real world few 
consumers appreciate that they are agreeing before the fact to litigate in a 
distant forum.569 
Under the Brussels Regulation articles 15-16, consumers in the 
Eurozone are entitled to have their disputes settled in a local forum, 
because the licensor is in a better position to afford the travel expenses 
associated with the litigation.570  In Ingmar G.B. Ltd. v. Eaton Leonard 
Tech., Inc., the European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that “a principal 
established in a non-member country, whose commercial agent carries on 
his activity within the Community, cannot evade those provisions by the 
simple expedient of a choice-of-law clause.”571  Even though Ingmar was 
decided in a business-to-business context, the principle of advancing EU 
 
 567. 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991). 
 568. Id. (upholding a forum selection clause as enforceable unless the consumers 
“accession to the forum clause” was a product of  “fraud or overreaching” given that they 
had notice of the forum and “therefore, presumably retained the option of rejecting the 
contract with impunity”). 
 569. See, e.g., Koch v. Am. Online, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 690, 695–96 (D. Md. 2000) 
(upholding choice of forum clause requiring all claims against AOL to be adjudicated in 
Virginia);  see also  Forrest v. Verizon Comm., Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1012 (D.C. 2002) 
(similar holding); Am. Online, Inc. v. Booker, 781 So. 2d 423, 425 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2001) (similar holding); Celmins v. Am. On Line, 748 So. 2d 1041, 1041–42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1999) (upholding AOL’s  forum selection clause); Groff v. Am. Online, Inc., No. PC 
97-0331, 1998 R.I. Super. LEXIS 46, at *16 (Super. Ct. R.I. May 27, 1998) (same holding). 
 570. Brussels Regulation, supra note 220, at arts. 15–17. 
 571. Ingmar GB Ltd. v. Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc., Case C-381/98, 2000 E.C.R. 
I-9305.  This case regards the Council Directive on commercial agents, which imposes an 
obligation on the Member States to enact a provision for the indemnification of commercial 
agents upon the termination of their contracts.  In this case, an agent was performing his 
activities in the UK on behalf of a California firm and the law chosen by the parties to 
govern the agency contract was the law of California, which did not include such 
indemnification.  The ECJ stated that: 
[I]t is essential for the Community legal order that a principal established in a non-
member country, whose commercial agent carries on his activity within the 
Community, cannot evade those provisions by the simple expedient of a choice-of-law 
clause.  The purpose served by the provisions in question requires that they be applied 
where the situation is closely connected with the Community, in particular where the 
commercial agent carries on his activity in the territory of a Member State, 
irrespective of the law by which the parties intended the contract to be governed. 
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mandatory provisions such as the Unfair Contract Terms Directive is the 
same.  The ECJ would likely rule that the Unfair Contracts Directive would 
have an extraterritorial effect so not as to evade its mandatory provisions.572  
In France, commentators believe that shrinkwrap licenses can be held valid 
if the user is aware that she is assenting to the terms of the license by 
tearing open the package.573 
However, French Courts will vigilantly police clauses that violate the 
Unfair Contracts Terms Directive.  American-style forum selection clauses 
in business-to-consumer licensing transactions clash with that Directive.  
Article 6.2 provides that  
 
[m]ember States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that 
the consumer does not lose the protections granted by this 
Directive by virtue of the choice of the law of a non-Member 
country as the law applicable to the contract if the latter has a 
close connection with the territory of the Member States.574   
 
U.S. companies can assume that their choice of law and forum clauses are 
unenforceable in the Eurozone. 
F.  Sixth Point:  What’s Wrong With Anti-Reverse Engineering Clauses? 
Proprietary software companies include anti-reverse engineering 
clauses because they regard source code as a trade secret.  Software 
licensors frequently prohibit reverse engineering, a proposition illustrated 
in Nvidia’s license agreement.575  The Reporters for the ALI’s Principles of 
the Law of Software Contracts acknowledge that anti-reverse engineering 
clauses are “troublesome terms.”576  Software licenses frequently prohibit 
reverse engineering so that customers do not work “backward to derive the 
unprotected source code.”577  These prohibitions have been enforced in the 
United States.  The Federal Circuit, for example, upheld a reverse 
 
 572. See Council Directive 93/13, supra note 269, at art. 7. 
 573. Clarisse Girot, La Validité des Licences de Logiciel sous Plastique en Droit 
Francais: les Enseignements du Droit Comparé [Validity of Shrinkwrap Licenses in French 
Law: the Lessons of Comparative Law], 1998 DROIT DE L’INFORMATIQUE ET DES TELECOMS 
[COMPUTER & TELECOMS LAW REVIEW] 7. 
 574. Council Directive 93/13, supra note 269, at art. 6.  Another case illustrating this 
principle is Ingmar GB Ltd. v. Eaton Leonard Tech., Inc., Case C-381/98, 2000 E.C.R. I-
9305.  See supra text accompanying note 573. 
 575. “No Reverse Engineering.  Customer may not reverse engineer, decompile, or 
disassemble the SOFTWARE, nor attempt in any other manner to obtain the source code.”  
License for Customer Use of NVIDIA Software, NVIDIA,  
http://www.nvidia.com/object/nv_swlicense.html (last visited June 10, 2012). 
 576. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 1.09 (2009). 
 577. RUSTAD, supra note 1, at 617. 
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engineering clause in Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc.578 
European courts would not likely enforce anti-reverse engineering 
clauses that prohibited reverse engineering to achieve interoperability 
because of the Software Directive.  In Europe, all users of software have a 
right to reverse engineer code to achieve interoperability of computer 
programs under the Software Directive adopted in 1991.579  Software 
licensors and content creators asserting overly expansive restrictions in 
their licensing agreements are using contract law to infringe basic human 
rights of expression and inquiry. 
G.  Seventh Point:  What’s Wrong With Gag Clauses in Licenses or 
TOUs? 
The English Court of the Star Chamber was synonymous with 
“secrecy, severity and extreme injustice.”580  The licensing of books and the 
prosecution of those who distributed books without a license were the chief 
means of censorship of the press in Sixteenth Century England.581 
When software licensors or other content providers impose restrictions 
on speech, the First Amendment prohibition on prior restraints is not 
applicable since there is no state action.  “No comment” or gag clauses first 
evolved in software licenses.  Software licensors included a clause in their 
agreements that prohibited public comment on benchmark testing of their 
products: 
In one instance, Network World magazine was testing Microsoft 
SQL 7 and found that it ran twice as fast on Windows NT as on 
Windows 2000.  The tester consulted with Microsoft to see if 
there was a setup problem but none was found.  Microsoft then 
threatened legal action based on the DeWitt Clause if the results 
were published.  Network World’s lab director said, “[w]e have 
been intimidated into not going forward with our results because 
we don’t have the pockets to battle Microsoft in court.”  The 
results of  the test were published, removed and then republished.  
Another incident involved a report comparing IBM and 
Microsoft databases that Microsoft forced IBM to remove from a 
web posting.  A favorable report on Microsoft’s Visual C++ was 
almost not published because the writer of the report had 
significant difficulty actually contacting someone for the 
permission required by the EULA.582 
 
 578. 320 F.3d 1317, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 579. Council Directive 91/250/EEC, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42 (EC). 
 580. Daniel L. Vande Zande, Coercive Power and the Demise of the Star Chamber, 50 
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 326, 326 (2010). 
 581. Id. at 332. 
 582. Anthony G. Read, Note, Dewitt Clauses: Can We Protect Purchasers Without 
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Clauses in U.S.-based TOUs that prohibit public criticism of content 
or other information-based products do not violate the First Amendment 
because there is no state action.  A software publisher boldly included a 
clause in its TOU preventing its customer from “disclosing details about 
bugs, defects, and contractual breaches with the press, peers, and user 
groups.”583  The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) 
disfavors gag clauses that attempt to restrain public discussion about 
software or other digital content.584  The UCITA seemingly gives the courts 
discretion to “avoid a result contrary to public policy, in each case to the 
extent that the interest in enforcement is clearly outweighed by a public 
policy against enforcement of the term” though there is no case law 
interpreting this provision.585  The UCITA Standby Committee would go 
even further in prohibiting clauses restricting public comment: 
In a transaction in which a copy of computer information is 
offered in its final form to the general public including 
consumers, a term of a contract is unenforceable to the extent that 
the term prohibits an end-user licensee from engaging in 
otherwise lawful public discussion of the quality of performance 
of the computer information.  However, this section does not 
preclude enforcement of a contract term that establishes or 
enforces rights under trade secret, trademark, defamation, 
commercial disparagement, or other laws.586 
Public policy has rarely been used to strike down terms of service 
even where there has been an extreme imbalance of rights.587  In People v. 
Network Ass’ns,588 New York Attorney General Elliot Spitzer challenged a 
“no public comment” rule in a license agreement.  The software license 
agreement challenged by the state attorney general contained the following 
terms: 
Installing this software constitutes acceptance of the terms and 
conditions of the license agreement in the box.  Please read the 
license agreement before installation.  Other rules and regulations 
 
Hurting Microsoft?, 25 REV. LITIG. 387, 398–99 (2006) (alteration in original) (internal 
footnotes omitted). 
 583. R. “Ray” Wang, Tuesday’s Tip: Software Licensing and Pricing—Now’s The Time 
to Remove ‘Gag Rule’ Clauses in Your Software Contracts, A SOFTWARE INSIDER’S POINT 
OF VIEW (Jan. 27, 2009), http://blog.softwareinsider.org/2009/01/27/tuesdays-tip-nows-the-
time-to-remove-gag-rule-clauses-in-your-software-contracts/. 
 584. UCITA § 105 cmt. 4 (2002). 
 585. Id. § 105(b). 
 586. Report of UCITA Standby Committee, Recommendation 5 (Dec. 17, 2001) 
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucita/UCITA_Dec01_Proposal.htm 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2012). 
 587. See RUSTAD, supra note 1, at 616 (“To date, courts have provided the software 
industry with little guidance as to which terms violate public policy.”). 
 588. People v. Network Ass’n, 758 N.Y.S.2d 466 (2003). 
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of installing the software are: 
a.  The product cannot be rented, loaned, or leased—you are 
the sole owner of this product. 
b.  The customer shall not disclose the result of any 
benchmark test to any third party without Network 
Associates’ prior written approval. 
c.  The customer will not publish reviews of this product 
without prior consent from Network Associates, Inc.589 
 
The New York trial court enjoined the enforcement of “language 
restricting the right to publish the results of testing and review.”590  In the 
past four decades, few courts have challenged gag clauses.  While there is 
no case law on point, it is likely that no court in the Eurozone would 
enforce these clauses.  In the past four decades, few U.S. courts have 
policed clauses that restrict a consumer’s right to freely speak about defects 
in software or content.  However, prohibitions against public comment 
clauses would likely be an unfair practice under the EU Directive on Unfair 
Contract Terms. 
H.  Eighth Point:  The U.S. “Duty to Read” Rule 
The consumer’s duty to read is a well-established principle of U.S. 
contract law.  Courts have gone so far as to hold that even a “justifiable 
reliance standard did not eviscerate a consumer’s duty to read.”591  An 
empirical study of terms of use agreements concluded that only a handful 
of users actually read terms of use or contractual provisions before clicking 
“I accept.”  Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, an associate professor at New York 
University School of Law, presented her research before a U.S. Senate 
Committee hearing on online contracting practices.592  Professor Marotta-
 
 589. Id. at 467. 
 590. Id. at 470. 
 591. Sanford v. H.A.S., Inc., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1221 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (compelling 
a consumer arbitration in a used car sale and financing of the transaction); Mladineo v. 
Schmidt, 52 So. 3d 1154, 1162 (Miss. 2010) (“Thus, the ‘duty-to-read’ and ‘imputed-
knowledge’ doctrines are firmly rooted in Mississippi precedent.”); see also Cherry v. 
Anthony, Gibbs, Sage, 501 So. 2d 416, 419 (Miss. 1987) (“Even if [the insureds] had not 
[read the subject insurance policy], knowledge of its contents would be imputed to them as a 
matter of law.”); Zepponi v. Home Ins. Co.,  161 So. 2d 524, 526 (Miss. 1964) (holding as a 
matter of law that where the insured’s mortgagee required insurance and had possession of 
the subject insurance policy, the insured is charged with knowledge of the terms of the 
policy because he relied on the policy for protection).  Thus, the “duty-to-read” and 
“imputed-knowledge” doctrines are firmly rooted in Mississippi precedent. 
 592. Aggressive Sales Tactics on the Internet and Their Impact on American Consumers: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 2009 Leg., 1st Sess. 24–39 
(testimony of Prof. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Assoc. Professor, NYU Sch’l of Law). 
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Wurgler and two co-authors studied the online browsing behavior of 
greater than 45,000 households for sixty-six major vendors and concluded 
that only one or two consumers in a thousand actually read online 
contracts.593  Moreover, the researchers found that of this miniscule 
number, the average amount of time spent reading the contract was a mere 
twenty-nine seconds.594  The NYU researchers concluded that in their 
sample of clickwrap agreements, the average length of the agreement was 
2,277 words and therefore Internet users could not have read such 
extensive contracts in less than a minute.595 
Professor Marotta-Wurgler and her team contend that the widespread 
practice of post-transaction marketing is deceptive because vendors exploit 
the empirical reality that consumers do not read online contracts.596  
Professor Marotta-Wurgler’s research team explains how vendors construct 
post-transaction offers in deceptive ways lulling consumers into 
complacency: 
Post-transaction marketers often identify their offers as rewards 
or bonuses that the consumers in fact should be grateful to 
receive.  Offers may feature a prominently displayed coupon 
with a title such as “$10 off your next purchase—Good for your 
next Fandango Purchase” or “$10 CASH BACK ON YOUR 
PURCHASE TODAY!”  Fandango is a very popular vendor of 
movie tickets, among other products.  (See for example, Exhibits 
B and C.)  It is natural to imagine that the new offer is part of the 
original transaction. 
The offers also splash relatively larger-font terms around the 
page such as “Congratulations,” “MEMBER REWARDS,” and 
“Thank You . . . Please Complete Your Survey and Claim Your 
Reward.”  These phrases are likely to distract attention from the 
disclosures that explain the new charges associated with the new 
offer.597 
The NYU School of Law researchers also found that online vendors 
deceptively positioned terms so that most consumers would overlook 
them.598  They concluded that post-transaction marketers “should be 
required to identify themselves.”599  They also recommend that the 
marketers improve their disclosures and implement a means for consumers 
to cancel the contract and obtain a refund.600 
 
 593. Id. at 4. 
 594. Id. 
 595. Id. 
 596. Id. 
 597. Id. at 5. 
 598. Id. 
 599. Id. at 6. 
 600. Id. 
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UCITA broadly validates standard-form licenses “only if the party 
agrees to the license, such as by manifesting assent, before or during the 
party’s initial performance or use of or access to the information.”601  
Nevertheless, consumer TOUs are broadly enforceable so long as the 
license satisfies three conditions:  (1) the customer has an opportunity to 
review the terms of the license, (2) the user manifests assent after having an 
opportunity to review the terms, and (3) the actions are “attributable in 
law” to the customer.602  When U.S. companies are doing business in 
Europe, they should remember that Europe has much more rigorous and 
definitive consumer rules than the United States. 
The U.S. approach to TOUs is that consumers’ duty to read is satisfied 
so long as they have an opportunity to view the terms and manifest 
assent.603  Courts in the Eurozone do not enforce TOUs simply because 
they meet the procedural standards of giving a consumer an opportunity to 
review the terms and a method for manifesting assent.  The consumer 
provisions of the Brussels and Rome I Regulations, for example, are non-
waivable.604  Habbo, the social networking site for teenagers, imposes a 
duty on all users to read and review their terms of use on a weekly basis so 
that they may learn of new terms and conditions.605 
While no U.S. court has ruled on the enforceability of a social 
networking sites’ terms of service, the Ninth Circuit in Douglas v. U.S. 
Court ruled that Talk America customers had no obligation to check the 
company’s website “on a periodic basis to learn whether” the company had 
changed them because this was a unilateral modification.606  Moreover, the 
 
 601. UCITA § 209(a). 
 602. Id. § 112, cmt. 2. 
 603. Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981 (E.D. Ca. 2000). 
 604. Article 17 of the Brussels Regulation provides that the mandatory consumer rules 
may not be modified by agreement, except the parties may agree to allow a consumer “to 
bring proceedings in courts other than those indicated in this Section.”  Brussels Regulation, 
supra note 220, at art. 17.1. 
Notwithstanding paragraph 1, the parties may choose the law applicable to a contract 
which fulfils the requirements of paragraph 1, in accordance with Article 3.  Such a 
choice may not, however, have the result of depriving the consumer of the protection 
afforded to him by provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement by virtue 
of the law which, in the absence of choice, would have been applicable on the basis of 
paragraph 1. 
EU Parliament & Council Regulation on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations No 
593/2008 (June 17, 2008) (EC), at art 6(2), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:177:0006: 0016:En:PDF . 
 605. Terms and Conditions—US, HABBO (Oct. 1, 2010, 04:03 AM), 
https://help.habbo.com/entries/278067-terms-and-conditions-us (“You agree to review these 
Terms of Use on at least a weekly basis to be aware of Changes (as defined herein).  Our 
employees cannot change the terms of these Terms of Use except as posted on these 
Services.”). 
 606. Douglas v. U.S.D.C. C.D. Cal., 495 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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court also reasoned that assent could not be predicated upon a consumer’s 
continued use of the Talk America Service, because “assent can only be 
inferred after he received proper notice of the proposed changes.”607 
U.S. courts reason that users have presumptive knowledge of 
browsewrap agreements so long as they are placed prominently on the 
home page.608  The major paradigmatic difference between the United 
States and the Eurozone is that European consumers are protected by 
paternalistic legislation governing TOUs, whereas the United States adopts 
a free market approach.609 
The differences between the EU and the U.S. approaches to TOUs 
reflect different assumptions about the role of government in regulating 
markets.610  In the United States, the skepticism regarding the efficacy of 
government regulation has been growing at the same time that enthusiasm 
for market-driven institutional arrangements has increased.611  Consumers 
throughout the EU have mandatory rights and remedies that are non-
waivable, regardless of whether or not the consumer reads these terms. 
I.  Ninth Point: Inadequate Pre-contractual Disclosures in TOUs 
Europe’s Unfair Contract Terms Directive mandates pre-contractual 
disclosures not found in U.S.-style TOUs.  European consumers need to be 
able to access the terms of a TOU in any online contract classifiable as a 
distance contract.  The software vendor or content provider must minimally 
make terms available in a manner that calls it to the attention of a 
reasonable person.612  Neither shrinkwrap agreements nor box-top licenses 
meet this requirement because they are in effect “pay now and terms later.”  
Shrinkwrap or box-top licenses have been of less significance in recent 
years as software vendors reduce margins by converting to online 
installwraps.  Nevertheless, consumers continue to purchase boxed 
software at large retailers such as CompUSA, Office Depot, and Best Buy.  
For instance, Amazon.com sells business and office software, children’s 
software, Web development tools, tax preparation software, and language 
and travel software.  Consumers can buy boxed software for programs such 
as Adobe Acrobat Professional 9, TurboTax Deluxe, and Quicken on 
websites or in retail stores.  Simply put, shrinkwraps where the consumer 
cannot view the terms prior to payment are invalid in all twenty-seven 
 
 607. Id. at 1067. 
 608. Motise v. AOL, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 2d 563, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 609. See generally Rustad, supra note 217, at 577 . 
 610. Winn & Bix, supra note 213, at 183 (2006). 
 611. Winn & Webber, supra note 350, at 209. 
 612. UCITA § 113 cmt. 2(a). 
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Member States of the EU under the Unfair Contract Terms Directive.613 
J.  Tenth Point:  No Guarantee of a Minimum Adequate Remedy 
The concept of a minimum adequate remedy ensures that licensees or 
users of content have remedies for bad software or content that is the 
proximate cause of economic losses.  The emergent norm is to validate 
TOUs that do not give the user a remedy other than to stop using software, 
content, or a social networking platform.614  UCITA refuses to accept the 
doctrine of the “minimum adequate remedy” and does not provide 
consumers with special protections.615  For example, UCITA reasons that 
an agreed limited remedy provision is enforceable even if it does not afford 
a consumer (or other licensee) a “minimum adequate remedy.”616  The 
consumer’s only tools for challenging TOUs will be on the narrow grounds 
of unconscionability, fundamental public policy, and the issue of mutuality 
of obligation.617  None of these tools is promising in addressing problems 
such as one-sided choice of law and forum clauses. 
Professor Marotta-Wurgler’s empirical study of TOUs found that most 
sellers restrict remedies and completely disclaim consequential damages.618  
 
 613.  
Without prejudice to Article 7, the unfairness of a contractual term shall be assessed, 
taking into account the nature of the goods or services for which the contract was 
concluded and by referring, at the time of conclusion of the contract, to all the 
circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract and to all the other terms of the 
contract or of another contract on which it is dependent. 
Council Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 93/13/EEC (Apr. 5, 1993), at art. 
4(1). 
 614. See, e.g., Terms of Service, MUBI.COM, http://mubi.com/terms_of_service (last 
visited June 10, 2012) (“Therefore, you should review these Terms of Service prior to each 
purchase so you will understand the terms applicable to such transaction.  If you do not 
agree to these Terms of Service, do not make any purchases on the Site or the Social 
Network”).  Additionally, the terms of service for Stickam.com include the following 
language:   
By actually using the Services.  In this case, you understand and agree that Stickam 
will treat your use of the Services as acceptance of the Terms of Service from that 
point onwards.  In the event that you do not agree to the Terms of Service, or any 
changes or modifications thereto, you should not continue to access or use the 
Services provided by Stickam.  In the event that you do not agree to the Terms of 
Service, or any changes or modifications thereto, you should not continue to access or 
use the Services provided by Stickam. 
Terms of Service, STICKAM.COM, http://www.stickam.com/viewUniversal Terms.do (last 
visited June 10, 2012). 
 615. UCITA § 803 cmt. 6. 
 616. Id. 
 617. Id. 
 618. Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 52, at 700 (concluding that in the sample of 647 
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U.S. software companies have no statutory obligation to give consumers a 
minimum adequate remedy, guaranteed under European Law by the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive.  UCITA rejects the doctrine of the minimum 
adequate remedy; it states that “[a]n agreed remedy provision does not fail 
because the court believes that the remedy does not afford a ‘minimum 
adequate remedy.’”619  If a licensee can prove that “performance of an 
exclusive or limited remedy causes the remedy to fail of its essential 
purpose,” he may pursue any other UCITA remedy.620  UCITA’s doctrine 
of the failure of essential purpose is the functional equivalent of Article 2’s 
provision in UCC § 2-719(2).621  Software makers’ limited remedies may 
fail due to their essential purpose.  Similarly, if an exclusive remedy is 
stricken as unconscionable, the aggrieved party may seek any of the 
statutory remedies of UCITA.622  The Reporter’s notes explain that a 
licensee may challenge remedies on grounds of unconscionability, 
fundamental public policy, and for determining whether mutuality of 
obligation exists for a binding contract.623  In the Reporter’s view, this is 
the “floor on what agreed terms are binding with respect to remedies.”624 
Social networking sites use a contracting form that essentially 
deprives consumers of any meaningful remedy.  Facebook, the largest 
social media site, disclaims all responsibility and requires users to assume 
the risk of using their website and its services: 
WE TRY TO KEEP FACEBOOK UP, BUG-FREE, AND SAFE, 
BUT YOU USE IT AT YOUR OWN RISK.  WE ARE 
PROVIDING FACEBOOK AS IS WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS 
OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES INCLUDING, BUT NOT 
LIMITED TO, IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF 
MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 
PURPOSE, AND NON-INFRINGEMENT.  WE DO NOT 
GUARANTEE THAT FACEBOOK WILL BE SAFE OR 
SECURE.  FACEBOOK IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE 
ACTIONS, CONTENT, INFORMATION, OR DATA OF 
THIRD PARTIES, AND YOU RELEASE US, OUR 
DIRECTORS, OFFICERS, EMPLOYEES, AND AGENTS 
FROM ANY CLAIMS AND DAMAGES, KNOWN AND 
 
standard form TOUs that sellers “limit damages by disclaiming consequential, special, and 
incidental damages, or by disclaiming damages for foreseeable loss” and on occasion go so 
far as to “restrict the theories of liability on which buyers can base causes of action against 
them”). 
 619. UCITA § 803 cmt. 6. 
 620. Id. § 803(b). 
 621. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1996) (“Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited 
remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act.”). 
 622. UCITA § 803(c). 
 623. Id. 
 624. Id. § 803 cmt. 6. 
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UNKNOWN, ARISING OUT OF OR IN ANY WAY 
CONNECTED WITH ANY CLAIM YOU HAVE AGAINST 
ANY SUCH THIRD PARTIES.  IF YOU ARE A CALIFORNIA 
RESIDENT, YOU WAIVE CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE § 
1542, WHICH SAYS:  A GENERAL RELEASE DOES NOT 
EXTEND TO CLAIMS WHICH THE CREDITOR DOES NOT 
KNOW OR SUSPECT TO EXIST IN HIS FAVOR AT THE 
TIME OF EXECUTING THE RELEASE, WHICH IF KNOWN 
BY HIM MUST HAVE MATERIALLY AFFECTED HIS 
SETTLEMENT WITH THE DEBTOR.625 
U.S.-style TOUs, such as Facebook’s Terms of Use, do not comply with 
the Unfair Contracts Term Directive because of their total disavowal of 
responsibility and failure to provide a meaningful guaranteed remedy. 
European courts take the position that even if a consumer assents to an 
abusive term, it is unenforceable as a matter of law and European 
consumers, unlike their American counterparts, cannot be hauled into 
distant forums and be divested of mandatory consumer protection.  The 
illustrative cases from Europe highlight diametrically opposed mass-market 
licensing paradigms.  The U.S. market-based approach is antithetical to the 
European paternalistic approach to consumer contracts.  By contrast, in the 
Eurozone, there is a growing acceptance of mandatory consumer rules.626 
The purpose of the EU was to create a seamless body of consumer 
protection, providing certainty for consumers and predictability for the 
business community.  Winn and Weber note how the European 
Commission noted that “[c]onsumer confidence needs to be enhanced if e-
commerce is to achieve its full potential.”627  The European Commission 
contends that e-commerce will increase only if consumers are convinced 
they have a minimal adequate remedy when entering into cross-border 
sales and services.628 
The EU’s harmonized rules for consumer protection enable cross-
border sales.  In addition, the seamless consumer rules enable EU 
consumers to purchase goods and services in the other Member States with 
confidence.  A high level of consumer protection necessitates higher costs 
because merchants, to avoid the liability imposed by the law, must offer 
products more responsive to consumer expectations.  However, the 
 
 625. Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/terms.php?ref=pf (last updated Apr. 26, 2011). 
 626. See Rustad, supra note 218, at 577. 
 627. Winn & Webber, supra note 350, at 211. 
 628. “The [Directive on Consumer Rights] Proposal ensures a high level of consumer 
protection and aims at establishing the real retail internal market, making it easier and less 
costly for traders to sell cross border and providing consumers with a larger choice and 
competitive price.”  Europam Proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights, 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/cons_acquis_en.htm (last visited June 10, 2012). 
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merchants are secure about recovering these costs because a high level of 
consumer protection encourages consumers to buy more new products, 
while by contrast, a low level of consumer protection could decrease the 
number of transactions.  The wedge between European and American 
consumer protection will result in further disputes between U.S. software 
companies and European consumer authorities.629 
CONCLUSION 
Robert Kagan’s article in The Economist entitled “Old America v. 
New Europe,” explodes the naive assumption that Europe is a an old 
continent while America is a mere teenager.630  America’s political system 
is a senior citizen compared to the upstart European Union.  The golden 
age of U.S.-style TOUs may be coming to an end because of the 
increasingly flattened world in which U.S. companies license content to 
European consumers.  The United States is like Mars and Europe like 
Venus when it comes to consumer rights for TOUs.  When it comes to the 
reform of unjust rules such as those enforced in the United States, it will 
not do to simply “let the market solve the problem.”  Europeans recognize 
that there is no freedom of contract when it comes to standard-form 
consumer contracts.  Europe has breached the citadel of regressive software 
licensing practices in enacting community-wide directives and regulations 
to protect consumers against abuses by dominant software companies. 
America is falling behind the European Union in protecting 
consumer’s rights in online transactions.  If the United States wants to 
continue to be competitive in the international arena and continue to sell 
software programs in Europe, it should adopt a more consumer-friendly 
approach.  As a result, the United States should reform the law governing 
software transactions imposing some limits on the terms of shrinkwrap and 
clickwrap licenses.  This Article proposes ten reasons why TOUs must 
change in order to be broadly enforceable in the Eurozone.  The U.S.-style 
TOU is unenforceable in other areas of the world as well.  Japanese 
contract law likely does not recognize the enforceability of shrinkwrap 
agreements, absent proof that the consumer is aware of the license terms 
before purchasing the software.631  Many software publishers print the 
 
 629. See generally Winn & Bix, supra note 213. 
 630. Kagan notes how America’s political system is old as compared to the upstart 
European Union.  The U.S. free market approach to consumer e-commerce relies upon 
private ordering generally taking the form of one-sided clickwrap license agreements that 
disclaim all warranties, meaningful remedies, and require them to litigate in the functional 
equivalent of Siberia.  It may come as a surprise to some e-businesses that European courts 
are not as eager to enforce one-sided choice of law or forum clauses in consumer 
transactions.  Rustad, supra note 218, at 577. 
 631. Tsuneo Matsumoto, Article 2B and Mass Market License Contracts: A Japanese 
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software license on the box, giving consumers the opportunity to read the 
license terms.  Laws have been proposed in Japan that suggest a refusal to 
enforce box-top licenses if the terms are one-sided and unfavorable to the 
consumer.632 
This means that unfair terms cannot be enforceable against the 
consumer even if the opportunity to review the terms and assent is present.  
In a globalized networked economy, U.S. companies must localize their 
TOUs to conform to mandatory consumer rules around the world.  The 
U.S. approach enforces one-sided license agreements deferring to the free 
market.  There are many cases in the United States that illustrate a tendency 
by courts to defer to market-based license agreements that favor the 
dominant party, so long as the consumer has the opportunity to read or 
review the contractual clauses.633  However, the general lesson drawn from 
Europe is that the mere opportunity to review oppressive terms is not 
enough to preordain enforcement.  Software publishers are licensing their 
products in a flattened world.  The stabilization of society through contract 
law requires the adjustment of competing interests.  Since the birth of the 
industry, the law of contracts has been lagging behind the rapidly evolving 
technology.  The law of terms of service is not settled until it is settled in a 
way that is fair to consumers throughout the world.  Greater consumer 
rights in social networking sites is based on reason and tested by the 
European experience. 
 
 
Perspective, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1283, 1284 (1998). 
 632. Id. at 1285. 
 633. See Winn, supra note 213, at 1361 (“[C]ourts reviewing the contracting interfaces 
used by adware distributors in light of current law are unlikely to demand that they make 
clear and explicit disclosures before claiming that consumers have consented to running 
their software.”). 
